University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
2016

Information Heterogeneity and Economic Voting: A CrossNational Analysis
Chia-yin Wei
University of South Carolina

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Wei, C.(2016). Information Heterogeneity and Economic Voting: A Cross-National Analysis. (Doctoral
dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/3847

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Information Heterogeneity and Economic Voting: A Cross-National Analysis
by
Chia-yin Wei
Bachelor of Arts
Shih-Chien University, 1997
Master of Arts
National Taiwan University, 2001
Master of Arts
University of Texas at Austin, 2007

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Political Science
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Carolina
2016
Accepted by:
Fuh-sheng Hsieh, Major Professor
David Darmofal, Committee Member
Charles J. Finocchiaro, Committee Member
Tse-min Lin, Committee Member
Paul Allen Miller, Vice Provost and Interim Dean of Graduate Studies

© Copyright by Chia Yin Wei, 2016
All Rights Reserved.

ii

DEDICATION
Dedicated to my grandparents, parents, my brother, sister, sister-in-law, and
nephews for love, wisdom, and strength.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, my
supervisor, for his patient guidance, continuous encouragement, and constructive
critiques since I entered the Ph.D. program in University of South Carolina. I am also
grateful for encouragement and comments from my committee members: Lee Walker,
David Darmofal, Charles J. Finocchiaro, and Tse-min Lin.
I also thank to research fellows who gave me advice for my work and encouraged
me in Institute of Political Science in Academia Sinica: Yu-shan Wu, Yun-han Chu, Jihwen Lin, Huo-yan Shyu, Chung-li Wu, Fang-yi Chiou, Szu-chien Hsu, Chin-en Wu,
Nathan Batto, Wen-hsuan Tsai, Wen-chin Wu, and Nien-chung Chang Liao. I also
appreciate my colleagues and friends for help, encouragement, and cordial friendship:
Fred Cady, Heather Hawn, Roger Chi-feng Liu, Charles Wu, Mandy Liao, Alex Chienwu Hsueh, Soon Oh, Mariam Dekanozishvili, Juri Kim, Jerry Yi-tzu Lin, Yu-hsien Sung,
Yu-hsiu Lin, Alison Zeng, Yvonne Chen, Wendy Li, Rex Chen, Yi-Hsuan Yang, Irene
Chia-hua Lin, Henry Tseng, Chuan-fa Tang, Feng-yu Lee, Fu-yi Yang, and Hsiao-chi
Hsu.
Finally I very much appreciate supportive help from my beloved family: my
grandmother, my parents, my uncles and aunts, my brother, my sister-in-law, my sister,
my cousins, my nephews and nieces. I could not finish my dissertation without their
incredibly support and love.

iv

ABSTRACT
My dissertation explores the effect of information sources (especially the media)
on retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations and their subsequent
voter choice in comparative perspective. I examine whether the level of democracy and
level of economic development are associated with the effect of information sources on
economic voting across nations. The results indicate that consolidated democracies and
countries with middle income (GDP per capita: $1,000~$9,999) are most strongly
associated with both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations.
However, the level of democracy and economic development are not associated with
voter choice. The comparative case study of Mexico and Taiwan substantiates the claim
that countries with consolidated democracy can have a stronger effect on national
economic evaluations than those with a lower level of democracy. Given that Taiwan has
a higher level of democracy (the polity score of Mexico and Taiwan are 8 and 10 in 2012
respectively), the media effect on economic voting is more influential in Taiwan than in
Mexico.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This research explores how information sources (the media and talking about
politics with others) influence economic voting in comparative perspective and offers a
comparative case study of Taiwan and Mexico. The pioneering study of economic voting
can be traced back to national election studies in the United States, where it has been
demonstrated to be significant (Gomez and Wilson, 2006; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001;
Powell and Whitten, 1993; Chappell, 1990; Erikson, 1989; Fair, 1978; Hibbs, 1977).
Generally speaking, economic voting centers on the relationship between
retrospective/prospective economic evaluations and voter choice. When the U.S.
economy is good, voters reward the incumbent; when the economy is poor, voters are
likely to punish the incumbent and cast votes for the challenger (Fiorina, 1981; Kramer,
1971). Economic voting has been demonstrated to be a significant determinant for voter
choice in the United States.
Outside the United States, however, the significance of economic voting is
controversial, and quite diverse across nations. Take Lewis-Beck’s (1990) research, for
example. He discovered that retrospective national economic evaluation (sociotropic
voting) influences people’s voting behaviors in established democracies such as the
United States, Britain, France, and Italy. In contrast, personal economic evaluation
(pocketbook voting) is not significant in those countries. In addition, some scholars find
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that retrospective national economic evaluation is not salient in most new democracies.
Especially in developing countries, voters do not punish the incumbent for poor economic
performance. One possible explanation is that voters know they “must suffer hard times
in the near future if they are to enjoy prosperity later” (Miller and Niemi, 2002; Weyland,
2002; Stokes, 1996, 2001). In other words, they may still look forward to the economic
prosperity promised by the incumbent and believe he or she will do a good job with the
economy in the future. It seems that economic voting is not necessarily a significant
factor in voter choice in new democracies. Although voters do not blame the incumbent
for the bad economy in new democracies, they are still looking forward to a prosperous
economy in the future and believe the incumbent party will do a good job with the
economy. Does this phenomenon imply that prospective economic evaluation is more
important than retrospective voting in new democracies? What may cause the differences
in the significance of economic voting across countries? Why would this be the case? I
seek to answer these important questions in my dissertation.
Why do information sources (especially the media) possibly play an important
role in economic voting? Dalton(2008) claims that the rise of the media has increased
people’s level of political information and the rise of education has increased voters’
political skills for processing political information in advanced industrial societies.
Hetherington (1996) demonstrates that media consumption has influence on voters’
retrospective national economic evaluation in the United States. In other words, media
consumption may enhance people’s knowledge about the national economic condition,
and in turn people may evaluate the national economic condition according to the
political information provided by the media. Moreover, Mickiewicz (2008) and Moser
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and Scheiner (2012) contend that new democracies have less well-developed media
institutions than established democracies. In this sense, level of democracy may influence
the media effect on economic voting, and it is essential to take the media’s role into
consideration since it is an important source of political information that can heighten
voters’ level of political information about the national economic condition.
The significance of economic voting is controversial and quite diverse across
nations. Is economic voting really associated with level of democracy? This research tries
to establish a general explanation about the relationship between media consumption and
economic voting across countries and attempts to explore whether economic voting varies
with macro-level factors. In other words, I would like to discover whether there is a
nomothetic explanation of the relationship between media consumption and economic
voting globally or if it still varies across countries.
This introduction chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I review the relevant
literature on media effect and economic voting. The theory of media effect is the agendasetting theory in political communication. It mainly explores how the media activates the
salience of the issue among the public, the attributes of the issues, and political behaviors.
The literature on economic voting is mainly individual-level in comparative perspective.
Second, I consider the theory of the effect of information sources on economic voting. In
addition to the media, talking about politics with family members, friends, and colleagues
is also an important information source and is taken into consideration. Level of political
sophistication is the ability of voters to attribute economic conditions to the government
and is discussed in the model as well. The third part of this chapter deals with
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methodology, including hypotheses derived from the theoretical arguments, data,
statistical methods, and variables, etc. The fourth is the chapter outline of the dissertation.
1.1 RELEVANT RESEARCH
Literature researching the media effect and economic voting abounds. The
seminal works are as follows. I review media effect and economic voting separately and
respectively.
1.1.1 Media Effect
Studies of media effect substantiate that mass media can influence public opinion
on current issues. In other words, the media agenda sets the public agenda (McCombs,
2004). Five issues are salient: foreign policy, law and order, economics, public welfare,
and civil rights (Ibid.). Foreign policy and economics usually rank as the most important
issues in terms of both the media agenda and the public agenda. In this sense, media
consumption enhances public attention to economics. In other words, the media can
prime the economic issues (Lenz, 2012; Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; Iyengar and Kinder,
1987; Iyengar et al., 1984). Moreover, the media can also enable us to recognize how we
think about some objects (McCombs, 2004). In other words, the media’s focus on
particular aspects of an issue affects public opinion about the issue. Therefore, the media
can affect how people evaluate the national economic condition. The stimulation of the
debates and evaluation of the issues by the media is called issue framing (Gamson, 1992;
Iyengar, 1991). This is also the second level of agenda-setting, also known as attribute
agenda-setting (McCombs, 2004). J. B. Hester and R. Gibson (2003) demonstrate that the
news media does have a certain amount of influence on people’s national economic
evaluations. More negative coverage of economic news can shape people’s negative
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evaluations of the national economy. Hetherington (1996) also contends that when there
is more negative than positive coverage of economic news, it negatively shapes people’s
national economic evaluation. In this sense, the media not only prime the issue of
economy but also frame opinions of the economy by the public.
In addition, studies of media effect also demonstrate that media can shape
people’s opinions and in turn their behaviors, such as electoral choice (McCombs, 2004).
Baek (2009) contends that the institutional setting of the media, which reduces
information cost, can boost turnout. Sheafer and Weimann’s (2005) study on Israeli
elections and Lenz’s (2012) study on the U.S. presidential election show that media effect
can influence voter choice. Hetherington’s (1996) research on the U.S. presidential
election in 1992 proves that the mass media negatively influences voters’ retrospective
national economic evaluation and that the negative evaluation, in turn, affects their vote
choice. The effect accounts for George H.W. Bush’s defeat in 1992.
The media can also enhance people’s levels of information. Dalton (2008) shows
that the rise of the media can help people acquire more political information since media
(especially television) is a main source of political information in established
democracies. He also claims that the process of “cognitive mobilization” -- the ability to
acquire political information and the ability to process political information -- heighten
people’s level of political sophistication. Compared with established democracies, new
democracies usually have less well-developed media institutions (Moser and Scheiner,
2012; Mickiewicz, 2008). In this sense, there may be less reliable information from the
media in new democracies. Voters usually have a low level of political information, and
their political behaviors, such as voting behaviors, are less influenced by the media (Ibid.).
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Because voters may have low level of political information, their level of political
sophistication will be probably low as well.
It is evident that the media is an important source of information for voters, and
the level of information may be associated with the degree to which the media institution
is established along with the level of democracy. Moreover, voters’ level of information
can affect their level of political sophistication. I therefore surmise that media
consumption and level of political sophistication affect how people evaluate the
retrospective and prospective national economy and in turn influences people’s voter
choice.
1.1.2 Economic Voting
U.S. elections have been a pioneering source for studies on economic voting.
Many have emphasized economic conditions as main determinants of U.S. election
outcomes, especially U.S. presidential elections (Gomez and Wilson, 2007; Nadeau and
Lewis-Beck, 2001; Chappell, 1990; Erikson, 1989; Fair, 1978; Hibbs, 1977). That is, this
body of work shows that the better the economy, the more votes cast for incumbents; the
worse the economy, the fewer votes cast for incumbents (Fiorina, 1981; Kramer, 1971).
Voter choice is based on the economic evaluation in the past, and this is known as the
retrospective national economic evaluation or sociotropic voting.
Some scholars also contend that prospective economic evaluation is an important
determinant for voter choice. If voters believe that a certain party or candidate will do a
good job with the economy in the future, they will vote for that party or that candidate
(Downs, 1957; Achen, 1992). Kuklinski and West (1981) and Lewis-Beck (1988)
demonstrate that prospective national economic evaluation is an important determinant in
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U.S. congressional and presidential elections. Moreover, Mackuen et al. (1992) and
Lockerbie (2008) find that prospective national economic evaluation is more important
than retrospective national economic evaluation in determining voter choice. Similarly,
prospective voting is significant instead of retrospective voting in the 1996, 2000, and
2004 presidential elections in Taiwan (Wan, 2005; Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou, 1998). LewisBeck et al.(2008) claim that retrospective voting is more important than prospective
voting when the incumbent runs for the election; prospective voting becomes more
important than retrospective voting when no candidate runs for the election.
In addition, Fiorina’s (1978) and Markus’s (1988) micro-analyses demonstrate
that pocketbook evaluation (personally better/worse off) can influence voter choice in a
presidential election. Moreover, Markus claims that voters are more sensitive to
sociotropic evaluation than pocketbook evaluation, as is evident in Kinder and Kiewiet’s
research (1979, 1981). However, according to Clarke and Stewart’s (1994) analysis using
an error correction model, both sociotropic evaluation and pocketbook evaluation are
equally crucial.
From these aggregate and individual-level analyses, it is evident that both
sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations are influential on people’s electoral behaviors.
Therefore, I assume such effects as plausible and will construct my model accordingly.
From the comparative perspective on economic voting, Miller and Niemi (2002)
contend that voters in new democracies usually do not punish incumbents when the
economy is in bad shape. In other words, voters vote for the incumbents despite the bad
economy because they recognize they “must suffer hard times in the near future if they
are to enjoy prosperity later” (p. 181). In her case study on Argentina, Stokes (2001) finds
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that voters do not punish politicians when they enact unmandated policies because
outcomes are good; in contrast, voters do not support unmandated policies when
outcomes are bad, as in the Venezuela case. Weyland’s (2002) research on neoliberal
reform in Latin America also demonstrates that people tend to support leaders who enact
drastic reforms in order to recover the status quo when they are suffering from economic
recession such as hyperinflation. In this sense, in new democracies, voters seem not to
blame politicians for a bad economy. They instead support incumbents who enact bold
economic reforms because they are looking forward to future prosperity. It seems that
prospective economic voting is more salient in Latin America than retrospective
economic voting.
Moreover, some pundits contend that party identification and candidate evaluation
are associated with national economic evaluation (Gerber and Huber, 2010; Achen and
Bartel, 2006; Anderson, Mendes, and Tverdova, 2004; Bartels, 2002; Niemi and
Weisberg, 2001). Fiorina (1981) claims party identification is a “running tally” of
retrospective evaluation of political parties and candidates. In addition, Achen and Bartel
(2006) contend that a high level of information can reinforce the influence of party
identification on national economic evaluation. In this vein, it is evident that the level of
political information is also an important determinant of national economic evaluation.
Much research on economic voting in Mexico and Taiwan has been undertaken.
Studies having to do with Taiwan, include Huang’s(1994) study of legislative elections in
Taipei county; Hsieh, Dean, and Niou’s (1998) analysis of the 1996 presidential election;
Wang’s (2002) research on Taiwan’s economic voting from 1996-2001; Wan’s (2005)
research on presidential elections; and Lin’s (2008) research on the 2004 legislative
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elections. As mentioned above, prospective voting is more salient than retrospective
voting in Taiwan’s presidential elections. Despite this, economic voting has not been the
dominant determinant of voter choice in Taiwan; rather, nearly all research on economic
voting in Taiwan demonstrates that national identity is always the most important
determinant of voter choice (Huang, 1994; Hsieh, Dean, and Niou, 1998; Wang, 2002;
Wan, 2005; Lin, 2008; Hsieh and Jang, 2009; Niou and Lacy, 2012).
As to the study of economic voting under one-dominant-party regime, there is
some literature exploring economic voting in Mexico and Taiwan, which both have
experienced a-one-dominant-party system.1 Aldrich and Magaloni (2006) show that
Mexican voters did not punish the incumbent for a short-term economic recession
because they had experienced long-term economic growth under a one-dominant-party
regime. Choi (2010) also finds that the better-educated in Taiwan, who experienced longterm economic prosperity under a one-party regime, did not punish the incumbent KMT
(Nationalist Party or Kuomintang) in the 1996 presidential election for a short-term
economic recession. In contrast, people who had experienced long-term economic
prosperity under a one-dominant-party regime punished the incumbent DPP (the
Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan from 2000-8) in the 2004 presidential election
for a short-term economic recession. Mongenstern and Zechmeister’s (2001) research on
the 1997 midterm election in Mexico finds that risk-acceptant individuals are more likely
to cast a vote for the opposition party when the economy is bad. In contrast, risk-averse
individuals still tended to vote for the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
despite the poor economy, because they were less likely to vote for the opposition party,
which had less experience in office. It is evident that there were quite a few voters in the
1

Both Taiwan and Mexico ended one-party rule in 2000.
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one-dominant-party regime who did not punish the incumbent even though the economy
was bad.
Based on the research questions and relevant literature above, it is evident that the
media can influence how people think about the national economic condition and its
subsequent voter choice. In this sense, I try to connect the effect of information sources
and the economic voting in my dissertation and explore the effect in comparative
perspective. The theory of the effect of information sources on economic voting is
establish as follows.
1.2 THEORY OF INFORMATION SOURCES ON ECONOMIC VOTING
I derived my theory of information sources on economic voting from my research
questions and relevant literature (please see figure 1.1). My theory follows
Hetherington’s (1996) study; I surmise that voters’ level of information can affect their
national economic evaluation and subsequent voter choice. In addition to the main
information source--the media--the other important information source is talking to others
about politics. Hetherington (1996) claims that talking about politics with others provides
important information to voters. In addition, level of education can enhances people’s
ability to process political information. This “cognitive mobilization” can heighten the
level of political sophistication (Dalton, 2008). The level of political sophistication can
affect how voters attribute economic conditions to government (Gomez and Wilson, 2003,
2006). In particular, Gomez and Wilson discover that highly sophisticated voters are
more likely to engage in pocketbook voting. In other words, a high level of political
sophistication may be a prerequisite for those who evaluate government performance
according to their personal economic condition. Godbout and Belanger (2007) replicate
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Gomez and Wilson’s research and find that level of political sophistication is associated
with sociotropic and pocketbook voting when incumbents run for reelection.
It is evident that the effect of economic voting varies across nations. Even within
in a certain nation, it is not necessarily significant across all elections. In some countries,
prospective voting is more important than retrospective voting, while in others,
pocketbook or sociotropic voting is more important. The only possible nomothetic rule is
that, in new democracies, voters do not punish incumbents for economic downturns and
expect economic prosperity in the future (Weyland, 2002; Stoke, 2001; Miller and Niemi,
2002). In other words, in new democracies, voters probably emphasize prospective
evaluation over retrospective evaluation. In addition, in the United States, the effect of
economic voting can be different according to the changing historical context. Powell and
Whitten (1993) contend that macroeconomic factors especially the GDP growth rate and
unemployment rate can affect the vote share of the incumbent party in comparative
perspective. In addition, Lin (1999) in his time-series analysis contends that economic
growth is associated with variations of economic voting in United States. In this sense, I
assume that level of democracy and level of economic development may be associated
with variations of economic voting in comparative perspective.
Media effect may be concerned with level of democracy and level of economic
development as well. Literature of political institution claims that it is essential for
countries to meet a threshold of economic growth and level of democracy in order for
political institutions, such as electoral systems, to produce their expected effects (such as
the number of parties, women’s representation, and minority representation) (Moser and
Scheiner, 2012; Matland, 1998). Established democracies have better-established media
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institutions than those in new democracies. Thus, voters have a higher level of political
information and their voting behavior is affected more by the media (Mickiewicz, 2008;
Moser and Scheiner, 2012). Level of democracy and level of economic development are
therefore associated with voters’ level of political information. People may have high
level of political information in countries with high level of democracy and economic
development.
Summing up, it is still difficult to derive a generalizable explanation of economic
voting given that there are variations of the significant of economic voting both within
nations and across nations. Nonetheless, it has been substantiated that media cannot only
prime but also framing issues and there are some research discovering that information
sources (especially media) can influence voters’ national economic evaluation and its
subsequent voter choice. Based on the arguments that countries should reach the
threshold of level of democracy and level of economic development in order for their
political institutions to have their expected effect and level of democracy and level of
economic development may be associated with variations of economic voting, I articulate
my theory of information sources on economic voting in both cross-national analysis and
the comparative case study as follows.
I surmise that level of democracy and level of economic development are
associated with variations of economic voting. Since it is still difficult to allege whether
pocketbook voting or sociotropic voting is more important than the other, both
pocketbook and sociotropic evaluation are controlled in the voter choice model
accordingly to figure out which one exerts more effect than the other. In addition to
variables of economic voting, media consumption, talking about politics, level of
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education, and level of political sophistication are independent variables which may
influence voter choice. Level of democracy and level of economic development are the
two national level variables. This research expect to explore a nomothetic explanation of
economic voting and make contribution to controversies and debates of economic voting
-- to establish the relationship between level of democracy and level of economic
development and economic voting in comparative perspective. The following section
delineates the model specification.
1.3 METHODOLOGY
My methodology section encompasses data, variables, statistical methods and
model specification, and hypotheses. The model specification of cross-national analysis
and comparative case study are discussed separately.
1.3.1 Data
Both cross-national analysis and comparative case study use individual-level
survey datasets. For cross-national analysis, my data is composed of survey respondents
from first-round national surveys (2003-7) across 58 nations from Global Barometer
(Table 1.1) and 2010 Latino Barometro national surveys from 18 Latin American
countries (Table 1.2).2 The Global Barometer survey data is used to measure
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations.3 The 2010 Latino
Barometro data is used to estimate voter choice because voter choice is only available in
Latino Barometro surveys. Please refer to appendix A for questions used for Global
Barometer and appendix B for questions used for Latino Barometro.

Global Barometer: www.jdsurvey.net/gbs/gbs.jsp ; Latino Barometro: www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp
Global Barometer is composed of national surveys from Asia Barometer, Latio Barometro, Afro
Barometer, and Arab Barometer. The wordings are different for each question, but the meanings are the
same. Please refer to Appendix A to see the different ways of asking respondents for each question.
2
3
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For comparative case study, I use Mexico Panel Studies, including the 1997, 2000,
2006, and 2012 panel studies (Lawson, Chappell et al. 2007).4 Except for the 1997 panel
study which is the Mexico City election, these are presidential election surveys (see
questions in Appendix C, D, E, and F). The last wave of each survey conducted
immediately after Election Day, is used for analysis in order to establish a comparison
with the cross-section datasets for Taiwan. The datasets for Taiwan are from the Center
for Survey Research in Academia Sinica and Taiwan’s Election and Democratization
Study (TEDS) at National Chengchi University (see questions in Appendix G, H, I, J, and
K).5 Post-election independence samples are used. Although TEDS has panel studies as
well, they are quite different from the ones I used for Mexico. Instead of interviewing the
same respondents before and immediately after a particular election, the TEDS studies
interview the same respondents from one election to the next (Wu and Lin, 2012).
Therefore, I chose to use the cross-section data only.
1.3.2 Variables
Because my dissertation contains cross-national study and comparative case study,
there are national-level (level 2) variables and individual-level (level 1) variables.
Answers such as “don’t know”, “forget it”, “decline to answer”, and missing values are
all recoded as missing values. All variables are described in detail as follows.

Senior project personnel for the Mexico panel study include (in alphabetical order): Andy Baker, Kathleen
Bruhn, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Kenneth Greene, Joseph Klesner, Chappell
Lawson (principal investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Alejandro Poiré,
and David Shirk. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-0517971)
and Reforma newspaper; fieldwork was conducted by Reforma newspaper’s polling and research team
under the direction of Alejandro Moreno (http://mexicopanelstudy.mit.edu/).
5
The Taiwan survey datasets were conducted in different institutions. The survey of the 1996 presidential
election was obtained from the Center for Survey Research in Academia Sinica. With the exception of the
1996 survey dataset, all survey data was obtained by TEDS at National Chengchi University, Taipei,
Taiwan.
4
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1.3.2.1 National-Level Variables
Level of democracy (polity score) and level of economic development (GDP per
capita) are national level variables which have been entered manually in the dataset.
Level of democracy is the macro-level variable referring to the polity score for
each country according to the year in which the survey was conducted. The score is from
10 (most democratic) to -10 (least democratic).6
Level of economic development can be explained by the economic index. The
natural log of Gross Domestic Product Per capita (GDP) of each country is used in this
research.7
1.3.2.2 Individual-Level Variables
Voter choice asks respondents who they voted for in the last presidential election.
This is the dichotomous variable in Latino Barometro and in some Mexico Panel Studies
and the TEDS studies if there are only two presidential candidates in the elections. For
Latino Barometro, the voter choice is recoded as a dummy variable (0= the opposition
party; 1= the incumbent party). The voter choice in Latino Barometro is a hypothetical
question which asks respondents which party would they vote for if elections were held
this Sunday (please see Appendix B). For Mexico voter choice and the voter choice in
1996 and 2000 presidential elections in Taiwan, there are at least three presidential
candidates and the voter choice is the nominal one which does not have a unique ordering.
Retrospective economic evaluation asks respondents about the national economic
condition over the last year. This is the dependent variable in measuring the model of
retrospective economic evaluation and it is the independent variable in voter choice.

6
7

Polity score website: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
GDP per capita is from the World Bank website: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
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Prospective economic evaluation asks respondents about future national economic
evaluation compared with current economic evaluation. This is the dependent variable in
measuring prospective economic evaluation and it is the independent variable in voter
choice.
Pocketbook evaluation (personal or family economic evaluation) refers to whether
the respondent is personally better or worse off in the last year or so and is usually used
to measure pocketbook voting. This variable is based on the idea that whether people
think the national economic condition is good or not depends on whether they are
personally better or worse off (Weatherford, 1983; Pomper, 1993; Hetherington, 1996).
In this sense, personal economic evaluation can influence national economic evaluation.
Both retrospective and prospective pocketbook evaluations are included.
For both sociotropic evaluation and pocketbook evaluation, they are ordinal
variables which may range from much worse (-2) to much better (2) or from worse (-1) to
better (1).
Media consumption which is an ordinal variable refers to how much time
respondents spend with television. Hetherington (1996) contends that more consumption
can lead to negative national economic evaluation. His assumptions and findings are
based on the idea that there is more negative news coverage about the national economic
condition on television. In other words, more consumption of negative news coverage
regarding the national economy can influence voters to evaluate national economic
condition negatively. However, it is difficult to explain why more consumption of media
can lead to either positive or negative national economic evaluation since whether there is
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more positive or negative news coverage of the national economy on television is
unknown unless content analysis is conducted.
In order to conquer that challenge, I use a different measurement (variable) in
comparative case study. It asks respondents which television channels or programs they
usually watch. In Mexico, there are two main media networks, Televisa and Televisión
Azteca; they represent 90% of the viewership in Mexico. Televisa is more likely to lean
toward the PRI, while the newer Televisión Azteca network tends to be more sympathetic
toward the National Action Party (PAN). Neither of the two networks is in favor of the
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) (Lawson and McCann, 2005; Venezuela and
McCombs, 2007). In Taiwan, television stations are categorized into two camps
according to their partisan bias: the pan-blue camp (Taiwan Television, China Television,
Chinese Television System, TVBS, Chung-tien Televsion, and ETTV) and the pan-green
camp (Formosa Television and San-lih E-Television) (Lo, 2013). Studies of political
communication in both countries claim that television news is usually the main sources of
information and can affect political behaviors (Lawson and McCann, 2005; Venezuela
and McCombs, 2007; Chen, 2013).
Talk about politics which is also an ordinal variable is interpersonal
communication that serves as an additional important source of political information
(Hetherington, 1996). It mainly asks respondents how often they discuss politics with
family members, colleagues, and friends during election.
Political interests asks how interested are respondents in politics? Political
interests and level of education together are used to be the interaction term in lieu of
political sophistication since items of political sophistication are not available either in
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Global Barometer or Latino Barometro. I assume that people who have a high level of
political sophistication have high interest in politics and have better ability to process
political knowledge they obtain.
Education is the respondent’s highest level of education. It can range from
“illiteracy” to “graduate school” (please refer to appendixes). Scholars contend that level
of education can influence voter ability to attribute responsibility for economic condition
to the government. Therefore, level of education has been demonstrated to be a
significant determinant for national economic evaluations (Gomez and Wilson, 2006;
Choi, 2010).
Political sophistication refers to “incorporating an individual’s level of political
awareness and cognitive integration” (Luskin, 1987). It is a bundle of concepts: to be
concerned about politics, to have political knowledge, and to recognize major positions
on issues and interrelationships between those positions (Gomez and Wilson, 2006;
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991). Gomez and Wilson (2006) claim that individuals
at different levels of political sophistication have different abilities to link problems and
their sources. Voters who are highly politically sophisticated are better able to attribute
responsibility for economic change to the government. Unfortunately, there are no items
regarding political sophistication available in Global Barometer. For cross-national
analysis, I use the interaction term of political interest and level of education (both are
ordinal variables) as an alternative to measure political sophistication.
In comparative case study, there are specific survey questions designed to
measure the political sophistication of respondents in order to allow researchers to
explore political sophistication directly. Respondents may be asked whether they know
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the name of the president and prime minister, the leaders of the main political parties, the
congressional candidates in the respondents’ districts, the number of years in a
congressman’s term, the ruling party of the government, the unemployment rate, and so
on. In the comparative case study of Taiwan and Mexico, I use factor analysis for those
items and take the first factor score in the model.
Party identification asks respondents which political party they feel closest to. In
electoral behavior studies, party identification is always the most important determinant
of voter choice. Party ID is available in Latino Barometro only. It is a dichotomous
variable (1= the incumbent party and 0= the opposition party). In comparative case study,
both weak and strong partisans are recoded as one category. In Mexico, I treat each party
as one dummy variable according to most of studies in Mexico. In Taiwan, I recode party
identification as an ordinal variable according to each party’s position on cross-strait
relationship.
The specific variable in the Mexico case is ideology (left vs. right). In Mexico, the
PAN is the right-wing party and the PRD the left-wing party (Dominguez and McCann,
1996; Hart, 2013).
The specific variable in the Taiwan case is national identity. National identity
refers to people’s attitudes about the relationship between Taiwan and China. As
mentioned before, national identity is an important determinant of voter choice in Taiwan.
Typically the survey question asks respondents whether they prefer independence for
Taiwan, unification with China, or the status quo. The DPP (or pan-green camp) supports
independence while the KMT (or pan-blue camp) occupies the middle ground between
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the status quo and unification. National identity is an ordinal variable from 0
(independence) to 10 (unification).
1.3.3 Statistical Methods and Models
For statistical analysis, my dissertation mainly uses survey data. Given the nested
nature of the data and the violation of the independence assumption, traditional ordinary
least square (OLS) and analyses of variance (ANOVA) data are not appropriate for crossnational analysis. Because the cross-national analysis dataset contains individual
observations nested within nations, I use multilevel models (or hierarchical linear models
and mixed effects models). The fundamental goal of a multilevel model is to examine the
influences of independent variables from several contexts (individual and national levels).
In other words, the goal of a multilevel model is to predict values of some dependent
variables based on a function of a predictor variables at more than one level. Multilevel
data include multiple units of analysis, one nested within the other (Steenbergen and
Jones, 2002).
The multilevel models in my dissertation measure whether the effect of
information sources on national economic evaluation and subsequent voter choice varies
across countries with different levels of democracy and levels of economic development.
In other words, I would like to explore if level of democracy and level of economic
development can exert different effects of information sources on economic voting. Some
research on electoral behavior and democratization argues that level of economic
development and level of democracy are associated with the number of parties and the
level of women’s and minority representation (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005; Coppedge,
1997; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). It is necessary for countries to meet the threshold
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of economic growth and level of democracy for their political institutions, such as
electoral systems, to produce their expected effects, such as the number of parties,
women’s representation, and minority representation (Moser and Scheiner, 2012;
Matland, 1998). In this sense, level of democracy and level of economic development are
highly associated with electoral behaviors, and I assume these effects as plausible and
specify my model accordingly at the national level. I am going to run multilevel ordered
logit models to estimate both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations
and multilevel logit models for voter choice. The basic form of hierarchical linear model
is as follows:
Level 1 (individuals)

𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗

Level 2 (nations)

𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 𝑍𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11 𝑍𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗

Where: i = 1, 2,….., 𝑛𝑗 for the number of individual (level 1) within a given
nation unit (level 2: j = 1,2…., J). Individual i is nested within nation j. 𝑋𝑖 = individual
level variables and 𝑍𝑗 = national level variables
After substituting the Level 2 effects into the Level 1 equation, we obtain:
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = [𝛾00 + 𝛾10 𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾01 𝑍𝑗 + 𝛾11 𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝑍𝑗 ] + [𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗 𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗 ]
Fixed Effects

Random Effects

For my comparative case study of Mexico and Taiwan, I use ordered logit models
for retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation and logit models or
multinomial logit models for voter choice. Multilevel ordered logit models, multilevel
logit models, and models for comparative case study are described in the following
sections.
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1.3.3.1 Multilevel Ordered Logit Models
Multilevel ordered logit models are used to measure retrospective and prospective
national economic evaluations, which are ordinal variables (from -2 much worse to 2
much better). The multilevel ordered logit model, which is an extension of the singlelevel ordered logit model, measures cumulative comparisons of the ordinal response
(Hedeker, 2007). A random intercept cumulative logit model is specified as:
Pr(𝑌 ≤𝑐)

log [Pr(𝑌 𝑖𝑗>𝑐)] = logit(𝛾𝑐𝑖𝑗 ) = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗 c =1, …C-1
𝑖𝑗

Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the ordinal outcome for individual i in group j and 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is an
individual-level explanatory variable. 𝑢𝑗 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢2 ) is the level 2 random effect or
residual (Steele, 2011).
The multilevel ordered logit model for retrospective and prospective national
economic evaluations (with intercept only) is specified as:
Level 1 Let 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑐 = 𝑃𝑟 (𝑌𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑐)
𝑃

log [1−𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑐 ] = 𝑟𝑐 − [𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗 ) +
𝑖𝑗𝑐

𝛽2𝑗 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗 )+𝛽3𝑗 (𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽4𝑗 (𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽5𝑗 (𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑗 ) +
𝛽6𝑗 (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽7𝑗 (𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 ) ] (c=1, …, C-1) (1)
Level 2

𝛽𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + µ𝑖𝑗

(1a)

Where: i = 1, 2, …., 7𝑗 level 1 units nested within j = 1, 2, ….., J level 2. 𝛾𝑖𝑗 is a
fixed intercept and µ𝑖𝑗 is a random intercept. 𝑢𝑗 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢2 ) is the level 2 random effect or
residual. The model with C-1 strictly increasing model thresholds 𝛾𝑐 (i. e. , 𝑟1 < 𝑟2 … . <
𝑟𝑐−1 ).
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Then the random coefficient model (e.g., group variable: polity score) in level 2 is
as follows (equation 2 is the same as equation 1):
𝑃

Level 1 log [1−𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑐 ] = 𝑟𝑐 − [𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗 ) +
𝑖𝑗𝑐

𝛽2𝑗 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗 )+𝛽3𝑗 (𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽4𝑗 (𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽5𝑗 (𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑗 ) +
𝛽6𝑗 (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽7𝑗 (𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 )] (c=1, …, C-1) (2)
Level 2 𝛽𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖1 (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗 ) + µ𝑖𝑗 (2a)
The random coefficient model which allows the intercept and slope (polity score)
to vary across nations assumes that the random intercept and slope are independent across
nations and independent of the covariates 𝑥𝑖𝑗 . Also the random intercept and slope have a
bivariate normal distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix shown as follows
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012):
𝜓
Ψ = [ 11
𝜓21

𝜓12
]
𝜓22

𝜓21 = 𝜓12 = 0

The likelihood ratio test which compares the random intercept model with the
random coefficient model can demonstrate which model is more appropriate than the
other. If the test is significant (the asymptotic p-value <.05), the random coefficient
model is more appropriate. The likelihood ratio test can also compares the random
coefficient model (with uncorrelated variance) with the random coefficient model (with
correlated variance). If the test is significant, the random coefficient model with
uncorrelated variance is rejected in favor of the random coefficient model with correlated
variance.
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1.3.3.2 Multilevel Logit Models
In models of voter choice, the retrospective and prospective economic evaluations
are added in the models as independent variables. Voter choice is a dichotomous variable
in which the incumbent party is coded 1 and the opposition party is coded 0. The
multilevel logit model of voter choice is written in terms of the log odds of the
probability of voting for the incumbent party (the answer is 1), which is denoted 𝑝𝑖𝑗 =
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1). In addition, the question of party identification is available in Latino
Barometro and is added in the model. In the same way as voter choice, party
identification is a dichotomous variable (incumbent party = 1, opposition party = 0). The
two-level random slope model (with intercept and slope varying only) is as follows:
𝑃

Level 1 log{1−𝑃𝑖𝑗 } = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗 ) +
𝑖𝑗

𝛽2𝑗 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑗 )+𝛽3𝑗 (𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽4𝑗 (𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽5𝑗 (𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑗 ) +
𝛽6𝑗 (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽7𝑗 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽8𝑗 (𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑗 ) +
𝛽9𝑗 (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛽10𝑗 ((𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛾𝑖𝑗 (3)
Level 2 𝛽𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + µ𝑖𝑗

(3a)

Where: i = 1, 2, …., 10𝑗 level 1 units nested within j = 1, 2, ….., J level 2. 𝛾𝑖𝑗 is
a fixed intercept and µ𝑖𝑗 is a random intercept. 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 is the level 2 variable.
The likelihood ratio tests are conducted for multilevel logit models to compare the
random intercept model with random slope model and compare the random slope model
with uncorrelated variance with the model with correlated variance to figure out which
model is more appropriate than the others.
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1.3.3.3 Models in the Comparative Case Study
The ordered logit models are used to estimate retrospective and prospective
national economic evaluations. Ordinal responses in ordered logit model assumes that the
intervals between adjacent categories are equal (Long, 1997). In addition, ordered logit
model which specifies the cumulative probability of a response is in a higher category
than s, given a covariate 𝑥𝑖 , be structured as
Pr(𝑦𝑖 > s|𝑥𝑖 ) = F(𝛽2 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑘𝑠 )

s=1, ……., S-1

F(．) is a standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the ordered
logit model. Then the probability for a specific category s can be specified as (RabeHesketh and Skrondal, 2012):
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = s|𝑥𝑖 ) = Pr(𝑦𝑖 > 𝑠 − 1|𝑥𝑖 ) − Pr(𝑦𝑖 > s|𝑥𝑖 ) = 𝐹(𝛽2 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑘𝑠−1 ) − 𝐹(𝛽2 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑘𝑠 )
The multinomial logit models and logit models are used to estimate voter choice.
The nominal variable is a categorical variable which is not ordered or does not have a
unique ordering. In this sense, the multinomial logit models measure elections which
have at least three candidates. In the case of s candidates which is usually coded 1, 2, …,
S ), the probability of category s is specified as (Ibid.):
[𝑠]

Pr(𝑦𝑖 = s|𝑥𝑖 ) =

[𝑠]

exp(𝛽1 +𝛽2 𝑥𝑖 )
[𝑐]

[𝑐]

1+exp(𝛽1 +𝛽2 𝑥𝑖 )

s=1, 2, ……, S

Where the index c takes the values (1, 2, …., S) to produce the required s terms in
the sum in the denominator. The coefficients display log odds-ratios for the odds of each
category versus the baseline category (Ibid.). In other words, multinomial logit models
can be regarded as simultaneously estimating binary logits (probits) for all possible
combinations of responses. For example, multinomial logit models with three categories
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(1, 2, 3) are similar to simultaneously measuring three logit models (e.g. estimating three
combinations: 1 vs. 2, 1 vs. 3, and 2 vs. 3).
The logit model which estimates elections which have only two candidates;
therefore, the outcome should be dichotomous. In contrast to linear regression which the
expectation of the response is modeled as a linear function ( E(𝑦𝑖 |𝑥𝑖 ) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑥𝑖 ) of the
covariates, the expectation of a dichotomous response (0 or 1) is just the probability that
the answer is 1. The nonlinear function is specified as follows (Ibid.):
E(𝑦𝑖 |𝑥𝑖 ) = Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖 ) = ℎ(𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑥𝑖 )
Where h is the inverse logit function of the linear predictor.
The models for Mexico and Taiwan are as follows:
1.3.3.3.1 Mexico Case
The ordered logit models for both retrospective and prospective national economic
evaluation for Mexico are specified as follows:
logit [Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 > s|𝑥𝑖 )] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 +
𝛽3 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 + 𝛽5 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽7 𝑃𝑅𝐼 + 𝛽8 𝑃𝐴𝑁 + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑅𝐷 +
𝛽10 𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
Since there have been three main parties (PRI, PAN, and PRD) in 1997 Mexico
city election and presidential elections, I use multinomial logit models to measure voter
choice in Mexico. The multinomial logit models for voter choice in Mexico are specified
as:

Pr(𝑦𝑖 = s|𝑥𝑖 ) =

exp(𝛽[1𝑠] + 𝛽[2𝑠] 𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽[3𝑠] 𝑥3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽[12𝑠] 𝑥12𝑖 + 𝛽[13𝑠] 𝑥13𝑖 )

∑3𝑐=1 exp(𝛽[1𝑐] + 𝛽[2𝑐] 𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽[3𝑐] 𝑥3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽[12𝑐] 𝑥12𝑖 + 𝛽[13𝑐] 𝑥13𝑖 )
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S=1, 2, 3 Where 𝑥2𝑖 is retrospective national economic evaluation, 𝑥3𝑖 is
prospective national economic evaluation, 𝑥4𝑖 is talking about politics, 𝑥5𝑖 is media
consumption, 𝑥6𝑖 is ideology, 𝑥7𝑖 is retrospective pocketbook evaluation, 𝑥8𝑖 is
prospective pocketbook evaluation, 𝑥9𝑖 is level of education, 𝑥10𝑖 is political
sophistication, and 𝑥11𝑖 , 𝑥12𝑖 , and 𝑥13𝑖 are the party identification (PRI, PAN, and PRD)
dummies. The index c takes the values (1, 2, …., S) to produce the required s terms in the
sum in the denominator.
1.3.3.3.2 Taiwan Case
The ordered logit models for both retrospective and prospective national economic
evaluation for Taiwan are specified as follows:
logit[Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 > s|𝑥𝑖 )] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 +
𝛽3 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘 + 𝛽7 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷
Since there were four presidential candidates in 1996 presidential election and
three candidates in 2000 presidential election, the multinomial logit models are used to
estimate voter choice in 1996 and 2000. The multinomial logit models are specified as
follows (take the 1996 presidential election for example):

Pr(𝑦𝑖 = s|𝑥𝑖 ) =

exp(𝛽[1𝑠] + 𝛽[2𝑠] 𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽[3𝑠] 𝑥3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽[10𝑠] 𝑥10𝑖 + 𝛽[11𝑠] 𝑥11𝑖 )

∑4𝑐=1 exp(𝛽[1𝑐] + 𝛽[2𝑐] 𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽[3𝑐] 𝑥3𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽[10𝑐] 𝑥10𝑖 + 𝛽[11𝑐] 𝑥11𝑖 )

S=1, 2, 3, 4 Where 𝑥2𝑖 is retrospective pocketbook evaluation, 𝑥3𝑖 is prospective
pocketbook evaluation, 𝑥4𝑖 is retrospective national economic evaluation, 𝑥5𝑖 is
prospective national economic evaluation, 𝑥6𝑖 is level of education, 𝑥7𝑖 is political
sophistication, 𝑥8𝑖 is media consumption, 𝑥9𝑖 is talking about politics, 𝑥10𝑖 is party
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identification, and 𝑥11𝑖 .is national identity. The index c takes the values (1, 2, …., S) to
produce the required s terms in the sum in the denominator.
The logit models for 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections in Taiwan are
specified as follows:
logit {Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖 )}
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2𝑖 + 𝛽3 RetroPocketbook 3𝑖 + 𝛽4 ProsPocketbook 4𝑖
+ 𝛽5 Media5𝑖 + 𝛽6 Political sophistication6𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑘7𝑖
+ 𝛽8 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦8𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐼𝐷9𝑖
+ 𝛽10 Retrospective evaluation10𝑖 + 𝛽11 Prospective evaluation11𝑖
1.3.4 Hypotheses
My hypotheses are based on the theory of information sources on economic
voting in 1.2. The media institution is more well-established in established democracies
and it is necessary for level of democracy and level of economic development to meet the
minimum threshold for political institutions to produce the expected results. In this sense,
voters in established democracies are better informed and their voting behaviors are more
affected by the media than those in countries with low level of democracy and economic
development (Matland, 1998; Mickiewicz, 2008; Moser and Scheiner, 2012). Hypotheses
for cross-national analysis and comparative case study are as follows.
1.3.4.1 Cross-National Analyses
The hypothesis for multilevel ordered logit model:
The level of democracy and level of economic development can impose strong
influence on retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations across
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countries. In particular, countries with higher level of democracy and higher level of
economic development can have stronger effect on national economic evaluations.
The hypothesis for multilevel logit model:
The level of democracy and level of economic development can exert significant
effects on voter choice across countries. In particular, countries with higher level of
democracy and higher level of economic development can produce stronger effect on
voter choice.
1.3.4.2 Comparative Case Study
I hypothesize that the media may not have any influence on economic voting
before 2000, when the media and political systems were not entirely open and free in
both countries. Even after 2000 the media institutions may still be less developed, and
thus the media might not have influenced economic voting between 2000 and before the
second change of party in government and in opposition. After the second change of
party in government and in opposition, the media can better influence economic voting
since the media and political institutions are totally free and open.
Here are hypotheses for Mexico case:
Hypothesis I: The media did not have any influence on economic voting in the
1997 Mexico City election, in which the media and political systems were still not totally
open and free.
Hypothesis II: The media effect on economic voting may not be significant in
either 2000 or 2006 since the media institutions were still not entirely developed.
Hypothesis III: The media can influence economic voting in 2012 since the media
system was well established.
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Here are hypotheses for Taiwan case:
Hypothesis I: The media did not influence economic voting in 1996, in which the
media and political systems had not been totally open and free yet.8
Hypothesis II: The media effect on economic voting may not be significant in 2000
and 2004 either since the media institutions were still developing.
Hypothesis III: The media influenced economic voting in 2008 and 2012 because
the political and media systems were free and open and were well-established.
1.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter 1 is the research design of this dissertation, including research questions,
literature review, the theory of information sources on economic voting, methodology,
hypotheses, and chapter outline. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are cross-national analyses using
multilevel models. Chapter 2 explores the effect of information sources on retrospective
national economic evaluation. I run ordered logit models for each country before running
multilevel ordered logit models to compare them with multilevel models and demonstrate
that macro-level effect is significant and it is essential to measure the effect of
information sources on retrospective national economic evaluation by multilevel ordered
logit models. The random intercept and random coefficient models are measured first.

In Taiwan, most newspapers and TV news stations have partisan bias, and people’s partisanship can affect
their choices (Lo et al., 1998; Lo and Huang, 2000; Lo, 2013). The questions asked “which newspaper do
you usually read or TV news channel do you usually watch?” It depends on which question is available in
the survey. The media consumption in 1996 and 2004 asked respondents “which newspaper do you usually
read?” In 1996, there was no pan-green news TV channel so I chose the question of newspaper for analysis.
In 2004, the TEDS survey did not ask a question about news TV channels. For the elections in 2000, 2008,
and 2012, I used the TV news channel which respondents usually watched. Generally speaking, there are
two categories: pro-KMT (blue camp) and pro-DPP (green camp). I categorized TV stations and
newspapers into two groups (pan-blue camp and pan-green camp). For TV stations, the pro-blue camp
includes TVBS, Era Communication, TTV, China TV (CTV), Chinese Television System (CTS), ETTV,
and Chungtien Television (CTT); the pro-green camp includes Formosa TV (FTV) and Sanlih E-televison
(SET). For newspapers, the pro-blue camp includes China Times, United Daily, Central Daily News (CD
News), and Chinese Daily; the pro-green camp includes Liberal Times, the Commons Daily, Taiwan Times,
and the Independent Daily News.
8
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Then the subset of Polity score and GDP per capita dummies are estimated. Chapter 3
focuses on the effect of information sources on prospective economic evaluation. The
procedure is the same as chapter 2. I run ordered logit models first and then multilevel
models. Chapter 4 focuses on the effect of information sources on voter choice.
Retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations are added as independent
variables to estimate voter choice. Similar to chapter 2 and chapter 3, I run logit models
for each country before running multilevel logit models to verify that it is necessary to
use multilevel logit models to estimate the effect of information sources on voter choice.
Then I proceed to examine the random intercept and random slope models and the subset
of Polity score and GDP per capita dummies.9 The subset of polity score and GDP per
capita dummies in Chapter 2, 3, and 4 can help to discover which level of democracy and
level of economic development explain the between-country variance on national
economic evaluations and voter choice. Chapter 5 is the comparative case study of
Mexico and Taiwan. I first explain why it is important to do a comparative case study.
Then I analyze the Mexico and Taiwan cases, respectively. Chapter 6 is the conclusion of
the dissertation. In addition to briefly summarizing the findings of the previous chapters, I
also discuss the limitations of this research and the relevant promising issues that deserve
further exploration in the future.

9

Please refer to Leckie (2010) for the subset of categorical dummies in multilevel models.
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Table 1.1 Countries in Global Barometer with Level of Democracy and Level of Economic Development (2003-2007)
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Country
Japan
Hong Kong
Korea
China
Mongolia
Philippines
Taiwan
Thailand
Indonesia
Singapore
Vietnam
Cambodia
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Costa Rica
Chile
Ecuador
El Salvador

Polity Score
10
8
-8
10
8
10
-5
8
-2
-7
2
8
8
8
7
10
9
6
7

Income
H
group
H
H
M
M
M
H
M
M
H
L
L
M
L
M
M
M
M
M
M

Country
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Benin
Botswana
Cape Verde
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia

Polity Score
8
7
8
8
9
8
9
10
6
6
8
10
8
8
8
7
6
7
6
6

Income
M
group
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
L
M
M
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
M

Country
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Bangladesh
India
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Jordan
Palestine
Algeria
Morocco
Kuwait
Lebanon

Polity Score
4
8
9
-1
-1
5
-4
6
9
-6
-5
5
-2
2
-6
-7
7

Income
L
group
L
M
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
M
M
L
M
M
H
M

1. H: high income (GDP per capita＞＝10,000 USD); M: middle income (GDP per capita: 1,000~9,999 USD); L: Low income (GDP
per capita<1,000 USD)

Table 1.2 Countries in Latino Barometro with Level of Democracy and Level of
Economic Development (2010)
Country

Polity Score

Income group

Argentina

8

MU

Bolivia

7

ML

Brazil

8

H

Colombia

7

MU

Costa Rica

10

MU

Chile

10

H

Ecuador

5

ML

El Salvador

8

ML

Guatemala

8

ML

Honduras

7

ML

Mexico

8

MU

Nicaragua

9

ML

Panama

9

MU

Paraguay

8

ML

Peru

9

MU

Uruguay

10

H

Venezuela

1

H

Dominican Republic

8

MU

1. H: high income (GDP per capita＞＝10,000 USD); MU: upper middle income (GDP
per capita: 5,000~9,999 USD); ML: lower middle income (GDP per capita:
1,000~4,999 USD)
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Individual-level Variables

Country-level Variables

Level of Democracy
Retrospective/Prospective
Pocketbook Evaluation

Level of Economic Development

Retrospective/Prospective
National Economic Evaluation
Education
34

Media Consumption
Talk about Politics
Political Sophistication
Education
Party Identification

Figure 1.1: Framework of cross-national analysis of information sources on economic voting

Voter Choice

CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION SOURCES ON RETROSPECTIVE
NATIONAL ECONOMIC EVALUATION
This chapter explores the effect of information sources on retrospective national
economic evaluation in comparative perspective by using multilevel modeling. First, I
run single-level ordered logit models for each country to discover differences among
countries. I then run multilevel ordered logit models. Two-level random intercept and
two-level random slope models are estimated and interpreted to see the country-level
effect. The models analyze how much level of democracy and level of economic
development can influence retrospective national economic evaluation. The third and the
fourth parts of the chapter further analyze the two-level random coefficient models, and
level of democracy and level of economic development are explored respectively. In
particular, level of democracy and level of economic development are treated as
categorical to estimate what levels explain the between-country variance more than others.
In other words, random coefficients on a subset of polity score and GDP per capita
dummies are estimated to discover which level of democracy and level of economic
development can have the strongest effect on retrospective national economic evaluation.
Finally, I conclude with an assessment of the effect of information sources on
retrospective national economic evaluation. I contend that consolidated countries and
countries with medium GDP per capita have the most substantive effect on retrospective
national economic evaluation.
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2.1 SINGLE-LEVEL ORDERED LOGIT MODELS IN EACH COUNTRY
Table 2.1 presents ordered logit models of the effect of information sources on
retrospective national economic evaluation for each country.10 The media effect on
retrospective national economic evaluation is not necessarily statistically significant in all
countries, although coefficients in most countries are negative. In other words, watching
more television leads respondents to believe national economic condition has become
worse over the past year. Talk about politics with others is not statistically significant
except in Brazil, Guatemala, Panama, Lesotho, and South Africa. The effect is different
across those five countries as well; the relationship can be positively or negatively
correlated. Retrospective pocketbook evaluation is positively correlated with
retrospective national economic evaluation in all countries. When people believe they
have personally become better off over the past year, they are more likely to believe
national economic condition has also become better over the last year. However, the
influence of prospective pocketbook evaluation is quite different from that of
retrospective pocketbook evaluation. Prospective pocketbook evaluation is less influential.
It is not significant in every country. The other three variables -- education, political
interest, and political sophistication (the interaction between education and political
interest) -- are less influential.
With the exception of retrospective pocketbook evaluation, which has the most
substantive effect on retrospective national economic evaluation, the effect of information
sources is quite different across countries. It is difficult to derive a general rule about the

A total of 23 countries (districts) are not included in the single-level ordered logit models in table 2.1
because of missing values in some variables. They are Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, China, Mongolia,
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, Bangladesh, India, Nepal,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Palestine, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, and Lebanon.
10
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effect of information sources on retrospective national economic evaluation when only
ordered logit models for each country are estimated. I wonder whether level of
democracy and level of economic development can account for these differences across
countries. As I mentioned in the first chapter, traditional ordinary least square (OLS) and
analyses of variance (ANOVA) data are not appropriate for cross-national analysis
because individual observations are nested within each country and the independence
assumption is violated. Because the cross-national analysis dataset contains individual
observations nested within nations, multilevel models (also known as hierarchical linear
models and mixed effects models) are more appropriate for estimating the effect of
information sources on retrospective national economic evaluation on both the individual
and the national level.
2.2 MULTILEVEL ORDERED LOGIT MODELS
Table 2.2 presents multilevel models of retrospective national economic
evaluation. I run one random intercept model (model 1) and five random slope models
(models 2 through 6). The interpretation of the six multilevel models is as follows.
2.2.1 Random Intercept Model
Model 1 is a random intercept model, which allows the model intercept to vary
randomly across countries. For fixed effects coefficients, retrospective and prospective
pocketbook evaluation, media consumption, and talking about politics with others are
individually significant. When respondents positively evaluated their past and future
personal economic evaluation, they were more likely to believe national economic
condition had become better over the past year. The more time they spent watching
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television, the more negatively they tended to view retrospective national economic
condition.
Figure 1 presents the effects of media consumption on retrospective national
economic evaluation by each country on fixed effect. The figure shows that more media
consumption does not increase the probability of positive retrospective national economic
condition. In contrast to media consumption, talking more about politics with others leads
to positive retrospective national economic evaluation. The intercept variance is 0.291.
The likelihood ratio statistic with a corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that there is
between-country variance across countries. In other words, the variation of retrospective
national economic evaluation can be attributed to between-country factors.
2.2.2 Random Slope Models (Models 2 thorough 6)
The random intercept model in model 1 shows significant between-country
variance in retrospective national economic evaluation. Models 2 through 6 are random
slope models, which allow the effects of level of democracy (polity score) and level of
economic development (GDP per capita) to vary across nations. Models 3 and 5 allow the
random intercepts and slopes to co-vary (as opposed to the default, in which they are
uncorrelated).
2.2.2.1 Random Coefficients of Polity Score (Models 2 and 3)
Model 2 is a random slope model that allows polity score to vary across countries.
There is no difference in the fixed effects coefficients and standard errors in models 1 and
2. In model 2, the intercept variance is the same as in model 1, and the random coefficient
of polity score is close to zero. Apparently, polity score does not explain much of the
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variance across countries. In other words, level of democracy in general may have little
influence on retrospective national economic evaluation.
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. Most of the fixed
effects coefficients are the same as those in model 2. The coefficients of prospective
pocketbook evaluation and political sophistication change slightly, but only prospective
pocketbook evaluation is individually significant. The between-country variance as a
function of polity score is as follows:
2
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢8𝑗 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 ) = var(𝑢0𝑗 ) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗 𝑢8𝑗 )𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢8𝑗 )𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗
2
= 0.024 − 0.10 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 0.09 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗

Figure 2.2 shows the graph of the between-country variance as a function of
polity score. The between-country variance increases rapidly as a function of polity score.
The likelihood ratio test can determine whether polity score can explain any of the
between-country variance of the effect of information sources on retrospective national
economic evaluation. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model
2 is nested within the correlated equation model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). It
implies that the correlated variance model (model 3) is not necessarily more appropriate
than the uncorrelated variance model (model 2). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test
(assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation
model 3) is also not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). The two likelihood ratio tests confirm
that the random effect for polity score is not significant and does not account much for
between-country variance of retrospective national economic evaluation.
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2.2.2.2 Random Coefficients of GDP per Capita (Models 4 and 5)
Model 4 is a random slope model that allows GDP per capita to vary across
countries. Compared with model 1, only fixed effects coefficients of prospective
pocketbook evaluation and political sophistication change slightly. The intercept variance
in model 4 is close to zero, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita is 0.313. That
indicates that GDP per capita probably explains some of the variance across countries.
Model 5 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects
coefficients are the same as those in model 4. The intercept variance of model 5 (0.006) is
greater than that in model 4, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita increases from
0.313 to 0.978. The between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita is as
follows:
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢9𝑗 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 ) = var(𝑢0𝑗 ) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗 𝑢9𝑗 )𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢9𝑗 )𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗2
= 0.006 − 0.154 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 0.978 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗2
Figure 2.3 is the between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita. The
between-country variance shows a linear increase as GDP per capita increases.
Nevertheless, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 4 is
nested within the correlated equation model 5) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). It
implies that the correlated variance model (model 5) is not necessarily more appropriate
than the uncorrelated variance model (model 4). In addition, the likelihood ratio test
(assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation
model 5) is also not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). The two likelihood ratio tests
demonstrate that the random effect of GDP per capita is not significant, and GDP per
capita does not explain much between-country variance.
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2.2.2.3 Random Coefficients of Polity Score and GDP Per Capita (Model 6)
Model 6 allows both polity score and GDP per capita to vary across nations. The
fixed effects coefficients remain the same as those in model 1. Neither of those is
individually significant. The intercept variance is 0.053. The random coefficient of polity
score is approximate to zero, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita is 0.004.
Although the likelihood ratio tests of the previous models indicate that polity score and
GDP per capita do not explain much between-country variance, the random coefficients
of polity score and GDP per capita in model 6 indicate that GDP per capita probably
explains more variance across countries than polity score.
2.3 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF POLITY SCORE DUMMIES
It seems that level of democracy does not explain much of between-country
variance on retrospective national economic evaluation, given that the random coefficient
of polity score is approximate to zero and the intercept variance is the same as that in the
random intercept model in model 1. Because this research surmises level of democracy
can impose strong influence on retrospective national economic evaluation, I wonder
whether countries with higher levels of democracy exhibit more variance than those with
lower levels. Although the likelihood ratio tests indicate that polity score does not explain
much between-country variance, figure 2.2 shows that the between-country variance as a
function of polity score increase steeply as polity score increases. It is highly possible that
between-country variance may be different in countries with higher levels of democracy.
In order to explore this effect, random coefficients on a subset of polity score dummies
are estimated. The subset of polity score dummies includes polity 5 (score: 10), polity 4
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(score: 6~9), polity 3 (score: 1~5), polity 2 (score: -5~0), and polity 1 (score: -10~6).11
Three models are interpreted. The first is a random intercept model with polity dummies
in the fixed effects. The second adds the random coefficients of polity 5. The third adds
the random coefficients of polity 5 along with correlated variance.
2.3.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of Polity Dummies
Model 1 in table 2.3 presents the random intercept model on a subset of polity
dummies. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as in the random intercept model in
table 2.2. Polity 2 (closed anocracy) is the only polity dummy that is individually
significant. The intercept variance is 0.245, and the likelihood ratio statistic with a
corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that there is between-country variance across
countries.
2.3.2 Random Coefficients of Polity 5 Only
The random coefficient model for polity 5 estimates whether between-country
variance is the same for polities 1 through 4 but different for polity 5. Although the fixed
effects coefficients in model 2 are almost the same as those in model 1, with the
exception of talk about politics and the three polity dummies, the intercept variance is
0.256, and the random coefficient of polity 5 is 0.257. The likelihood ratio test -assuming the intercept-only equation is nested within the intercept-slope equation -shows that the random coefficient for polity 5 is significant (p = 0.0001 < .05).
2.3.3 Random Slope Model with Correlated Variance
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects
coefficients are the same as those in model 2. The intercept variance and random

The regime types are categorized by Polity Score: Full democracy (10), Democracy (6-9), Open
Anocracy (1 to 5), Closed Anocracy (-5~0), and Autocracy (-10 to -6).
11
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coefficient for polity 5 are the same as for model 2. The covariance between the intercept
and polity 5 random effects is 0.0001. Although the likelihood ratio test (assuming the
uncorrelated model 2 is nested within the correlated model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000
> .05), the likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted model 1 is nested within the
unrestricted model 3) is significant (p = .0004 < .05). This reinforces the fact that the
random effect for polity 5 is significant. In other words, there is country-variation in the
difference between polity 5 and the other four polity dummies. The between-country
variance is estimated as follows:
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢11𝑗 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗 ) = var(𝑢0𝑗 ) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗 𝑢11𝑗 )𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢11𝑗 )𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦52𝑖𝑗
= 0.256 + 0.0002𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗 + 0.257𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦52𝑖𝑗
Because polity 5 is a dummy that takes the values of 0 and 1, the substitution of
the estimates from the random coefficient model provides the following between-country
variances:
0.256

for polity 1 to polity 4 (polity 5 = 0)

0.256 + 0.0002 + 0.257 = 0.5132 for polity 5 (polity 5 = 1)
The variance in polity 5 is more than twice as much as that in polities 1 through 4.
This indicates that consolidated democracies can produce a more substantial effect on
retrospective national economic evaluation than countries that are not fully democratic.
2.4 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF GDP PER CAPITA DUMMIES
Although the likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that the random effect of GDP per
capita in general is not significant, I still wonder which level of economic development
can best explain between-country variance. Similar to the hypothesis of the influence of
level of democracy, it surmises that level of economic development can impose a
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stronger influence on retrospective national economic evaluation. The plot of the
between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita in figure 2.3 shows a linear
increase so I wonder whether countries with higher levels of economic development
demonstrate more variance than those with lower levels. In order to explore this effect,
the random coefficients on a subset of GDP per capita dummies (GDPH: high income,
GDPM: middle income, and GDPL: low income) are estimated.12 The random intercept
model with GDP per capita dummies in the fixed effects is estimated first. The second
model adds random coefficient of GDPH (high income), and the third presents random
coefficient of GDPH along with correlated variance. Given that the covariance between
the intercept and GDPH random effects is very small and close to zero (model 3 in table
2.4), the fourth model (random coefficient of GDPM) and the fifth model (random
coefficient of GDPM along with correlated variance) are estimated in order to determine
whether GDPH or GDPM explains more between-country variance.
2.4.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of the GDP per Capita Dummies
Model 1 in table 2.4 is a random intercept model on a subset of GDP per capita
dummies. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as those in the random intercept
model in table 2.2. When compared with the random intercept model in table 2.2, adding
GDP per capita dummies reduces the intercept variance from 0.291 to 0.284. The
likelihood ratio statistic with a corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that there is
between-country variance across countries.
2.4.2 Random Coefficients of GDPH Only and Model with Correlated Variance
The random coefficient model for GDPH can estimate whether between-country
variance is the same for GDPM and GDPL but different for GDPH. The fixed effects
12

Please refer to table 1.1 for income category.
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coefficients and intercept variance in model 2 are the same as those in model 1. The
random slope model with correlated variance in model 3 shows a result similar to that in
models 1 and 2. The fixed effects coefficients and intercept variances in models 1 through
3 are nearly the same. The covariance between the intercept and GDPH random effects
approximates zero. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 2
is nested within the correlated equation model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). Also,
the likelihood ratio test -- assuming the random intercept equation (the restricted model in
model 1) is nested within the intercept-coefficient equation with correlated variance (the
unrestricted equation in model 3) -- shows that the random effect for GDPH is also not
significant (p = 1.000 > .05). In other words, GDPH may not explain much betweencountry variance.
2.4.3 Random Coefficients of GDPM Only and Model with Correlated Variance
Because GDPH does not explain much between-country variance, I estimate
whether GDPM accounts for more between-country variance than GDPH. Model 4
presents a random coefficient model for GDPM. The fixed effects coefficients are the
same as those in the random intercept equation in model 1 with the exception of the
coefficient of GDPM. The intercept variance decreases from 0.284 to 0.150; the random
coefficient of GDPM is 0.409.
Model 5 allows the random intercept and slope to co-vary. The fixed effects
coefficients remain the same as those in the previous models in table 2.4; only the fixed
effect coefficient of GDPM changes. The intercept variance increase from 0.150 in model
4 to 0.193, and the random coefficient of GDPM reduces from 0.409 to 0.138. The
covariance between the intercept and GDPM random effects is 0.082. The likelihood
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ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated model 4 is nested within the correlated model 5)
shows that the random coefficient for GDPM is significant (p = .0000 < .05). In addition,
the likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the
unrestricted equation model 5 is also significant (p = .0000 < .05). Therefore, the two
likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that the random effect for GDPM is indeed significant,
and there is country-variation in the difference between GDPM and other two GDP
dummies (GDPH and GDPL). The between-country variance is estimated as follows:
2
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢10𝑗 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗 ) = var(𝑢0𝑗 ) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗 𝑢10𝑗 )𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢10𝑗 )𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗
2
= 0.193 + 0.164𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗 + 0.138𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗

Because GDPM is a dummy that takes the values of 0 and 1, the substitution of
the estimates from the random coefficient model provides the following between-country
variances:
0.193

for GDPL and GDPH (GDPM = 0)

0.193 + 0.164 + 0.138 = 0.495

for GDPM (GDPM = 1)

The variance in GDPM is more than two times as much as in GDPL and GDPH.
This indicates that countries with middle GDP per capita can produce a more substantial
effect on retrospective national economic evaluation than countries with high or low GDP
per capita.
2.5 CONCLUSION
The ordered logit models of retrospective national economic evaluation in each
country demonstrate that the effect of information sources on retrospective national
economic evaluation varies strongly across countries. It is significant in some countries,
but the relationship may be positive or negative. In other countries, the effect is not
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significant. Retrospective pocketbook evaluation is the only mutually significant variable
in all countries. It is therefore challenging to formulate a general explanation of the effect
of information sources on retrospective national economic evaluation. Multilevel models
can explore whether level of democracy and level of economic development account for
the between-country variance.
The random intercept model in table 2.2 indicates that there is between-country
variance in national retrospective evaluation. For the fixed effects, all models show that
retrospective and prospective pocketbook evaluations, the media consumption, and
talking about politics with others are individually significant. The random slope models
for polity score and GDP per capita demonstrate that neither can explain much of the
between-country variance. However, the random coefficient models on a subset of polity
score and GDP per capita dummies can explore whether countries with higher levels of
democracy or economic development produce more substantial effects on retrospective
national economic evaluation than countries with lower levels of democracy or economic
development. For level of democracy, consolidated countries have the most substantive
effect on retrospective national economic evaluation. This corroborates the assumption
that countries with higher level of democracy can impose a stronger influence on national
economic evaluation. For level of economic development, countries with high GDP per
capita does not have stronger effect on retrospective national economic evaluation than
countries with lower GDP per capita. Particularly, countries with medium GDP per capita
produce on retrospective national economic evaluation. Are these finding the same as
those in prospective national economic evaluation? The next chapter is going to explore
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and substantiate the effect of information sources on prospective national economic
evaluation in comparative perspective.
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Table 2.1. Ordered Logit Models of Retrospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country
Argentina

Bolivia

Brazil

Colombia

Costa
Rica

Chile

Ecuador

El
Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

.99(.09)***

.67(.07)***

.42(.06)***

.78(.08)***

.51(.07)***

1.03(.08)***

1.04(.08)***

.66(.08)***

.56(.10)***

.74(.08)***

.32(.10)**

.01(.06)

.31(.07)***

.12(.06)#

.39(.07)***

.51(.08)***

.08(.07)

.23(.07)**

.03(.08)

.20(.07)**

-.02(.06)

-.02(.05)

-.02(.05)

.04(.05)

-.005(.07)

.16(.07)*

.11(.06)#

.12(.07)#

-.17(.07)*

-.11(.06)#

-.10(.11)

-.21(.11)#

.28(.11)**

-.22(.13)

.15(.13)

-.19(.14)

-.09(.12)

.08(.12)

-.34(.17)*

-.19(.14)

.03(.10)

-.10(.08)

-.01(.07)

.26(.10)**

.07(.11)

.07(.10)

.08(.10)

.002(.08)

-.12(.14)

-.34(.12)**

Political Interest

-.25(.17)

-.14(.14)

-.07(.11)

-.06(.13)

-.22(.15)

-.33(.18)#

.31(.16)#

-.11(.13)

.05(.15)

-.33(.14)*

Edu*Interest

-.02(.05)

.01(.03)

-.001(.04)

-.04(.04)

.001(.05)

.01(.04)

-.07(.04)

.01(.04)

-.03(.06)

.08(.05)

1,040

1,103

1,072

1,072

839

1,080

1,115

765

663

792

-1081.62

-1470.28

-1426.19

-1367.65

-1034.46

-1189.10

-1319.35

-1022.08

-806.65

-989.69

207.77

111.14

108.16

183.42

150.67

319.02

212.60

128.69

66.52

194.44

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.0876

.0364

.0365

.0628

.0679

.1183

.0746

.0592

.0396

.0894

Country
Variable
Retrospective
Pocketbook
Prospective
Pocketbook
Media
Talk
Education
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N of Obs
Log Likelihood
LR chi2
Prob
Pseudo R2

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Table 2.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of Retrospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country
Mexico

Nicaragua

Panama

Peru

Uruguay

.57(.07)***

.73(.08)***

.59(.08)***

.84(.11)***

.66(.07)***

1.14(.08)***

.36(.07)***

.18(.07)**

.18(.07)*

.24(.11)*

.33(.07)***

-.06(.07)

.01(.06)

-.01(.07)

-.06(.09)

Talk

.01(.10)

-.19(.12)

-.26(.11)*

Education

.05(.06)

-.05(.09)

Political
Interest
Edu*Interest

.15(.12)

Country

Paraguay

Venezuela

Benin

Botswana

Cape Verde

.87(.07)***

3.37(.14)***

1.45(.09)***

2.19(.10)***

.29(.07)***

.34(.06)***

-.09(.07)

.12(.06)*

.15(.09)#

-.09(.06)

.18(.06)**

-.03(.06)

-.05(.08)

.002(.05)

-.07(.05)

.07(.16)

.03(.11)

-.07(.10)

-.01(.08)

-.22(.14)

.06(.09)

-.01(.09)

-.15(.11)

-.04(.10)

.04(10)

.15(.08)*

-.14(.07)*

-.26(.11)*

-.09(.09)

.04(.08)

-.13(.13)

-.25(.18)

-.25(.20)

-.06(.18)

.11(.14)

-.19(.12)

-.14(.10)

-.03(.12)

.05(.09)

-.03(.04)

.04(.04)

.05(.05)

.05(.05)

-.0002(.04)

-.06(.04)

.02(.03)

.11(.05)*

.02(.04)

.01(.04)

1,133

722

821

547

1,064

1,074

996

846

980

1,067

-1397.63

-930.93

-989.72

-704.21

-1323.02

-1290.38

-1270.65

-613.13

-1104.01

-1088.17

121.45

148.52

88.7

87.84

171.94

339.58

310.97

1217.40

388.46

660.71

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.0416

.0739

.0429

.0587

.0610

.1163

.1090

.4982

.1496

.2329

Variable
Retro
Pocketbook
Pros
Pocketbook
Media
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N of Obs
Log
Likelihood
LR chi2
Prob
Pseudo R2

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Table 2.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of Retrospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country
Country

Ghana

Kenya

Lesotho

Madagascar

Malawi

Mali

Mozambique

Namibia

Nigeria

Senegal

Variable
2.89(.12)***

2.15(.09)***

1.29(.08)***

1.80(.09)***

1.53(.07)***

1.88(.08)***

1.15(.09)***

1.22(.08)***

1.31(.05)***

2.28(.11)***

.21(.07)**

.06(.06)

.12(.06)*

.34(.07)***

-.03(.05)

-.03(.06)

.20(.08)*

.21(.08)**

-.05(.04)

.33(.10)**

-.03(.06)

-.03(.05)

-.03(.08)

.17(.06)**

-.14(.08)#

-.03(.05)

-.17(.06)**

-.27(.05)***

-.02(.04)

-.07(.06)

Talk

.06(.12)

.15(.11)

.23(.10)*

-.17(.11)

.10(.09)

-.07(.09)

-.04(.11)

-.14(.09)

.03(.07)

.06(.10)

Education

.06(.12)

-.14(.08)#

-.34(.15)*

-.08(.08)

.09(.13)

.06(.13)

.03(.12)

.08(.11)

-.10(.05)*

-.28(.10)**

-.05(.13)

-.16(.11)

-.26(.13)#

.08(.11)

-.05(.10)

.18(.07)*

.04(.11)

.58(.17)**

.04(.08)

.02(.09)

-.03(.05)

.06(.04)#

.11(.06)*

.002(.04)

-.02(.05)

-.01(.05)

.06(.05)

-.08(.05)#

.01(.02)

.08(.04)#

963

1,074

853

1,173

894

1,097

777

1,063

2,182

952

-733.33

-1094.04

-985.45

-1209.99

-1008.85

-1102.87

-877.41

-1241.86

-2692.70

-871.83

1143.70

826.97

318.74

676.62

657.71

767.21

236.09

437.44

955.61

679.59

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.4381

.2743

.1392

.2185

.2458

.2581

.1186

.1497

.1507

.2804

Retro
Pocketbook
Pros
Pocketbook
Media
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Political
Interest
Edu*Interest
N of Obs
Log
Likelihood
LR chi2
Prob
Pseudo R2

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Table 2.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of National Economic Evaluation, by Country
Country

South Africa

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

Zimbabwe

1.90(.07)***

1.54(.10)***

1.55(.06)***

1.46(.08)***

3.69(.16)***

.21(.05)***

.17(.07)*

.09(.04)*

.04(.06)

-.25(.09)**

.001(.04)

-.15(.07)*

-.07(.05)

-.12(.05)*

-.16(.08)*

.27(.70)***

-.10(.10)

.14(.08)#

.01(.11)

.17(.16)

-.10(.06)#

-.28(.17)

-.06(.07)

-.01(.08)

.02(.12)

-.04(.10)

-.14(.16)

-.05(.09)

.17(.13)

.09(.21)

.03(.03)

.15(.07)*

.02(.03)

-.05(.04)

-.11(.06)#

2,132

771

2,042

1,054

1,007

-2228.04

-834.34

-2236.62

-1275.31

-468.25

1347.09

363.78

993.88

440.30

1329.14

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.2321

.179

.1818

.1472

.5867

Variable
Retrospective
Pocketbook
Prospective
Pocketbook
Media
Talk
Education
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Political Interest
Edu*Interest
N of Obs
Log Likelihood
LR chi2
Prob
Pseudo R2

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Table 2.2. Multilevel Models of Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6
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Individual-Level
Retro Pocketbook 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)*** 1.34(.01)***
Pros Pocketbook .13(.01)*** .13(.01)*** .12(.01)*** .12(.01)*** .12(.01)*** .13(.01)***
Media -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)*** -.03(.01)***
Talk .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** .06(.02)*** .06(.02)***
Education
-.02(.01)
-.02(.01)
-.02(.01)
-.02(.01)
-.02(.01)
-.02(.01)
Political Interest
.01(.02)
.01(.02)
.01(.02)
.01(.02)
.01(.02)
.01(.02)
Political Sophistication
-.002(.01)
-.002(.01)
-.003(.01)
-.003(.01)
-.003(.01)
-.002(.01)
Country-Level
Polity Score
2.46e-28
.09
2.63e-33
GDP per capita
.313
.978
.004
Random Effect (N=36,825)
Variance Component
.291
.291
.024
1.43e-28
.006
.053
Covariance
-.05
-.077
Log Likelihood
-43970.02
-43970.02
-43997.53
-44022.54
-44041.85
-43969.48
Prob
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

The Media Consumption
on Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
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Figure 2.1. The Effect of Media on Retrospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country
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Table 2.3. Random Coefficients On A Subset of Polity Score Dummies
Model 1
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Individual-Level
Retro Pocketbook
Pros Pocketbook
Media
Talk
Education
Political Interest
Political Sophistication
Polity 2
Polity 3
Polity 4
Polity 5
Country-Level
Polity 5
Random Effect
(N=36,825)
Variance Component
Covariance
Log Likelihood
Prob

Model 2

Model 3

1.34(.01)***
.13(.01)***
-.03(.01)***
.06(.02)***
-.02(.01)
.01(.02)
-.002(.01)
-1.27(.61)*
-.94(.50)#
-.46(.37)
-.66(.46)

1.34(.01)***
.13(.01)***
-.03(.01)***
.07(.02)***
-.02(.01)
.01(.02)
-.002(.01)
-1.26(.62)*
-.94(.51)#
-.45(.37)
-.36(.36)

1.34(.01)***
.13(.01)***
-.03(.01)***
.06(.02)***
-.02(.01)
.01(.02)
-.002(.01)
-1.26(.62)*
-.94(.51)#
-.45(.37)
-.36(.36)

-

.257

.257

.245
-43967.06
.000

.256
-43959.24
.000

.256
.0001
-43959.24
.000

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001
2. Polity 1 was dropped automatically because of collinearity.

Table 2.4. Random Coefficient On A Subset of GDP Per Capita Dummies
Model 1
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Individual-Level
Retro Pocketbook
Pros Pocketbook
Media
Talk
Education
Political Interest
Political
Sophistication
GDP Medium
Country-Level
GDP High
GDP Medium
Random Effect
(N=36,825)
Variance
Component
Covariance
Log Likelihood
Prob

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

1.34(.01)***
.13(.01)***
-.03(.01)***
.06(.02)***
-.02(.01)
.01(.02)
-.002(.01)

1.34(.01)***
.13(.01)***
-.03(.01)***
.06(.02)***
-.02(.01)
.01(.02)
-.002(.01)

1.34(.01)***
.13(.01)***
-.03(.01)***
.06(.02)***
-.02(.01)
.01(.02)
-.002(.01)

1.34(.01)***
.13(.01)***
-.03(.01)***
.06(.02)***
-.02(.01)
.01(.02)
-.002(.01)

1.34(.01)***
.13(.01)***
-.03(.01)***
.06(.02)***
-.02(.01)
.01(.02)
-.002(.01)

-.18(.18)

-.18(.18)

-.22(.21)

-.02(.19)

-.09(.14)

-

1
-

.180
-

.409

.138

.284

.284

.284

.150

.193

-43969.56
.000

-43969.56
.000

-2.18e-06
-43969.56
.000

-43968.64
.000

.082
-43953.52
.000

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001
2. GDPH and GDPL are dropped automatically because of collinearity.

CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION SOURCES ON PROSPECTIVE
NATIONAL ECONOMIC EVALUATION
The multilevel models in chapter 2 demonstrate that consolidated democracies
and countries with middle income level produce the most substantial effect on
retrospective national economic evaluation. This chapter explores the effect of
information sources on prospective national economic evaluation in comparative
perspective, also by using multilevel modeling. I wonder whether consolidated
democracies and countries with middle income have the strongest effect on prospective
national economic evaluation. First, I run single-level ordered logit models of prospective
national economic evaluation for each country in order to discover differences among
countries. I then run multilevel ordered logit models. Two-level random intercept and
two-level random slope models are estimated and interpreted to see the country-level
effect. The models analyze the effect of information sources on prospective national
economic evaluation depending on level of democracy and level of economic
development. The third and the fourth parts of the chapter further analyze two-level
random slope models, and level of democracy and level of economic development will be
explored respectively. As in the analysis of retrospective national economic evaluation, a
subset of polity score and GDP per capita dummies are used to estimate what levels
explain the between-country variance. Finally, I conclude with an assessment of the
effect of information sources on prospective national economic evaluation.
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3.1 SINGLE-LEVEL ORDERED LOGIT MODELS IN EACH COUNTRY
Table 3.1 presents ordered logit models of the effect of information sources on
prospective national economic evaluation for each country.13 The media effect on
prospective national economic evaluation is statistically significant in only seven
countries (Chile, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The
coefficients are negative except in Chile. In other words, watching more television can
lead respondents to believe national economic condition will be worse in the future. In
other countries, the media effect on prospective national economic evaluation is not
significant. Coefficients are positive in some countries and negative in others. Talk about
politics with others is not statistically significant except in Paraguay, Uruguay, and South
Africa. The relationship is positively correlated in South Africa and negatively correlated
in Paraguay and Uruguay. In around two-thirds of the countries, retrospective pocketbook
evaluation is positively correlated with prospective national economic evaluation.
When people believe they have personally become better off over the past one
year, they are more likely to evaluate prospective national economic condition positively.
Compared with retrospective pocketbook evaluation, prospective pocketbook evaluation
has a more substantial effect on prospective national economic evaluation; it is significant
in all countries. When people believe they will personally become better off in the future,
they are more likely to believe national economic condition will also be better in the
future. The other three variables -- education, political interest, and political
sophistication -- are less influential.

The same as retrospective national economic evaluation, there are 23 countries (districts) that are not
included in the single-level ordered logit models in table 3.1 because of missing values in some variables.
Please refer to footnote 1 in chapter 2 for names of the countries that are not included in the single-level
ordered logit models.
13
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With the exception of prospective pocketbook evaluation, which has the most
substantive effect on prospective national economic evaluation, the effect of information
sources is quite different across countries. As with the effect of information sources on
retrospective national economic evaluation, it is difficult to develop a nomothetic rule
about the effect of information sources on prospective national economic evaluation
when only the ordered logit models for each country are estimated. I wonder whether
level of democracy and level of economic development can account for these differences
across countries, as is evident in multilevel models of retrospective national economic
evaluation. Multilevel models of prospective national economic evaluation are estimated
as follows.
3.2 MULTILEVEL ORDERED LOGIT MODELS
Table 3.2 presents multilevel models of prospective national economic evaluation.
I run one random intercept model (model 1) and five random slope models (models 2
through 6). The interpretation of the six multilevel models is as follows.
3.2.1 Random Intercept Model
Model 1 is a random intercept model that allows the model intercept to vary
randomly across countries. For fixed effects coefficients, both retrospective and
prospective pocketbook evaluation, media consumption, talking about politics with others,
and education are individually significant. When respondents positively evaluate their
personal economic evaluation in the past and in the future, they are more likely to believe
national economic condition will be better in the future. The coefficient of prospective
pocketbook evaluation indicates that prospective pocketbook evaluation produces a
stronger effect on prospective national economic evaluation than retrospective
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pocketbook evaluation. The more time respondents spend watching television, the more
negatively they tend to view prospective national economic condition.
Figure 3.1 presents the effects of media consumption on prospective national
economic evaluation by each country on fixed effect. More media consumption does not
increase the probability of positive prospective national economic evaluation. In contrast
to media consumption, talking more about politics with others can lead to positive
prospective national economic evaluation. The intercept variance is 0.385. The likelihood
ratio statistic with a corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that between-country
variance is significant.
3.2.2 Random Slope Models (Models 2 through 6)
The random intercept model in model 1 shows significant between-country
variance in prospective national economic evaluation. Models 2 through 6 are random
slope models that allow the effects of level of democracy (polity score) and level of
economic development (GDP per capita) to vary across nations. Models 3 and 5 allow the
random intercepts and slopes to co-vary (as opposed to the default, in which they are
uncorrelated).
3.2.2.1 Random Coefficients of Polity Score (Models 2 and 3)
Model 2 is a random slope model that allows polity score to vary across countries.
There is no difference between the fixed effects coefficients and standard errors in
models 1 and 2. The intercept variance in model 2 decreases from 0.385 to 0.372, and the
random coefficient of polity score is 0.0002. However, the likelihood ratio test (assuming
the random intercept equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model
2) is not significant (p = 0.9386 > .05). The random slope model is not necessarily more
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appropriate than the random intercept model. In this sense, the random coefficient of
polity score is not significant and that the polity score explains little between-country
variance.
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. Most of the fixed
effects coefficients are the same as those in model 2. The coefficients of media
consumption and political interest change slightly, but only media consumption is
individually significant. Although the coefficient of education remains the same as in
models 1 and 2, it only becomes significant at the .10 level (p= .055 < .10). The intercept
variance decreases significantly, from 0.372 to 0.028. The random coefficient of polity
score is 0.061, and the covariance between intercept and polity score random effect is 0.041. The between-country variance as a function of polity score is as follows:
2
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢8𝑗 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 ) = var(𝑢0𝑗 ) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗 𝑢8𝑗 )𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢8𝑗 )𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗
2
= 0.028 − 0.082 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 0.061 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗

Figure 3.2 shows the graph of the between-country variance as a function of
polity score. The plot is quite similar to that in retrospective national economic evaluation.
The between-country variance increases rapidly as a function of polity score. However,
the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 2 is nested within the
correlated equation model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). That implies that the
correlated variance model (model 3) is not necessarily more appropriate than the
uncorrelated variance model (model 2). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the
restricted model 1 is nested within the unrestricted model 3) is also not significant (p =
1.000 > .05). The three likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that the random effect for polity
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score is not significant. Therefore, polity score in general does not account much for
between-country variance.
3.2.2.2 Random Coefficients of GDP per Capita (Models 4 and 5)
Model 4 is a random slope model that allows GDP per capita to vary across
countries. Compared with model 1, only fixed effects coefficients of media consumption
and political interest change. The intercept variance in model 4 decreases from 0.385 to
nearly zero, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita is 0.044.
Model 5 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects
coefficients are the same as those in model 4. The intercept variance (0.099) in model 5 is
greater than that in model 4, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita increases from
0.044 to 0.891. The between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita is as
follows:
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢9𝑗 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 ) = var(𝑢0𝑗 ) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗 𝑢9𝑗 )𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢9𝑗 )𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗2
= 0.099 − 0.596 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 0.891 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗2
Figure 3.3 is the between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita. The
same as that in retrospective national economic evaluation, the between-country variance
shows a linear increase as GDP per capita increases. The likelihood ratio test (assuming
the uncorrelated equation model 4 is nested within the correlated equation model 5) is not
significant at .05 (p = 1.000 > .05). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the
restricted equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation model 5) is also not
significant (p = 1.000 > .05). It is evident that the random effect for GDP per capita is not
significant, and GDP per capita does not explain much between-country variance.
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3.2.2.3 Random Coefficients of Polity Score and GDP per Capita (Model 6)
Model 6 allows both polity score and GDP per capita to vary across nations. The
fixed effects coefficients remain the same as those in model 1. The intercept variance
decreases from 0.385 to 0.140. The random coefficient of polity score is 0.116 and the
random coefficient of GDP per capita is 0.115. However, the likelihood ratio test
(assuming the random intercept equation model 1 is nested within the random slope
equation model 6) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). In order to explore which levels of
democracy and economic development explain more between-country variance, I now
estimate the random coefficients on a subset of the polity score and GDP per capita
dummies.
3.3 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF POLITY SCORE DUMMIES
As with retrospective national economic evaluation, level of democracy does not
explain much between-country variance on prospective national economic evaluation,
given that none of the three likelihood ratio tests are significant. Despite this, this section
explores whether countries with higher levels of democracy exhibit more variance than
those with lower levels. In order to explore this effect, the random coefficients on a
subset of polity score dummies are estimated. The subset of the polity score dummies is
the same as in the retrospective national economic evaluation.14 Three models are
interpreted. The first is a random intercept model with polity dummies in the fixed effects.
The second adds the random coefficients of polity 5, and the third adds the random
coefficients of polity 5 along with correlated variance.

14

Please refer to footnote 2 in chapter 2 for the subset of polity score dummies.
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3.3.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of Polity Dummies
Model 1 in table 3.3 is a random intercept model on a subset of polity dummies.
The fixed effects coefficients are the same as in the random intercept model in table 3.2
with the exception of political interest. Polity 2 (closed anocracy) is the only polity
dummy that is individually significant. The intercept variance is 0.324, and the likelihood
ratio statistic with a corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that the between-country
variance is significant.
3.3.2 Random Coefficients of Polity 5 Only
The random coefficient model for polity 5 estimates whether between-country
variance is the same for polities 1 through 4 but different for polity 5. Although the fixed
effects coefficients in model 2 are the same as in model 1, with the exception of political
interest. The random coefficient of intercept is 0.299, and the random coefficient of polity
5 is 0.305. The likelihood ratio test -- assuming the intercept-only equation (model 1) is
nested within the intercept-slope equation (model 2) -- shows that the random coefficient
for polity 5 is significant (p = 0.0010 < .05).
3.3.3 Random Slope Model with Correlated Variance
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects
coefficients are the same as in model 2. The intercept variance and random coefficient of
polity 5 are the same as in model 2. The covariance between the intercept and polity 5
random effects is 0.00007. Although the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated
model 2 is nested within the correlated model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05), the
likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the
unrestricted equation model 3) is significant (p= .0044 < .05). This substantiates the idea
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that the random effect for polity 5 is significant. In other words, there is country-variation
in the difference between polity 5 and other four polity dummies. The between-country
variance is estimated as follows:
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢11𝑗 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗 ) = var(𝑢0𝑗 ) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗 𝑢11𝑗 )𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢11𝑗 )𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦52𝑖𝑗
= 0.299 + 0.00014𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦5𝑖𝑗 + 0.305𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦52𝑖𝑗
Because polity 5 is a dummy that takes the values of 0 and 1, the substitution of
the estimates from the random coefficient model provides the following between-country
variances:
0.299

for polity 1 to polity 4 (polity 5 = 0)

0.299 +0.00014 + 0.305 = 0.604

for polity 5 (polity 5 = 1)

The variance in polity 5 is almost twice as much as that in polities 1 through 4.
This indicates that consolidated democracies can produce a more substantial effect on
prospective national economic evaluation than countries that are not fully democratic.
3.4 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF GDP PER CAPITA DUMMIES
The random coefficients of GDP per capita in models 4 and 5 in table 3.2 show
that GDP per capita cannot explain the between-country variance according to the
likelihood ratio test. Similar to the hypothesis of the influence of level of democracy, it
surmises that level of economic development imposes a stronger influence on national
economic evaluation. I wonder whether countries with higher levels of economic
development can demonstrate more variance than those with lower levels. In order to
explore this effect, the random coefficients on a subset of GDP per capita dummies are
estimated.15 The random intercept model with GDP per capita dummies in the fixed

15

Please refer to table 1.1 for income category.

66

effects is estimated first. The second model adds random coefficient of GDPH (high
income), and the third presents random coefficient of GDPH along with correlated
variance. Given that the covariance between the intercept and GDPH random effects is
very small and close to zero (model 3 in table 3.4), the fourth model (random coefficient
of GDPM) and the fifth model (random coefficient of GDPM with correlated variance)
are estimated in order to determine whether GDPH or GDPM explains more betweencountry variance.
3.4.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of the GDP per capita Dummies
Model 1 in table 3.4 is a random intercept model on a subset of GDP per capita
dummies. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as those in the random intercept
model (model 1) in table 3.2 with the exception of a slight change in the media
consumption coefficient. The intercept variance is 0.376. The likelihood ratio statistic
with a p-value of .000 indicates that between-country variance is significant.
3.4.2 Random Coefficients of GDPH Only and Model with Correlated Variance
The random coefficient model for GDPH estimates whether between-country
variance is the same for GDPM and GDPL but different for GDPH. The fixed effects
coefficients and intercept variance in model 2 are the same as those in model 1. The
random slope model with correlated variance in model 3 shows results similar to those in
model 1 and 2. The fixed effects coefficients and intercept variances are the same. The
covariance between the intercept and GDPH random effects approximates zero. The
likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 2 is nested within the
correlated equation model 3) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). Moreover, the likelihood
ratio test -- assuming the intercept-only equation (the restricted equation in mode1) is
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nested within the intercept-slope equation with correlated variance (the unrestricted
equation in model 3) -- shows that the random coefficient for GDPH is also not
significant (p = 1.000 > .05). The two likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that the random
effect for GDPH is not significant. In other words, countries with a high level of
economic development (GDPH) may not exhibit much between-country variance.
3.4.3 Random Coefficients of GDPM Only and Model with Correlated Variance
Because GDPH does not explain much between-country variance, I estimate
whether GDPM accounts more between-country variance than GDPH. Model 4 is a
random coefficient model for GDPM. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as those
in the random intercept model in model 1 with the exception of the coefficients of media
and GDPM. The intercept variance decreases from 0.376 to 0.267; the random coefficient
of GDPM is 0.552. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the random intercept equation
model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model 4) is significant (p = .000
< .05).
Model 5 allows the random intercept and slope to co-vary. The fixed effects
coefficients remain the same as those in model 4 in table 3.4. The intercept variance
increases from 0.267 to 0.273, and the random coefficient of GDPM also rises from 0.552
to 0.757. The covariance between the intercept and GDPM random effects is -0.121.
Although the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 4 is nested
within the correlated equation model 5) shows that the random coefficient for GDPM is
not significant (p = 0.9132 > .05), the likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted
equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation model 5) is significant (p
= .0000 < .05). Therefore, likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that there is country-
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variation in the difference between GDPM and other two GDP dummies (GDPH and
GDPL). The between-country variance is estimated as follows:
2
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢9𝑗 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗 ) = var(𝑢0𝑗 ) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗 𝑢9𝑗 )𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢9𝑗 )𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗
2
= 0.273 − 0.242𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗 + 0.757𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑗

Because GDPM is a dummy that takes the values of 0 and 1, the substitution of
the estimates from the random coefficient model provides the following between-country
variances:
0.273

for GDPL and GDPH (GDPM = 0)

0.273-0.242 + 0.757 = 0.788

for GDPM (GDPM = 1)

The variance in GDPM is nearly three times as much as that in GDPL and GDPH.
This indicates that countries with middle GDP per capita can produce a more substantial
effect prospective national economic evaluation than countries with high or low GDP per
capita.
3.5 CONCLUSION
The ordered logit models of prospective national economic evaluation in each
country demonstrate that the effect of information sources on prospective national
economic evaluation is quite different across countries. The media effect is significant in
only seven countries. With the exception of the positive relationship in Chile, increased
media consumption leads respondents to believe that national economic condition will be
worse in the future. Talking about politics with others does not influence prospective
national economic evaluation in most of the countries. Prospective pocketbook evaluation
is the only mutually significant variable in all countries. When people believe they will be
personally better off in the future, they are more likely to believe national economic
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condition will be better in the future. It is therefore challenging to formulate a general
explanation of the effect of information sources on prospective national economic
evaluation. Multilevel models can explore whether level of democracy and level of
economic development account for the between-country variances.
The random intercept model in table 3.2 indicates that there is between-country
variance in the effect of information sources on prospective national economic evaluation.
For the fixed effects, all models demonstrate that retrospective and prospective
pocketbook evaluations, the media consumption, talking about politics, and education are
individually significant. The random coefficient models for polity score and GDP per
capita show that neither can explain much of the between-country variance.
However, the random coefficient models on a subset of polity score and GDP per
capita dummies can explore whether countries with higher levels of democracy and
economic development can produce more substantial effects on prospective national
economic evaluation than those with lower level of democracy or lower level of
economic development. For level of democracy, consolidated democracies have the most
substantive effect on prospective national economic evaluation. For level of economic
development, countries with medium GDP per capita produce the strongest effect on
prospective national economic evaluation. These results are the same as those in the
retrospective national economic evaluation. Therefore, it is evident that consolidated
democracy and countries with middle income level have the most substantial effect on
both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations. Do consolidated
democracy and countries with middle income level have the same impact on voter choice?
The next chapter proceeds to confirm these effects.
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Table 3.1. Ordered Logit Models of Prospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

El
Salvador
Coef.(SE)

-.16(.10)

.11(.07)

.11(.06)#

.32(.08)***

.22(.07)**

.34(.08)***

.25(.07)**

.37(.08)***

-.04(.10)

.56(.08)***

2.33(.13)***

1.15(.07)***

1.09(.08)***

.85(.07)***

.67(.07)***

1.16(.09)***

.87(.08)***

.72(.08)***

.55(.09)***

.60(.08)***

.04(.08)

-.02(.05)

.04(.05)

.08(.05)

.07(.07)

.15(.07)*

.002(.06)

.07(.07)

-.08(.07)

-.005(.06)

Talk

-.09(.13)

.04(.11)

.13(.11)

-.22(.14)

-.03(.13)

.13(.14)

.18(.12)

-.05(.13)

.03(.19)

-.25(.14)#

Education

-.04(.12)

-.14(.09)

.02(.07)

.02(.10)

-.16(.10)

.19(.11)#

.05(.10)

-.05(.09)

-.05(.14)

-.14(.12)

Political
Interest
Edu*Interest

-.24(.20)

-.23(.15)

-.10(.11)

-.49(.14)***

-.55(.16)***

-.05(.18)

.05(.17)

-.24(.14)#

-.23(.15)

-.37(.14)**

.04(.06)

.04(.04)

-.04(.04)

.05(.04)

.07(.05)

-.04(.04)

-.04(.04)

.01(.04)

-.01(.06)

.05(.05)

993

1,072

1,025

1,023

803

1,036

1,073

683

589

723

-716.36

-1305.33

-1236.57

-1304.20

-1070.88

-1136.23

-1273.41

-920.87

-766.28

-920.22

387.58

306.83

264.13

289.07

163.96

315.84

166.38

157.72

47.65

219.91

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.21

.11

.10

.10

.07

.12

.06

.08

.03

.11

Country
Variable
Retro
Pocketbook
Prospective
Pocketbook
Media
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N of Obs
Log
Likelihood
LR chi2
Prob
Pseudo R2

Argentina

Bolivia

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Brazil

Colombia

Costa Rica

Chile

Ecuador

Guatemala

Honduras

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Table 3.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of Prospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country
Country
Variable

Mexico

Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Uruguay

Venezuela

Benin

Botswana

Cape Verde

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Retro
Pocketbook
Pros
Pocketbook
Media

.25(.08)**

.21(.08)**

.14(.08)

.05(.12)

.31(.07)***

.25(.07)***

.33(.07)***

.15(.09)

.06(.08)

.30(.10)**

.76(.07)***

.94(.08)***

.85(.08)***

2.14(.16)***

1.00(.07)***

1.36(.09)***

1.06(.07)***

4.54(.20)***

1.80(.09)***

3.48(.15)***

.003(.07)

.005(.06)

-.08(.07)

.06(.10)

-.02(.06)

.05(.06)

.04(.06)

.02(.10)

-.05(.05)

-.13(.07)#

Talk

-.08(.10)

-.12(.13)

-.03(.12)

-.49(.20)*

.15(.11)

-.33(.10)**

.03(.08)

-.03(.19)

-.10(.09)

.005(.12)

.03(.07)

-.14(.10)

-.39(.11)***

-.10(.13)

-.08(.10)

.05(.08)

-.02(.07)

.09(.14)

-.07(.09)

-.09(.10)

-.06(.12)

-.29(.14)*

-.61(.19)**

-.51(.24)*

-.26(.19)

-.23(.14)

-.07(.12)

.03(.13)

.07(.12)

.11(.12)

.01(.04)

.07(.04)

.15(.05)**

.02(.06)

.03(.05)

.02(.04)

-.03(.03)

-.09(.06)

.01(.04)

.03(.05)

1,103

668

783

528

1,021

1,038

938

818

939

1,085

-1409.66

-876.01

-1016.14

-423.21

-1260.88

-1155.30

-1232.27

-376.00

-1027.38

-578.34

162.88

227.08

153.76

244.31

302.14

357.97

413.28

1518.08

669.80

853.38

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.05

.11

.07

.22

.11

.13

.14

.67

.25

.42

Education
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Political
Interest
Edu*Interest
N of Obs
Log
Likelihood
LR chi2
Prob
Pseudo R2

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Table 3.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of Prospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country
Country

Ghana

Kenya

Lesotho

Madagascar

Malawi

Mali

Mozambique

Namibia

Nigeria

Senegal

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

.18(.09)*

.27(.07)***

.07(.07)

.19(.09)*

-.03(.06)

.15(.07)*

.18(.09)*

.21(.08)**

.06(.04)

.28(.10)**

3.96(.16)***

2.53(.10)***

1.46(.08)***

2.91(.12)***

2.02(.09)***

2.69(.12)***

1.81(.11)***

1.26(.08)***

1.71(.06)***

2.99(.15)***

.08(.07)

-.07(.06)

-.16(.08)*

.09(.07)

.03(.09)

-.04(.06)

-.17(.07)*

-.28(.05)***

-.05(.04)

-.14(.07)#

-.07(.15)

-.01(.12)

.04(.11)

.15(.13)

.08(.10)

.004(.11)

-.01(.13)

-.10(.10)

.08(.07)

.10(.12)

-.001(.14)

-.06(.09)

-.08(.14)

-.09(.10)

-.19(.15)

-.16(.16)

.06(.13)

.09(.11)

-.06(.05)

-.51(.13)***

-.25(.15)

.02(.12)

.23(.14)

-.03(.14)

-.13(.10)

.23(.09)**

.02(.12)

.41(.17)*

.04(.09)

-.06(.12)

.04(.06)

.02(.04)

.01(.06)

.01(.05)

.07(.06)

.04(.06)

.03(.06)

-.07(.05)

.004(.02)

.08(.05)#

926

1,036

759

1,133

858

1,084

755

1,071

2,131

938

Log Likelihood

-517.76

-906.61

-899.25

-787.45

-783.29

-704.12

-715.73

-1180.99

-2340.91

-584.18

LR chi2

1550.23

1125.94

441.72

919.44

964.08

905.25

384.98

418.19

1523.49

652.26

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.60

.38

.20

.37

.38

.39

.21

.15

.25

.36

Variable
Retro
Pocketbook
Prospective
Pocketbook
Media
Talk
Education
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Political
Interest
Edu*Interest
N of Obs

Prob
Pseudo R2

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Table 3.1. (continued) Ordered Logit Models of Prospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country
Country

South Africa

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Variable

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Retro
Pocketbook
Prospective
Pocketbook
Media

.16(.06)**

.05(.08)

.12(.05)*

.10(.07)

-.01(.09)

2.60(.08)***

2.48(.12)***

2.07(.07)***

1.35(.07)***

2.88(.14)***

-.05(.04)

-.03(.08)

-.18(.05)**

-.13(.05)*

-.17(.08)*

.22(.08)**

-.02(.11)

.12(.09)

.01(.12)

.18(.16)

-.04(.06)

-.07(.19)

-.15(.08)*

.05(.08)

-.14(.13)

Political Interest

.11(.11)

.10(.18)

-.02(.10)

.20(.14)

-.22(.22)

Edu*Interest

.01(.03)

.04(.08)

.02(.03)

-.07(.04)#

.05(.06)

2,095

708

1,957

1,013

1,005

-1773.75

-646.36

-1889.45

-1275.22

-459.61

1954.37

659.63

1452.65

488.92

818.66

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.36

.34

.28

.16

.47

Talk
Education
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N of Obs
Log Likelihood
LR chi2
Prob
Pseudo R2

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

The Media Consumption
on Prospective National Economic Evaluation
bolivia

brazil

colombia

costa rica

chile

ecuador

el salvador

guatemala

honduras

mexico

nicaragua

panama

paraguay

peru

uruguay

venezuela

benin

botswana

cape verde

ghana

kenya

lesotho

madagascar

malawi

mali

mozambique

namibia

nigeria

senegal

.1
.05
0
.15
.1
.05
0

0

south africa

tanzania

uganda

zambia

1

.05

.1

.15

zimbabwe

0
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.15

0
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0

.05
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X: Media Consumption Y: Change in Probability of "Much Better"

Figure 3.1 The Effect of Media on Prospective National Economic Evaluation, by Country
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Figure 3.3. Between-Country Variance as A Function of GDP per capita
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Table 3.2. Multilevel Models of Prospective National Economic Evaluation
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Individual-Level
Retro
Pocketbook
Pros Pocketbook
Media
Talk
Education
Political Interest
Political
Sophistication
Country-Level
Polity Score
GDP per capita
Random Effect
(N=35,410)
Variance
Component
Covariance
Log Likelihood
Prob

Model 1
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***

Model 2
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***

Model 3
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***

Model 4
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***

Model 5
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***

Model 6
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***

1.67(.01)***
-.03(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)*
.001(.02)
-.003(.01)

1.67(.01)***
-.03(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)*
.001(.02)
-.003(.01)

1.67(.01)***
-.02(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)#
.002(.02)
-.003(.01)

1.67(.01)***
-.02(.01)**
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)#
.002(.02)
-.003(.01)

1.67(.01)***
-.02(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)#
.002(.02)
-.003(.01)

1.67(.01)***
-.03(.01)**
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)*
.001(.02)
-.003(.01)

-

.0002
-

.061
-

.044

.891

.116
.115

.385

.372

.028

8.21e-29

.099

.140

-38662.10
.000

-38662.10
.000

-.041
-38679.47
.000

-38678.15
.000

-.298
-38726.19
.000

-38702.40
.000

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Table 3.3. Random Coefficients on A Subset of Polity Score Dummies

78

Individual-Level
Retro Pocketbook
Pros Pocketbook
Media
Talk
Education
Political Interest
Political Sophistication
Polity 2
Polity 3
Polity 4
Polity 5
Country-Level
Polity 5
Random Effect
(N=35,410)
Variance Component
Covariance
Log Likelihood
Prob

Model 1
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***
1.67(.01)***
-.03(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)*
-.0001(.02)
-.003(.01)
-1.69(.70)*
-.75(.57)
-.43(.42)
-.49(.52)

Model 2
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***
1.67(.01)***
-.03(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)*
.0001(.02)
-.003(.01)
-1.69(.68)*
-.75(.55)
-.43(.40)
-.45(.39)

Model 3
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***
1.67(.01)***
-.03(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)*
.0001(.02)
-.003(.01)
-1.69(.68)*
-.75(.55)
-.43(.40)
-.45(.39)

-

.305

.305

.324
-38659.14
.000

.299
-38653.71
.000

.299
.00007
-38653.71
.000

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Table 3.4. Random Coefficients on A Subset of GDP Per Capita Dummies
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Individual-Level
Retro Pocketbook
Pros Pocketbook
Media
Talk
Education
Political Interest
Political
Sophistication
GDPM
Country-Level
GDPH
GDPM
Random Effect
(N=35,410)
Variance
Component
Covariance
Log Likelihood
Prob

Model 1
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***
1.67(.01)***
-.02(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)*
.001(.02)
-.003(.01)

Model 2
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***
1.67(.01)***
-.02(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)*
.001(.02)
-.003(.01)

Model 3
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***
1.67(.01)***
-.02(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)*
.001(.02)
-.003(.01)

Model 4
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***
1.67(.01)***
-.03(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)*
.001(.02)
-.003(.01)

Model 5
Coef.(SE)
.15(.01)***
1.67(.01)***
-.03(.01)*
.09(.02)***
-.03(.01)*
.001(.02)
-.003(.01)

-.19(.21)

-.19(.21)

-.19(.21)

-.24(.15)

-.24(.16)

-

1
-

.013
-

.552

.757

.376

.376

.376

.267

.273

-38661.71
.000

-38661.71
.000

3.03e-08
-38661.71
.000

-38637.22
.000

-.121
-38637.21
.000

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

CHAPTER 4
THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION SOURCES ON VOTER CHOICE
The previous two chapters explore the effect of information sources on
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations in comparative perspective
using multilevel models. They demonstrate that consolidated democracies (polity score
10) and countries with middle income (GDP per capita between USD 1,000~9,999) have
the strongest effect on both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations.
This chapter continues to explore the effect of information sources on voter choice, and
seeks to substantiate whether countries with consolidated democracy and countries with
middle income produce the strongest effect on voter choice.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I run single-level logit models of voter
choice for each country by using 2010 Latino Barometro national surveys to discover the
differences among countries. I then run multilevel logit models. Two-level random
intercept and two-level random slope models are estimated and interpreted to see the
country-level effect. The models analyze the effect of information sources on voter
choice depending on level of democracy and level of economic development.
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Since I use Latino Barometro national surveys to estimate the effect of information
sources on voter choice, polity score and GDP per capita for some countries may be
different from those in Latino Barometro.16 The third and the fourth parts of the chapter
further analyze the two-level random slope models further, and level of democracy and
level of economic development are explored respectively. As with retrospective and
prospective national economic evaluation, a subset of polity score and GDP per capita
dummies are used to estimate what levels explain between-country variance more than
others. Finally, I conclude with an assessment of the effect of information sources on
voter choice.
4.1 SINGLE-LEVEL LOGIT MODELS IN EACH COUNTRY
Table 4.1 presents ordered logit models of the effect of information sources on
voter choice for each country. The media effect on voter choice is statistically significant
in only three countries: Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Honduras. The coefficients are negative
in Bolivia and Costa Rica but positive in Honduras. In other words, in Bolivia and Costa
Rica, watching more television leads respondents to vote for the opposition party; in
Honduras respondents who spend more time watching television are more likely to vote
for the incumbent party. In other countries, the media effect on voter choice is not
significant. The coefficients are positive in some countries and negative in others. Talk
about politics with others is not statistically significant except in Nicaragua. In Nicaragua,
talking about politics with others frequently leads voters to cast votes for the incumbent.
For variables of economic evaluation, retrospective pocketbook evaluation is
significant only in Panama, but the relationship is negative. When people in Panama
The polity score for some countries are different in Global Barometer and Latino Barometro because
surveys were conducted in different years, such as the polity scores of Ecuador, El Salvador, and Venezuela
and the GDP per capita in Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Please refer to table 1.1 and 1.2.
16
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believe they have become personally better off over the past year, they are more likely to
support the opposition party. Prospective pocketbook evaluation is influential only in
Peru. When people in Peru believe they will become personally better off in the future,
they are more likely to vote for the incumbent party. Retrospective national economic
evaluation is significant only in Bolivia and Venezuela. Therefore, the better the national
economic condition was in the past, the more likely voters will cast votes for the
incumbent. Prospective national economic evaluation is influential only in Uruguay and
Dominican Republic, and the relationship is positive. Party identification is the only
significant variable in all countries. Voters are more likely to vote for the parties to which
they think they are the closet. The other three variables -- education, political interest, and
political sophistication (the interaction between education and political interest) -- are less
influential.
With the exception of party identification, which has the most substantive effect
on voter choice, the effect of information sources on voter choice is quite different and
not so influential across countries. As with the effect of information sources on both
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation, it is difficult to develop a
nomothetic rule about the effect of information sources on voter choice when only the
logit models for each country are estimated. I wonder whether level of democracy and
level of economic development can account for these differences across countries, as is
evident in multilevel ordered logit models for retrospective and prospective national
economic evaluation. The multilevel logit models for voter choice are estimated as
follows.
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4.2 MULTILEVEL LOGIT MODELS
Table 4.2 presents multilevel models of voter choice. I run one random intercept
model (model 1) and five random slope models (models 2 through 6). The interpretation
of the six multilevel models is as follows.
4.2.1 Random Intercept Model
Model 1 is a random intercept model, which allows the model intercept to vary
randomly across countries. For fixed effects coefficients, both retrospective and
prospective national economic evaluation and party identification are individually
significant. When respondents positively evaluate national economic condition in the past
and in the future, they are more likely to vote for the incumbent party. However, media
does not influence voter choice. Figure 4.1 indicates that more media consumption does
not increase the probability of voting for the incumbent party. The intercept variance is
0.687. The likelihood ratio statistic with a corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that
there is between-country variance on voter choice, and it is essential to run multilevel
logit models to estimate this effect.
4.2.2 Random Slope Models (Models 2 through 6)
The random intercept model in model 1 shows significant between-country
variance in voter choice. Models 2 through 6 are random slope models, which allow the
effects of level of democracy (polity score) and level of economic development (GDP per
capita) to vary across nations. Models 3 and 5 allow the random intercepts and slopes to
co-vary (as opposed to the default, in which they are uncorrelated).
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4.2.2.1 Random Coefficients of Polity Score (Models 2 and 3)
Model 2 is a random slope model that allows polity score to vary across countries.
There is no difference in the fixed effects coefficients except for talk about politics. The
intercept variance in model 2 decreases significantly and approximates zero, and the
random coefficient of polity score is 0.012. However, the likelihood ratio test (assuming
the random intercept equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model
2) is not significant (p = 0.5074 > .05). It indicates that polity score explains little
between-country variance.
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. Most of the fixed
effects coefficients are the same as those in model 2, with the exception of education. The
intercept variance is 0.035. The random coefficient of polity score is 0.07, and the
covariance between intercept and polity score random effect is 0.016. The betweencountry variance as a function of polity score is as follows:
2
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢11𝑗 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 ) = var(𝑢0𝑗 ) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗 𝑢11𝑗 )𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢11𝑗 )𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗
2
= 0.035 + 0.032 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 0.007 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗

Figure 4.2 shows the graph of the between-country variance as a function of
polity score. The between-country variance shows a linear increase as polity score
increases. However, the likelihood ratio test (assuming that the uncorrelated equation
model 2 is nested within the correlated equation model 3) is not significant (p = 0.6599
> .05). It implies that the correlated variance model (model 3) is not necessarily more
appropriate than the uncorrelated variance model (model 2). Moreover, the likelihood
ratio test (assuming the restricted model 1 is nested within the unrestricted model 3) is
also not significant (p = 0.7287 > .05). The three likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that
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the random effect for polity score is not significant. Therefore, polity score in general
does not account much for between-country variance.
4.2.2.2 Random Coefficients of GDP per Capita (Models 4 and 5)
Model 4 is a random slope model that allows GDP per capita to vary across
countries. The fixed effects coefficients and intercept variance are the same as those in
model 1. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the random intercept equation model 1 is
nested within the random slope equation model 4) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). It
implies that the random slope model, which allows GDP per capita to vary across
countries, is not necessarily more appropriate than the random intercept model.
Model 5 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects
coefficients remain the same as those in model 4. The intercept variance in model 5
(173.73) is much greater than that in model 4, and the random coefficient of GDP per
capita is 2.16. The between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita is as
follows:
var(𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢12𝑗 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 ) = var(𝑢0𝑗 ) + 2cov(𝑢0𝑗 𝑢12𝑗 )𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + var(𝑢12𝑗 )𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗2
= 173.73 − 38.76 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 2.16 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗2
Figure 4.3 is the between-country variance as a function of GDP per capita. The
between-country variance shows a little like U-shape as the GDP per capita increases.
However, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation model 4 is nested
within the correlated equation model 5) is not significant (p = 0.1770 > .05). Moreover,
the likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the
unrestricted equation model 5) is also not significant (p = 0.402 > .05). This demonstrates
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that the random effect for GDP per capita is not significant, and GDP per capita does not
explain much between-country variance.
4.2.2.3 Random Coefficients of Polity Score and GDP per Capita (Model 6)
Model 6 allows both polity score and GDP per capita to vary across nations. As in
models 2 through model 5, the fixed effects coefficients remain the same as in model 1,
with the exception of talk about politics. The intercept variance approximates to zero. The
random coefficient of polity score is .012, and the random coefficient of GDP per capita
approximates zero. In addition, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the random intercept
equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model 6) is not significant
(p = 0.8028 > .05). Therefore, the random slope model is not more appropriate than the
random intercept model. Although table 4.2 indicates that polity score and GDP per
capita do not explain much between-country variance, I still would like to explore which
levels of democracy and economic development explain more between-country variance.
The random coefficients on a subset of polity score and GDP per capita dummies are
estimated in the next two sections.
4.3 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF POLITY SCORE DUMMIES
As with retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation, level of
democracy in general does not explain much between-country variance on voter choice
given that none of the three likelihood ratio tests are significant. Despite this, this section
seeks to discover whether countries with higher levels of democracy exhibit more
between-country variance than those with lower levels. I wonder whether countries with
higher levels produce the strongest effect on voter choice, as is evident in estimations of
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation. In order to explore this effect,

86

random coefficients on a subset of the polity score dummies are estimated.17 Five models
are interpreted. The first is the random intercept model with polity dummies in the fixed
effects. The second adds the random coefficients of polity 3, and the third adds the
random coefficients of polity 3 along with correlated variance. The fourth and the fifth
models estimate the random coefficient models of polity2 and polity1.
4.3.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of the Polity Dummies
Model 1 in table 4.3 is a random intercept model on a subset of the polity
dummies. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as in the random intercept model in
table 4.2. The intercept variance is 0.542, and the likelihood ratio statistic with a
corresponding p-value of .000 indicates that there is between-country variance.
4.3.2 Random Coefficients of Polity 3 Only
The random coefficient model for polity 3 estimates whether between-country
variance is the same for polities 1 and 2 but different for polity 3. Although the fixed
effects coefficients in model 2 are the same as those in model 1, with the exception of
polity1 dummy, the intercept variance is 0.470, and the random coefficient of polity 3 is
0.222. The likelihood ratio test -- assuming the intercept-only equation (model 1) is
nested within the intercept-slope equation (model 2) -- is not significant (p = 0.6004
> .05). That indicates that the random coefficient model for polity 3 is not more
appropriate than the random intercept model.

Polity scores in Latin America range from 1 in Venezuela to 10 in Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay;
therefore, the subset of polity score dummies is different than that for voter choice: polity3 (score: 9-10),
polity2 (score: 7-8), and polity1 (score: 1-5). Please refer to table 1.2 for the polity score in Latin American
countries.
17
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4.3.3 Random Slope Model with Correlated Variance
Model 3 is a random slope model with correlated variance. The fixed effects
coefficients are the same as in model 1 and 2. The intercept variance of polity 3 is the
same as that of model 2, and the random coefficient of polity 3 increases from 0.222 to
0.613. The covariance between the intercept and polity 3 random effects is -0.195.
However, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated model 2 is nested within the
correlated model 3) is not significant (p = 1.0000 > .05), and the likelihood ratio test
(assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation
model 3) is also not significant (p = 0.8718 > .05). This substantiates the idea that the
random effect for polity 3 is not significant. In other words, there is no country-variation
in the difference between polity 3 and other two dummies.
4.3.4 Random Coefficient of Polity 2 and Polity 1 Only
Because there is no between-country variance in the difference between polity 3
and other two polity dummies, I seek to substantiate whether polity 2 or polity 1 explains
more between-country variance. Models 4 and 5 are random coefficient models of polity
2 and polity 1. The fixed effects coefficients of the two models are the same as those in
the random intercept model (model 1) with the exception of constant term. The intercept
variance in the two models is the same as that in model 1. In other words, the intercept
variance does not change. In addition, both of the random coefficients of polity 2 and
polity 1 approximate zero. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the random intercept
equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model 4) is not significant
(p = 0.9999 >.05). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the random intercept
equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model 5) has the same result
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(p = 0.9999 > .05). It is evident that neither polity 2 nor polity 1 explains more betweencountry variance than polity 3.
4.4 RANDOM COEFFICIENTS ON A SUBSET OF GDP PER CAPITA DUMMIES
The random coefficients of GDP per capita in models 4 and 5 in table 4.2 show
that GDP per capita does not explain the between-country variance according to the
likelihood ratio tests. As with the hypothesis on the influence of level of democracy, it
surmises that level of economic development can impose a stronger influence on voter
choice. I wonder whether countries with higher levels of economic development exhibit
more variance than those with lower levels. In order to explore this effect, the random
coefficients on a subset of the GDP per capita dummies are estimated.18 The random
intercept model with GDP per capita dummies in the fixed effects is estimated first. The
second model adds random coefficient of GDPH (high income), and the third adds
random coefficient of GDPH along with correlated variance. In order to substantiate
whether countries with middle level of economic development can have a greater effect
on voter choice, a fourth model (random coefficient of GDPMU), a fifth model (random
coefficient of GDPMU with correlated variance), a sixed model (random coefficient of
GDPML), and a seventh model (random coefficient of GDPML with correlated variance)
are estimated to determine whether GDPH, GDPMU, or GDPML explains more betweencountry variance.

The subset of GDP per capita here is different from those in the national economic evaluations. Because
there is no country whose GDP per capita is below $1000 (low income category) in Latin America, the
subset of GDP per capita dummies in this chapter is high income (H: GDP per capita >= $10,000), upper
middle income (UM: GDP per capita $5,000~9,999), and lower middle income (LM: GDP per capita:
$1000~4,999). Please refer to table 1.2 for the income categories of Latin American countries.
18
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4.4.1 Random Intercept Model on a Subset of the GDP per capita Dummies
Model 1 in table 4.4 is a random intercept model on a subset of the GDP per
capita dummies. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as those in the random
intercept model (model 1) in table 4.2, with the exception of a slight change in
coefficients of talk about politics and education. Compared with the intercept variance of
model 1 in table 4.2, the intercept variance of model 1 here decreases from 0.687 to 0.646.
In other words, the addition of the subset of GDP per capita dummies decrease a little bit
between-country variance.
4.4.2 Random Coefficients of GDPH Only and Model with Correlated Variance
Model 2 in table 4.4 is a random coefficient model for GDPH, which estimates
whether between-country variance is the same for GDPMU and GDPML but different for
GDPH. The fixed effects coefficients are the same as those in model 1. The intercept
variance is 0.637, and the random effect coefficient of GDPH is 0.040. However, the
likelihood ratio test (assuming the intercept-only equation model 1 is nested within the
intercept-slope equation model 2) is not significant (p = 0.943 > .05). That demonstrates
that the random slope equation model 2 is not necessarily better than random intercept
equation model 1.
The random coefficient model for GDPH with correlated variance in model 3
shows a similar result as that for model 2. The fixed effects coefficients and intercept
variances are the same, and the random effect coefficient of GDPH is 1.7. The covariance
between the intercept and GDPH random effects is -0.832. The likelihood ratio test
(assuming the uncorrelated equation model 2 is nested within the correlated equation
model 3) is not significant (p = 0.999> .05). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test --
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assuming the intercept-only equation (the restricted equation in mode1) is nested within
the intercept-slope equation with correlated variance (the unrestricted equation in model 3)
-- shows that the random coefficient for GDPH is also not significant (p = 0.9974 > .05).
The three likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that the random effect for GDPH is not
significant. In other words, countries with high levels of economic development (GDPH)
do not exhibit much between-country variance.
4.4.3 Random Coefficients of GDPMU Only and Model with Correlated Variance
Because GDPH does not explain much between-country variance, I estimate
whether GDPMU accounts for more between-country variance than GDPH. Model 4 in
table 4.4 is a random coefficient model for GDPMU. The fixed effects coefficients and
intercept variance are the same as those in the random intercept equation model 1; the
random coefficient of GDPMU approximates zero. The likelihood ratio test (assuming
the random intercept equation model 1 is nested within the random slope equation model
4) is not significant (p = 1.000 > .05). That indicates that the random coefficient model
for GDPMU is not necessarily more appropriate than the random intercept model.
Model 5 allows the random intercept and slope to co-vary. The fixed effects
coefficients remain the same as those in model 4, with the exception of a slight change in
retrospective pocketbook evaluation. The intercept variance is 0.794, and the random
coefficient of GDPMU is 0.137. The covariance between the intercept and GDPMU
random effects is -0.263. The likelihood ratio test (assuming the uncorrelated equation
model 4 is nested within the correlated equation model 5) shows that the random
coefficient for GDPMU is not significant (p = 0.3749 > .05). Moreover, the likelihood
ratio test (assuming the restricted equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted
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equation model 5) is also not significant (p = 0.6745 > .05). The three likelihood ratio
tests demonstrate that GDPMU is not significant, and the between-country variance of
GDPMU is not different from those of GDPH and GDPML.
4.4.4 Random Coefficients of GDPML Only and Model with Correlated Variance
Although the random coefficient models for GDPH and GDPMU described above
indicate that the between-country variance is not different for GDPH and GDPMU, I seek
to verify whether GDPML can explain more between-country variance than GDPH and
GDPMU. In other words, I surmise that between-country variance is the same for GDPH
and GDPMU but different for GDPML.
Model 6 is a random coefficient model for GDPML. The fixed effect coefficients
are almost the same as those in the random intercept equation in model 1, with the
exception of a slight change in talk about politics. The intercept variance decreases from
0.646 to 0.506, and the random effect coefficient of GDPML is 0.354. The likelihood
ratio test (assuming the random intercept equation model 1 is nested within the random
slope equation model 6) is not significant (p = 0.4569 > .05). That implies that the
random coefficient model for GDPML is not necessarily better than the random intercept
model, as is evident in the random coefficient models for GDPH and GDPMU.
Model 7 is a random coefficient model for GDPML with correlated variance. The
fixed effects coefficients and intercept variance are the same as those in model 6. The
random coefficient of GDPML increases from 0.354 to 0.873. The covariance between
the intercept and GDPML random effects is -0.259. The likelihood ratio test (assuming
the uncorrelated equation model 6 is nested within the correlated equation model 7) is not
significant (p = 1.0000 > .05); moreover, the likelihood ratio test (assuming the restricted
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equation model 1 is nested within the unrestricted equation model 7) is also not
significant (p = 0.7583> .05). The three likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that GDPML is
not significant and the between-country variance of GDPML is not different from those
of GDPH and GDPMU.
The subset of GDP per capita dummies further demonstrates that GDP per capita
does not explain much between-country variance. In other words, the between-country
variance is the same for all GDP per capita dummies.
4.5 CONCLUSION
The logit models of voter choice in each country demonstrate that the effect of
information sources on voter choice is quite different across countries. However, the
effect of information sources is not as influential as it is in national economic evaluation.
The media effect only works in three countries, and talking about politics with others is
significant in only one. For pocketbook and sociotropic voting, they are only effective in
one or two countries. Although the effect of information sources on voter choice is not
significant in most of countries, it is still somewhat difficult to formulate a general
explanation of the effect of information sources on voter choice. Multilevel logit models
explore whether level of democracy and level of economic development accounts for the
between-country variance.
The random intercept model in table 4.2 indicates that there is between-country
variance on voter choice. However, the random slope models and those with correlated
variance demonstrate that neither polity score nor GDP per capita can explain betweencountry variance. In other words, level of democracy and level of economic development
have little effect on voter choice.
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The random coefficient models on a subset of polity score and GDP per capita
dummies explore whether countries with higher levels of democracy and economic
development produce more substantial effects on voter choice than those with lower
levels. In contrast to the previous two chapters, in which consolidated democracies and
countries with middle income have the strongest effect on national economic evaluations,
here, none of the polity dummies and GDP per capita dummies can have more betweencountry variance than the others. In other words, level of democracy and level of
economic development have little effect on voter choice. It is evident that level of
democracy and level of economic development influence the two national economic
evaluations but have no influence on voter choice. How do those effects manifest
themselves in a case study of two countries? The comparative case study of Mexico and
Taiwan given in the next chapter further explore the effect of information sources on
economic voting.
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Table 4.1. Logit Models of Voter Choice, by Country
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Country
Variable
Retrospective
Pocketbook
Prospective
Pocketbook
Retrospective
Evaluation
Prospective
Evaluation
Media
Talk
Education
Political
Interest
Edu*Interest
Party ID
Constant
N of Obs
Log
Likelihood
LR chi2
Prob
Pseudo R2

Argentina
Coef.(SE)

Bolivia
Coef.(SE)

Brazil
Coef.(SE)

Colombia
Coef.(SE)

Costa Rica
Coef.(SE)

Chile
Coef.(SE)

Ecuador
Coef.(SE)

El Salvador
Coef.(SE)

Guatemala
Coef.(SE)

Honduras
Coef.(SE)

.29(.24)

.85(.52)#

.04(.20)

.21(.19)

.03(.21)

-.66(.48)

.13(35)

-.17(.41)

-.17(.32)

.16(.17)

-.21(.26)

1.01(.55)#

.17(.21)

-.17(.19)

.04(.19)

.52(.41)

.27(.29)

.40(.34)

.21(.31)

-.003(.16)

.24(.23)

1.57(.67)*

.40(.24)#

-.26(.16)

-.19(.19)

.45(.47)

.44(.27)

.05(.31)

.29(.32)

-.08(.14)

.34(.26)

.69(.64)

.09(.22)

.33(.17)#

.11(.18)

-.26(.50)

.08(.29)

.41(37)

.01(.28)

.01(.14)

-.06(.06)
.01(.15)

-.76(.33)*
-.57(.49)

-.22(.16)

-1.36(.50)**

-.31(.44)

-.59(.97)

-.09(.05)
.01(.13)
-.21(.14)
.27(.29)

.01(.06)
.01(.16)
.19(.15)
.58(.36)

-.16(.06)**
-.08(.17)
.0004(.13)
.57(.36)

.10(.13)
.27(.27)
-.26(.29)
-.91(.82)

.11(.09)
-.13(.18)
-.02(.17)
-.33(.45)

-.07(.11)
.15(.21)
-.03(.22)
-.43(.46)

.-.04(.12)
-.50(.27)#
.27(.21)
-.03(.51)

.12(.05)*
-.06(.11)
.02(.13)
-.47(.24)#

.08(.11)

.54(.29)#

-.002(.09)

-.14(.10)

.01(.11)

.19(.21)

-.03(.13)

.10(.17)

-.07(.16)

.10(.08)

2.88(.29)***
.67(.63)

8.68(2.53)**
7.90(2.81)**

3.32(.34)***
.60(.55)

3.27(.24)***
-.69(.54)

3.48(.33)***
.28(.48)

4.83(.56)***
-2.32(1.16)*

4.59(.59)***

5.24(.59)***

4.15(.52)***

2.87(.25)***

400
-136.81

268
-23.41

469
-161.04

632
-172.84

443
-132.15

514
-56.11

.84(.71)
452
-101.10

-.55(.82)
455
-62.27

-.56(.72)
306
-50.39

.97(.41)*
481
-177.18

237.87
.000
.465

243.11
.000
.839

289.86
.000
.474

523.96
.000
.603

316.35
.000
.545

418.93
.000
.789

336.53
.000
.625

499.56
.000
.801

276.73
.000
.733

298.74
.000
.457

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Table 4.1. (continued) Logit Models of Voter Choice, by Country
Country
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Variable
Retro
Pocketbook
Pros
Pocketbook
Retrospective
Evaluation
Prospective
Evaluation
Media
Talk
Education
Political
Interest
Edu*Interest
Party ID
Constant
N of Obs
Log
Likelihood
LR chi2
Prob
Pseudo R2

Mexico

Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Uruguay

Venezuela

Dominican
Republic
Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

Coef.(SE)

-.20(.20)

.65(.50)

-.53(.26)*

.02(.25)

.02(.49)

.17(.26)

-.07(.49)

-.27(.27)

-.08(.22)

-.53(.39)

.24(.24)

.33(.29)

1.47(.49)**

-.22(.29)

.30(.41)

.15(.24)

.19(.19)

.54(.43)

.28(.21)

.42(.24)#

.93(.57)

.14(.26)

.94(.35)**

.18(.26)

.10(.20)

-.67(.42)

.37(.23)

-.17(.26)

-.49(.42)

.96(.28)**

.42(.40)

.55(.25)*

-.002(.07)
.42(.22)#
.21(.15)
.26(.37)

-.32(.17)#
.94(.42)*
-.40(.31)
-.21(.79)

-.01(.08)
.15(.17)
-.12(.18)
.08(.36)

.0002(.07)
-.06(.20)
-.21(.16)
.09(.33)

.02(.14)
-.33(.38)
-.41(.28)
-1.64(1.13)

-.05(.07)
.14(.14)
.14(.22)
.65(.46)

-.11(.13)
.003(.29)
.20(.27)
.84(1.02)

.15(.10)
-.40(.23)#
-.02(.17)
.28(.40)

-.15(.11)
4.40(.44)***
-1.47(.54)**
581
-117.66

.26(.24)
8.11(1.22)***
-1.71(.89)#
401
-34.21

-.02(.11)
2.78(.25)***
-.01(.70)
379
-109.39

.03(.10)
2.71(.21)***
-.39(.56)
477
-123.52

.31(.26)
6.07(1.06)***
-1.33(1.20)
222
-34.54

-.16(.14)
3.21(.25)***
-.46(.82)
644
-138.31

-.12(.24)
5.99(.84)***
-1.63(1.39)
604
-42.77

-.02(.12)
3.79(.30)***
.05(.82)
649
-95.19

479.02
.000
.671

476.24
.000
.874

306.60
.000
.584

360.20
.000
.593

170.21
.000
.711

527.62
.000
.656

719.98
.000
.894

708.03
.000
.788

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001
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Figure 4.1. The Effect of Media on Voter Choice, by Country
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Table 4.2. Multilevel Models of Voter Choice

Individual-Level
Retro Pocketbook
Pros Pocketbook
Retro Evaluation
Pros Evaluation
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Media
Talk
Education
Political Interest
Political
Sophistication
Party ID
Constant
Country-Level
Polity Score
GDP per capita
Random Effect
(N=8,377)
Variance
Component
Covariance
Log Likelihood
Prob

Model 1
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.01(.04)
-.07(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 2
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.01(.04)
-.07(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 3
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.01(.04)
-.06(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 4
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.005(.04)
-.07(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 5
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.005(.04)
-.07(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 6
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.01(.04)
-.07(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

3.55(.08)***
-.04(.24)

3.55(.08)***
.01(.21)

3.55(.08)***
.03(.23)

3.55(.08)***
-.04(.24)

3.55(.08)***
-.07(.20)

3.55(.08)***
.01(.21)

-

.012
-

.007
-

6.33e-12

2.16

.012
2.87e-15

.687

4.71e-11

.035

.687

173.73

1.65e-08

-1993.44
.000

-1993.22
.000

.016
-1993.12
.000

-1993.44
.000

-19.38
-1992.53
.000

-1993.22
.000

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Table 4.3 Random Coefficients On A Subset of Polity Score Dummies
Model 1
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.01(.04)
-.07(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)
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Individual-Level
Retro Pocketbook
Pros Pocketbook
Retro Evaluation
Pros Evaluation
Media
Talk
Education
Political Interest
Political
Sophistication
Party ID
3.55(.08)***
Polity 1
1.04(.62)#
Polity 2
.74(.39)#
Constant
-.57(.34)#
Country-Level
Polity 1
Polity 2
Polity 3
Random Effect
(N=8,377)
Variance
.542
Component
Covariance
Log Likelihood
-1991.39
Prob
.000
1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

Model 2
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.01(.04)
-.07(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 3
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.01(.04)
-.07(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 4
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.01(.04)
-.07(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 5
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.01(.04)
-.07(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

3.55(.08)***
1.05(.61)#
.74(.42)#
-.57(.38)

3.55(.08)***
1.05(.61)#
.74(.42)#
-.57(.38)

3.55(.08)***
1.04(.62)#
.74(.39)#
-.56(.34)#

3.55(.08)***
1.04(.62)#
.74(.39)#
-.56(.34)#

.222

.613

7.91e-14
-

1.56e-10
-

.470

.470

.542

.542

-1991.26
.000

-.195
-1991.26
.000

-1991.39
.000

-1991.39
.000

Table 4.4. Random Coefficient On A Subset of GDP Per Capita Dummies
Model 1
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.004(.04)
-.06(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 2
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.004(.04)
-.06(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 3
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.004(.04)
-.06(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

3.55(.08)***
-.45(.52)
-.38(.44)
.21(.34)

3.55(.08)***
-.45(.52)
-.38(.44)
.21(.34)

3.55(.08)***
-.45(.52)
-.38(.44)
.21(.34)

-

.040
-

1.70
-

1.49e-14
-

.646
.637
Covariance
Log Likelihood
-1992.92
-1992.92
Prob
.000
.000
1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001

.637
-.832
-1992.92
.000

.646
-1992.92
.000

Individual-Level
Retro Pocketbook
Pros Pocketbook
Retro Evaluation
Pros Evaluation

Media
Talk
Education
Political Interest
Political
Sophistication
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Party ID
GDPH
GDPMU
Constant
Country-Level
GDPH
GDPMU
GDPML

Model 4
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.004(.04)
-.06(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 5
Coef.(SE)
.01(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.004(.04)
-.06(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 6
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.005(.04)
-.06(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

Model 7
Coef.(SE)
.02(.06)
.11(.06)#
.21(.05)***
.20(.05)***
-.02(.02)
-.005(.04)
-.06(.04)#
.04(.09)
.002(.03)

3.55(.08)*** 3.55(.08)***
-.45(.52)
-.45(.57)
-.38(.44)
-.38(.43)
.21(.34)
.21(.37)

3.55(.08)***
-.45(.51)
-.38(.45)
.21(.38)

3.55(.08)***
-.45(.51)
-.38(.45)
.21(.38)

.137
-

.354

.873

.794
-.263
-1992.53
.000

.506
-1992.65
.000

.506
-.259
-1992.65
.000

Random Effect
(N=8,377)
Variance Component

CHAPTER 5
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF MEXICO AND TAIWAN
The previous chapters explore the effect of information sources (especially the
media) on retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation and their
subsequent voter choice in comparative perspectives. It is evident that level of democracy
and level of economy can impact retrospective and prospective national economic
evaluations differently across nations. Consolidated democracies and countries with
middle income have the strongest effect on retrospective and prospective national
economic evaluations. However, level of democracy and level of economic development
does not influence voter choice. In this sense, the cross-national analyses have reached
some generalizable explanations of the effect of information sources on economic voting.
However, the cross-national analyses may have overlooked country-specific knowledge
about the effect of information sources on national economic evaluation and its
subsequent voter choice, which is possibly different from those of cross-national analyses.
In order to explore the depth of the effect of information sources on economic voting and
substantiate findings in cross-national analysis, a comparative case study is essential in
this study.
Although the effect of information sources is demonstrated to influence national
economic evaluation in cross-national analyses, it is still difficult to explain why more
media consumption can lead to either positive or negative national economic evaluation.
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In order to explore the relationship between media effect, economic evaluations, and
voter choice in detail and more precisely, a comparative case study is essential; the
measure of media consumption in a comparative case study is different from that in a
cross-national analysis. In addition to hours or days of media consumption, the choice of
television channels or programs is available in both Mexico Panel Studies and Taiwan
TEDS surveys. The choice of television channels or programs is used in lieu of the
amount of media consumption to measure the media effect in comparative case study.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will analyze the importance of
comparative case studies. The comparative case study, which aims at a middle ground
between generality and accuracy, cannot only contribute to theory building but also to the
discovery of context-specific knowledge with depth (Sartori, 1970; Ragin, 2000). The
Mexico and Taiwan cases are the two comparative case studies I offer. I will also explain
why I choose those two cases for analysis. The Mexico and Taiwan cases are in the
second and the third sections, respectively. The fourth section is the conclusion of this
chapter.
5.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES
Some scholars contend that political science should seek to establish universally
applicable general laws to avoid small-n problems (Lijphart, 1975). Through comparing
wide ranges of cases, generality can be reached (Przeworksi and Teune, 1982). In this
sense, chapters 2 to 4 in my dissertation aims at exploring whether there is a general
explanation of the media effect on economic voting across countries. Cross-national
analyses can provide nomothetic explanations about it globally.
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The advantages of cross-national analysis are that it can produce a generalized
theory across nations and achieve parsimony and breadth of the theory; however, the
disadvantages are that it overlooks the complexity of context-specific knowledge and it is
difficult to achieve the depth desired of the study. In this vein, there is a trade-off
between generality and accuracy. Take my dissertation, for example: I can derive the
general explanations of the media effect on economic voting from cross-national analyses,
but I may ignore the country-specific knowledge about it which can possibly be different
from the general explanations. To compensate for this weakness, I use the case study
approach and compare the findings with those in cross-national analyses. I conduct a
comparative case study to explore how the media effect influences economic voting in
my two comparative cases, Taiwan and Mexico.
The case studies center on a particular region in order to reference the deep and
country-specific knowledge about the region. Although it has been criticized that too
many emphases on cases studies may be deleterious to general theory building, I argue
that case studies have the following two strengths. The first is that, while case studies
may suffer from the loss of some parsimony, scholars can attain more specific
understanding of what is going on in a particular country or region and can develop ideas
on why the development of this country is different from other countries in the world.
Take Taiwan, for example: national identity is always the most important determinant for
voter choice (Hsieh and Jang, 2009). Economic evaluation seems to play a minor role on
voter choice even if it is often not statistically significant. In this sense, case-oriented
study focuses on the complexity of social phenomena (Ragin, 2000). The second strength
of case study is that it can contribute to general theory building as well. Many important
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theories come from case studies, such as Putnam’s (1993) theory on civil culture/social
capital (from Italy), Juan Linz and Stephan’s (1996) theories on democratic transitions
(from Spain), and Skocpol’s (1979) theory on revolutions (from France, Russia, and
China), etc. Case studies that center on country-specific phenomena may also contribute
to general theory building as well, as is evident in large-n studies (Lijphart, 1971).
As mentioned above, there is a trade-off between a general theory and case study.
While pursuing generality, the general theory is developed but accuracy may be lost.
While centering on case study, researchers can gain country-specific knowledge but it is
probably difficult to develop generalizable conclusions if the context-specific knowledge
is too specific to be generalizable. Therefore, scholars such as Sartori (1970) and Ragin
(2000) propose a middle-ground path between generality and accuracy. They claim that
the similar causal factors may generate outcomes differently in different contexts (Ibid.).
The comparative case study (small-n study) used in my research (Mexico and Taiwan)
aims at a middle-ground path (Coppedge, 1999).
I am going to compare the media effect on economic voting in Mexico and
Taiwan. There are several reasons to choose these two nations. First, both had one
dominant party systems before 2000 and have experienced at least two changes of party
in government and in opposition. I would like to explore whether one dominant party
systems in the two countries before and after 2000 (similar causal factors) may influence
economic voting differently under different political cleavages (Mexico’s right vs. left;
Taiwan’s national identity: unification, independence, and status quo). The comparative
case study of Taiwan and Mexico allows me to center on a middle-ground path between
generality and accuracy.
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The second reason to choose Mexico and Taiwan for comparative case study is
that one dominant party regimes may have restricted press freedoms. In Taiwan, three
main TV stations were dominated by the ruling party -- KMT -- before 2000, and the
majority of voters recognized that. The attribute agenda-setting effect was not significant
in the TV news channels (McCombs, 2004). McCombs (2004) argues that the attribute
agenda-setting effect can only take place wherever the political system and media
institution are open and free. In other words, mass media may not have any influence on
people’s national economic evaluations when political and media systems are not wellestablished. In Mexico, the opposition parties had limited access to mass media before
2000 as well; the expenditure of advertising for campaign was too expensive for
opposition parties to afford. In addition, the law for free public media time in 1990
regulated that free media time for each party was proportional to its electoral strength.
Therefore, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had more free media time
than other opposition parties (Greene, 2002). It is evident that the media system is not
open and free in one-dominant party regimes and the opposition parties’ access to the
media are not as equal as the dominant parties’. By comparing Mexico with Taiwan, the
general rule of media effects on economic voting may be established.
The third reason for comparative case study of Taiwan and Mexico are that the
two cases may be able to test the theories produced in cross-national analyses. Testing the
theory is one of the important strengths of case study (Eckstein, 1975). Both countries
have had one-party dominance before and at least two changes of party in government
and in opposition; in other words, they have experienced different levels of democracy.
Moreover, the two countries have different levels of economic prosperity. The low level
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of democracy in the one dominant party regimes, high level of democracy after regime
transition, and different level of economic prosperity in the two countries can help verify
whether level of democracy and level of economic prosperity can impact the effect of
information sources on economic voting.
Since it is difficult to provide detailed and substantial explanations of the media
effects on economic voting in cross-national analyses, the comparative case study may be
helpful to explore the media effect on economic voting. The comparative case study,
which centers on the middle-ground path, can not only resolve trade-offs between
generality and accuracy but also substantiate cross-national large-N studies. From the
experiences of Taiwan and Mexico before 2000, I surmise that the effect of information
sources may not have influenced economic voting since the political system and media
institution were not open and free. In contrast, media consumption may have influenced
economic voting especially when the high level of democracy is reached.
5.2 MEXICO CASE
Mexico is a third-wave democracy which has experienced one-party dominance
and two changes of party in government and in opposition. The specific experiences of
Mexico allows political scientists to research elections in different stages and types of
democratization (Gomez and Wilson, 2006). The Mexico case proceeds as follows. The
first section is the overview of political development in Mexico before 2000. In the
authoritarian regime, not only the ruling party PRI remaining in power for several
decades but also the evolution of opposition parties -- the PAN (National Action Party)
and the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) -- are essential for the subsequent
regime transition. The second, third, fourth, and fifth sections are the 1997 Mexico City
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election and three Mexican presidential elections from 2000 to 2012. The sixth section is
the conclusion of the Mexico case study. I will compare the effect of information sources
on economic voting before and after 2000.
5.2.1 The Dominance of Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) Before 2000
The PRI had been the dominant party which won every national and presidential
elections with large margins since 1929 (Gomez and Wilson, 2006; Greene, 2007). It is
said that the PRI retained its one-party dominance by electoral fraud and abuse of power.
Greene (2007) developed a theory of resource asymmetries between the dominant party
and opposition parties which explained the durability of the one dominant party system
and its breakdown. He claimed that the PRI used patronage from public resources to
retain its electoral competitiveness, and thus the resources disadvantages of opposition
parties made them uncompetitive (Greene, 2007).
Not until 1988 did the situation change. Although the PRI still won the presidency,
the opposition parties won 48% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which was the
highest in history (Dominguez and McCann, 1996). The change can be attributed to the
increased demand for democracy by the mass public in the late 1980s (Mainwaring,
1992). This substantiates the causes of democratization from the cultural perspective,
which claims that civic culture facilitates democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963, 1980;
Putnam, 1993; Inglehart, 1998; Diamond, 1999; Norris, 1999). In addition to the oldest
right-wing opposition party PAN, the left-wing party PRD was established right after the
1988 election. The PRI’s party strength mainly focused on rural areas and the less
educated. The PAN’s electoral strength was based on urban areas with the bettereducated, manufacturing-sector employees, and Catholics, especially in the north and
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center-west. The PAN-PRI competition centers on the north and the center-west, and the
PRD-PRI competition focuses on the south (Klesner, 2004). The PRI, PAN, and PRD
have been the three main parties in the Mexican political system since then.
The 1991 national election rejuvenated PRI’s one-party dominance. Although the
consumer price index dropped from 159.2% in 1987 to 18.9% in 1991, voters were
satisfied with economic policies and free-trade treaties by the Salinas administration. In
addition, neither retrospective nor prospective economic evaluations were associated with
voter choice. Partisanship was an important factor influencing the 1991 election
(Dominguez and McCann, 1996). Although the economic condition remained in bad
shape during the 1994 presidential election, candidate evaluation and party loyalty were
more important factors than economic evaluation and demographic factors. In particular,
the high turnout rate (75%) and the greater legitimacy of the 1994 election than in 1988
had led pundits to predict that Mexico would democratize in the near future (Ibid.)
The PRI lost their majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time in the
1997 congressional election as well as the mayoralty of Mexico City. Although the
economy was still in bad shape, national economic evaluation did not affect voter choice
(Gomez and Wilson, 2006). In particular, Gomez and Wilson (2006) find that people with
a high level of political sophistication were more likely to engage in pocketbook voting
than the least sophisticated people. Mongenstern and Zechmeister (2001) also discovered
that risk-acceptant individuals were more likely to cast a vote for PAN or PRD when they
thought national economic condition was not good. In contrast, risk-averse individuals
still voted for the ruling PRI even though they thought the national economic condition
was worse in the last year because they were less likely to vote for opposition parties,
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which had less experiences in office. Despite the fact that scholars can find what kind of
people were likely to engage in economic voting, it seems that economic issues were not
the dominant factor in the 1997 national elections. Rather, democratization issues
dominated the 1997 national elections. Vote share of the PAN and PRD increased. In
particular, the election was handled for the first time by the independent institute Federal
Electoral Institute (IFE). In this vein, the election was regarded as an open, free, and fair
one and facilitated the democratization of Mexico (Klesner, 1997).
It is evident that economic voting was not salient in Mexico before 2000. As
mentioned above, the opposition parties’ access to the media is quite limited due to the
regulation of free media time and the high expenditure of campaign advertising. Can this
imply that the media has no effect on economic voting before 2000? The 1997 Mexico
City election survey data may substantiate the media effect on economic voting.
5.2.2 The 1997 Mexico City Election
Mexico City is the government of the Federal District in Mexico. The 1997
election was the first direct election in Mexico City. The PRD candidate Cuauhtemoc
Cardenas won the mayoral election, and this was the first time that the mayor was not a
member of the ruling PRI. The strongest parties in Mexico City were PRD and PRI; the
PRD-PRI competition became significant in 1997 (Klesner, 2004). There were three
major candidates (the PRI’s Alfredo del Mazo Gonzalez, the PAN’s Carlos Castillo
Peraza, and the PRD’s Cuauhtemoc Cardenas) and five minor candidates.19 Only three
main candidates are included in the analysis.

The five minor candidates were Pedro Ferriz Santacruz in Party of the Cardenist Front of National
Reconstruction (Partido Frente Cardenista de Reconstruccion Nacional, PFCRN), Francisco Gonzalez
Gomez in Workers’ Party (Partido del Trabajo, PT), Jorge Gonzalez Torres in Green Party of Mexico
(Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico, PVEM), Manuel Hernandez Flores in Popular Socialist Party
19
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Table 5.1 shows that there were about two-thirds of the respondents (66.76%)
thought the national economic condition was worse in the last one or two years, and
45.51% of the voters evaluated the prospective national economy negatively. For voter
choice, neither retrospective nor prospective national economic evaluations were
associated with voter choice (Table 5.4). The media did not affect either people’s
retrospective or prospective national economic evaluations (Table 5.2 and Table 5.3), and
the media did not influence voter choice (Table 5.4). Party identification was the only
important determinant on voter choice. Those who felt close to PRD were more likely to
vote for Cardenas. The analysis of the 1997 Mexico City election demonstrated that the
media might not influence economic voting given that the media and political systems
had not been open and free entirely.
5.2.3 The 2000 Presidential Election
The 2000 presidential election is a milestone in the democratization of Mexico. It
not only ended the PRI’s one-party dominance that had lasted for seven decades but also
invigorated multiparty competition. The economic condition had improved since 1997,
and President Zedillo had a high approval rating because of his performance in regard to
the economy. Table 5.1 shows that 23.81% of the respondents thought the economy had
gotten somewhat or much better in Zedillo’s administration. Despite the economic
prosperity in Zedillo’s administration, the economy was not associated with voter choice.
Although the PRI candidate Francisco Labastida’s campaign strategies focused on
economy, his campaign messages seemed quite paradoxical to the public-to praise
Zedillo’s economic performance on the one hand and to keep himself from neoliberal

(Partido Popular Socialista, PPS), and Baltazar Ignacio Valadez Montoya in Mexican Democratic Party
(Partido Democrata Mexicano, PDM)(Grayson, 1997).
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policy on the other hand. The ambiguity of Labastida’s position on the economic policy
had benefited the PAN candidate Vicente Fox (Bruhn, 2004). In contrast to Labastida,
Fox’s main campaign strategy was to center on Mexico’s democracy. Therefore, the
demand for regime change was the dominant issue in the campaign. (Beatriz Magaloni
and Alejandro Poire, 2004; Bruhn, 2004; Hart, 2013). Because of these factors, I surmise
that there might not have been economic voting in 2000 presidential election.
Generally speaking, voters who were exposed to Television Azteca were more
likely to vote for the PAN and those who watched Televisa tend to support the PRI.
However, table 5.4 demonstrates that exposure to Televisa showed no significant
distinction between Fox and Labastida in 2000. This result conforms to Lawson’s finding
(Lawson, 2004). In particular, Lawson and McCann(2005) discover that there was more
negative coverage of news about the PRD candidate Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in the first
half of the campaign (Feb. ─ Apr.) on Televisa, but there was more positive coverage in
the second half (May ─ Jun.). This had influenced voter choice (Ibid.).
Since the presidential campaign did not center on economic issues, there were
fewer economic messages than regime change messages. Economic issues only consisted
of 12% of the TV advertisements in the campaign (Hart, 2013). Table 5.2 shows that the
media did not influence people’s retrospective national economic evaluation in 2000.
Also none of the economic evaluations (pocketbook and sociotropic) affected voter
choice (Table 5.4). Exposure to Televisa enhanced the probability to cast votes for
Cardenas and other candidates (except Fox) although it is barely significant at .10 level.
This result also substantiates Lawson and McCann’s (2005) finding that there was more
positive coverage of Cardenas on Televisa in the second half of the campaign. Party
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identification was the strong determinant on voter choice. In this vein, the media did not
have influence on economic voting in the 2000 presidential election.
5.2.4 The 2006 Presidential Election
The 2006 presidential election was the closest and most competitive election in
Mexican history. Felipe Calderon (PAN) defeated Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador
(AMLO) by only 0.58% of the margin in the presidential election. Despite the
controversy after the election, more than four-fifths of Mexican voters thought
democracy was important to them, and three-fourths agreed that democracy was the best
form of governance. In this sense, the presidential election enhanced the legitimacy of
democracy and can be regarded as part of an extended and continuous process of
democratization since 2000 (Lawson, 2009; Camp, 2009).
In contrast to the 2000 presidential election in which democracy was the main
issue, the dominant issue in 2006 was the economy (Bruhn, 2009; Moreno, 2009; Hart,
2013). Both Calderon and Obrador thought priming the economy was essential and could
be an advantage to their own campaigns (Bruhn, 2009). In the last three years of Fox’s
administration, the economy had grown more rapidly than the first half of his term.
Compared with 2000 in which only 23.81% of the respondents retrospectively evaluated
national economic condition positively, two-fifths of voters thought the national economy
had improved in Fox’s administration. However, Obrador condemned Fox’s neoliberal
economic policies and appealed to policy changes. Calderon contended that policy
changes were risky (Ibid.). Thanks to the rapid economic growth during Fox’s
administration in the last couple of years, Calderon benefited from Fox’s performance.
Calderon centered his campaign on the economy. He emphasized the importance of
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economic stability and the extension of Fox’s economic policies if he won the presidency.
His campaign strategies successfully activated those who positively evaluated national
economic condition in the last years to cast votes for him (Moreno, 2009).
Table 5.2, Table 5.3, and Table 5.4 show that the media did not have significant
influence on either economic condition or voter choice. The results produced from thirdwave panel data were different from that of Hart’s findings, which claimed that the
candidate can activate the economic vote via economic campaign advertisements (Hart
2013). Hart mainly focused on the influence of exposure to economic campaign
advertising on economic voting. In addition, he discovered that there was rarely
economic news on both TV Azteca and Televisa and thus economic news had no effect
on economic voting (Ibid.). In my analysis, media consumption is the dummy variable
(TV Azteca=1 and Televisa=0 in 2006). According to Hart’s findings, it may be difficult
for the media in general to prime economic voting. In this vein, it is the economic
campaign advertising and not economic TV news that activated economic voting in the
2006 presidential campaign.
In addition, retrospective pocketbook evaluation was highly associated with
retrospective economic evaluations, prospective economic evaluations, and voter choice.
Those who thought their personal economic condition was better in the last few years
were likely to vote for Calderon. Prospective pocketbook voting is not significant here.
However, Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni’s (2009) discovered that the two social
policy programs (Oportunidades and Seguro Popular) proposed by the PAN successfully
attracted the poor who had originally planned to vote for the left. Although prospective
pocketbook voting as a whole was not associated with voter choice, it matters to those
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who were poor and attracted by the PAN’s two social policy programs. Party
identification was also an important predictor of voter choice, as is evident in Moreno’s
(2009) work.
5.2.5 The 2012 Presidential Election
The PRI returned to the presidency in 2012 after they were defeated in 2000, and
this was the second change of party in government and in opposition in Mexico’s history.
The PRI candidate Pena Nieto won by 38.2% of the votes and defeated AMLO (31.6% of
the votes) and the PAN female candidate Josefina Vazquez Mota (25.4% of the votes)
(Lawson, 2015). Different from the 2000 and 2006 presidential campaigns, which
centered on regime change and the economy respectively, the 2012 presidential campaign
mainly focused on the personal competence of the candidates, although quite a few
Mexican voters thought economic growth, jobs, crime, and public securities were the
most important problems facing the country (Bruhn, 2015).
Compared with 2006 in which 11.56% of people thought national economic
condition was worse in the last year, the percentage of people who evaluated the national
economy negatively in the last year doubled in 2012 (Table 5.1). Moreover, 46.44% of
the respondents pessimistically evaluated national economy in the next year. Because the
economy in the U.S. was not in good shape, Mexico’s exports were heavily affected,
which resulted in economic recession (Lawson, 2015). Moreover, around 40% of the
people thought that only PRI could handle the economy well. The legacy of the PRI’s
one-party dominance benefited Nieto’s campaign and PRI legislative candidates
(McCann, 2015; Dominguez, 2015).
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Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 demonstrate that the media did not influence either
retrospective or prospective national economic evaluations in 2012. Table 5.4 shows that
the media can have significant influences on voter choice. Those who watched TV
Azteca (the same coding as that of 2006) were more likely to cast their votes for the PAN
candidate Mota; in contrast, those who watched Televisa tended to vote for Nieto or
AMLO. Actually, at least half of television viewers supported Nieto (Lawson, 2015;
Diaz-Dominguez and Moreno, 2015). Television contributed to Nieto’s victory because
the media portrayed him as a young and reformed PRI candidate. His campaign centered
on both his achievement as a governor and a competent candidate (Bruhn, 2015; Lawson,
2015). In addition to the role of the media, the electoral reform benefited Nieto as well.
Mexico reformed the electoral laws in 2007 in order to shorten campaigns to 90 days and
reduce media effects, as were evident in 2000 and 2006 (Dominguez and Lawson, 2004;
Dominguez et al., 2009; Bruhn, 2015; Magar, 2015). The reforms succeeded in the 2012
presidential election. In contrast to 2000 and 2006 in which the leading candidates in the
beginning of the campaign were different from those on Election Day, Nieto was the lead
in the beginning of the campaign and won the presidency in the long run.
In addition to the traditional media, the role of social media (i.e., Facebook,
Twitter, etc.) played a significant role in the 2012 presidential election (Camp, 2013;
Bruhn, 2015; Diaz-Dominguez and Moreno, 2015). The politicized student movement
known as #YoSoy132 demonstrated its importance because the movement mainly used
social media to mobilize voters.20 About 64% of voters regarded television as their main

On May 11th, 2012, a group of students showed up and protested against biased media coverage when
Neito visited Ibero-American University in western Mexico City. This is the so-called #YoSoy132
movement, which was mainly anti-PRI protests and later became supporters for AMLO. Although some
street protests and public meetings were organized, the movement mainly relied on internet and social
20
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source of political information, while 10% of them chose the internet (Camp, 2013).
Generally speaking, young, highly educated, and leftist voters tended to use the internet
and social media to obtain political information. In addition, those who positively
evaluated the movement were more likely to vote for AMLO (Diaz-Dominguez and
Moreno, 2015).
The PRI returned to the presidency in 2012. Power was handed over peacefully in
2000 and 2012, and the constitutional democracy was more successful than ever in 2012
(Dominguez, 2015). It is evident that democracy in Mexico has strengthened after it
experienced two changes of party in government and in opposition.
5.3.7 Conclusion of the Mexico Case
The Mexico case demonstrates that neither retrospective economic evaluation nor
prospective economic evaluation were influenced by the media. Figure 5.1 and 5.2
interpret the media effect on retrospective and prospective national economic evaluation
more clearly. The y-axis represents the change in the probability of “much better” of the
evaluation due to a change in in the media, which appears on the x-axis. The solid line is
the estimated change in the probability of “much better” in the evaluation. The gray zones
represent the 95% confidence interval for the effect. Neither the upward nor downward
sloping lines indicate the media had significant effect on retrospective and prospective
national economic evaluations. However, the media did exert some influence on voter
choice in 2000 and especially in 2012. Respondents who watched Televisa in 2000 were
more likely to vote for Cardenas given that there was more positive coverage of Cardenas
in the last half of the campaign season. The upward sloping line in Figure 5.3 can
demonstrate this. In 2012, Azteca viewers tended to vote for Mota, whether the choice
media to mobilize young voters (Diaz-Dominguez and Moreno, 2015).
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was between Mota and Nieto or between Mota and Obrador. Figure 5.3 shows that the
media has substantive effect on voter choice in 2012, especially the upward sloping line
represents that watching Azteca was more likely to vote for Mota. The media in general
did not have an effect in 2006. It is evident that the media affected voter choice in 2000
and 2012, but it might not activate economic voting.
In addition to the media effect, talk about politics with family and friends and
political sophistication did not significantly influence economic evaluations and voter
choice. The retrospective personal economic evaluation was highly associated with
retrospective national economic evaluation; similarly, prospective personal economic
evaluation strongly influence prospective national economic evaluation. However,
pocketbook voting was only salient in the 2006 election; voters who thought they were
personally better off in the last year and those who thought they would be personally
better off in the future one year tended to support Calderon.
For all other variables, ideology can occasionally affect economic evaluations,
and it only influenced voter choice in 2006. Those who were ideologically right were
more likely to vote for the right-wing party PAN. Education was not influential in
economic evaluations, but it affected voter choice in 2006 and 2012. In 2006, those who
were better-educated were more likely to support Calderon in the PAN. This conforms to
the finding that supporters of the PAN are better-educated (Klesner, 2004). However,
those who were better-educated tended to vote for PRI or PRD in 2012. The reason needs
to be explored further. Finally, party identification is the strongest determinant of voter
choice.
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Although the media exerted influence on voter choice in 2000 and 2012, it did not
prime economic voting even after the political and media systems became open, free, and
well-established.
5.3 TAIWAN CASE
Like Mexico, Taiwan is not only a third-wave democracy but it also has
experienced one-party dominance and three changes of parties in government and in
opposition (including 2016). The Taiwan case proceeds as follows. The first part is the
overview of political development in Taiwan before 2000. The Kuomintang (KMT)
retained one-party dominance until the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the
presidency in 2000. The second to the sixth parts are the five presidential elections from
1996 to 2012. The seventh part is the conclusion of the Taiwan case.
5.3.1 Introduction of Taiwan Politics and the Dominance of KMT Before 2000
Between the end of World War II and 2000, Taiwan was governed by the
Nationalist Party (or KMT). Although there were two opposition parties, they were not
politically viable. A group called Tangwai (means “outside the party”) appeared in the
middle of the 1970s and became a powerful opposition. The Tangwai transformed into
the DPP in September 1986 shortly before the lift of martial law. Although the KMT
faced competition since martial law was lifted, the KMT could still retained one-party
dominance (Chu, 2010). From the late 1980s and through the early 1990s, there was a
two-party system and the strength of the KMT was greater than that of the DPP.
Nonetheless, the social base of the KMT had weakened gradually since the young
Turks within the KMT withdrew from the party and formed the New Party (NP) in 1993.
The formation of the NP led to party fragmentation in Taiwan. Later on, a number of new
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parties such as the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), the People First Party (PFP), and
the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) appeared in the political arena consecutively. The
effective number of legislative parties in Taiwan gradually rose from two in 1992 to three
and half in the early 2000s. However, the KMT and the DPP, especially the KMT,
became the two major parties in Taiwan again after the legislative election in January
2008. KMT won around three-fourths of the legislative seats, and the effective number of
legislative parties decreased to less than two (Hsieh and Jang, 2009).
Despite the party fragmentation, there are two main political camps in Taiwan’s
political scene. The first is the pan-blue camp which consists of the KMT, the New Party
(NP), and the People First Party (PFP, which split from KMT in 2000). The second is the
pan-green camp which is composed of the DPP, the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP),
the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, split from KMT in 2001), and New Power Party
(established in 2015). Parties within each camp often cooperate with each other in
Legislative Yuan or elections against parties in the other camp.
The freedom of the media was restricted in authoritarian regimes such as Taiwan
and Mexico before 2000 (McCombs, 2004; Greene, 2007). Three main TV stations (TTV,
CTV, CTS) were dominated by the KMT before regime change. After 2000, more
television stations showed up. Some are pro-KMT (blue camp) or pro-DPP (green) camp
(Lo et al., 1998; Lo and Huang, 2000; Lo, 2013). In addition, the economy had grown
rapidly and prosperously under the dominant KMT-led economic policies (Choi, 2010).
Are there any differences in the media effect on economic voting between a one
dominant party regime and a competitive democratic regime? I would like to compare the
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media’s effect on economic voting in different presidential elections, from the one
dominant party regime in 1996 to the democratic regime after 2000.
5.3.2 The 1996 Presidential Election
The 1996 presidential election was a milestone in the democratization of Taiwan
because it was the first popular presidential election in the country’s history. There were
four presidential candidates in the election: the KMT’s incumbent, Teng-hui Lee; the
DPP’s Ming-min Peng; independent Yang-kang Lin (who withdrew from the KMT); and
independent Li-an Chen (who also withdrew from the KMT). The incumbent president
Teng-hui Lee won the election with 54% of the popular vote. Research demonstrated that
two-thirds of DPP identifiers showed support for Teng-hui Lee and that the so-called
“Teng-hui Lee complex” was influential in the presidential campaign (Yu, 1996). Table
5.5 shows that about two-thirds of respondents thought that the national economic
condition was much worse or somewhat worse over the past year. Although the economy
was still quite prosperous before the presidential election in general, the economic growth
became slower than previous years in which the economy grew rapidly (Choi, 2010).
Despite the economic downturn before the election, there were no significant effects in
economic voting. In particular, national identity was the dominant determinant on voter
choice (Wu, 2001; Choi, 2010). Those were evident in the voter choice in the 1996
presidential election in table 5.8. In the voter choice between Peng and Lee, those who
thought Taiwan should be unified with China were more likely to vote for Lee, and those
who thought Taiwan should declare independence from China tended to vote for Peng. In
voter choice between Lin and Lee, national identity is not statistically significant; those
who supported unification were more likely to vote for Lin than Lee given that Lin was a
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firm supporter of unification and Lee’s position on unification or independence was
ambiguous (Tsai, 2005; Choi, 2010; Chang and Huang, 2011).
As table 5.6 and 5.7 show, the media (newspaper) (pan-blue = 1, pan-green = 0)
influenced retrospective national economic evaluation; but it did not influence
prospective national economic evaluation. When people read more pro-blue newspapers,
they were more likely to think national economic condition was worse in the last one year.
Table 5.8 indicates that the media barely influenced voter choice between Lee and Peng
at 0.10 level. People who read pan-blue newspaper were more likely to vote for Lee.
5.3.3 The 2000 Presidential Election
The 2000 presidential election was another important milestone in Taiwan’s history.
It ended the one-party dominance of the KMT over the past five decades. Although the
DPP’s candidate Shui-bian Chen won the presidency, he received only 39.3% of the
popular vote, and the KMT remained in the majority in the Legislative Yuan until the
2001 legislative election. The other two main candidates -- the KMT’s Chan Lien and the
independent James Soong (who withdrew from the KMT) received 23.1% and 36.8% of
the vote respectively. The split of the KMT and the Chung Hsing Bills Finance scandal
involving James Soong during the campaign led to the victory of Chen (Chu, 2001; Hsu,
2001; Yu, 2001; Chang and Huang, 2011; Chang, 2012). Economic growth was even
lower in 2000 than in 1996. In other words, the economic condition was even worse in
2000 than that in 1996.
As table 5.5 shows, 62% of the respondents negatively evaluated the national
economic condition over the past year. However, the economic downtown could not
account for the KMT’s defeat. In table 5.8, retrospective national economic evaluation
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was significant in voter choice between Lien and Soong, and prospective national
economic evaluation was significant between Lien and Chen. Those who positively
evaluated the national economic condition in the last one year were more likely to reward
the KMT’s Lien; those who were optimistic the future prospects of the national economy
were more likely to vote for Chen.
As in 1996, the economy was not the dominant determinant of voter choice.
Rather, national identity was the most significant factor (Wu, 2001; Zhang, 2010).
Although all three main candidates’ positions on national identity emphasized the status
quo, there were still some differences on the meaning of status quo, on policies regarding
the cross-strait relationship, and regarding definitions of the state. Those nuances made
national identity the main issue in the 2000 presidential campaign (Chang and Huang,
2011). Both Soong and Lien asserted that Chen would announce Taiwan independence
after he won the presidency, although Chen promised he would not (Lee, 2000; Chen,
2000; Chang and Huang, 2011). Moreover, Lien also criticized Soong’s policies
regarding the cross-strait relationship, which seemed to surrender Taiwan to Mainland
China (Pu, 2000; Chang and Huang, 2011). As table 5.8 shows, those who were prounification were more likely to cast votes for Soong over Lien given that Song was a firm
supporter of unification. However, national identity was not significant between Chen
and Lien. Those who voted for Chen were probably engaged in strategic voting to prevent
Soong from being elected by deserting the hopeless candidate Lien (Chang and Huang,
2011).21

After the 1996 presidential election, Teng-hui Lee’s position on national identity changed from prounification toward pro-independence. He proposed “Two State Theory” which defined cross-strait
relationship was the special relationship between two nations (Taiwan vs. China). His KMT membership
was suspended by the KMT after the 2000 presidential election because he was suspected to assist Chen
21
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As tables 5.6 and 5.7 show, the media (pan-blue = 1, pan-green = 0) did not affect
either retrospective or prospective national economic evaluation in 2000. Nevertheless,
the media influenced voter choice both between Lien and Soong and between Lien and
Chen. Those who watched pan-blue TV stations were more likely to vote for Lien both
between Lien and Soong and between Lien and Chen.
5.3.4 The 2004 Presidential Election
There were only two presidential candidates that represented pan-blue and pangreen camps in the 2004 presidential election. The KMT candidate Chan Lien led the
pan-blue ticket again. The leader of the PFP, James Soong, cooperated with the KMT and
was the vice-presidential candidate of the KMT.22 The incumbent President Shui-bian
Chen, seeking reelection, represented the pan-green camp. Despite extraordinary
economic recession and political chaos during Chen’s first administration, he won the
presidency by a bare margin of 0.22% (Choi, 2010).
Similar to the situation in the 2000 election, national identity, not the economy,
dominated the campaign (Choi, 2010; Chang, 2010; Chang and Huang, 2011). In both the
pan-blue and pan-green camps, issues of national identity were not too much different
from in 2000. The pan-blue camp emphasized the importance of the status quo and
argued for reconciliation between Taiwan and China. It also attacked Chen’s intention to
declare Taiwan independent again. Although pan-green camp claimed the status quo as
well, they asserted that the cross-relationship was a special relationship between two
nations. In other words, both camps had different definitions of the status quo (Chang and
Huang, 2011). As table 5.8 shows, retrospective national economic evaluation did not
and abandon Lien secretly (Chang and Huang, 2011).
22
James Soong established the PFP shortly after the 2000 presidential election and was the leader of the
PFP.
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influence voter choice; rather, national identity was influential. Although table 5.5 shows
that there was 34.89% of the respondents thought national economy was worse in the last
one year, a majority of voters seemed to attribute the economic downturn to a global
economic recession, as claimed by the DPP, rather than mismanagement in Chen’s
administration (Chuang, 2008). Those who were pro-unification or who preferred the
status quo tended to vote for Lien; those who were pro-independence were more likely to
vote for Chen. In particular, prospective national economic evaluation affected voter
choice. Those who thought national economic conditions would be better in the future
were more likely to cast votes for Chen.
In table 5.6 and 5.7, neither retrospective nor prospective national economic
evaluation was influenced by the media (newspaper) (pan-blue = 0, pan-green = 1) in
2004. The media (newspaper) did not influence voter choice either (see table 5.8). In this
sense, the media effect on economic voting was not significant in 2004.
5.3.5 The 2008 Presidential Election
The 2008 presidential election is another significant milestone in Taiwan’s history.
There were only two presidential candidates; one was the KMT’s Ying-jeou Ma and the
other the DPP’s Frank Hsieh. Ying-jeou Ma won the presidency with 58.45% of the vote.
Taiwan experienced a second change of party in government and in opposition in 2008
and nearly approached the stage of democratic consolidation (Liu, Cheng, and Chen,
2009).
A total of 66.67% of voters thought national economic conditions were worse,
and only 3.07% thought they were better over the past year (see table 5.5). Actually the
global financial tsunami (or global credit crunch) that happened in 2007-2008 had caused
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an economic depression in Taiwan. GDP growth was 4.4% in 2007, but decreasing
exports reduced GDP growth to 0.12% in 2008. The unemployment rate was below 4% in
2007, but it had risen to 5.75% in 2008 (Niou and Lacy, 2012). Although two-thirds of
the voters (66.67%) evaluated the national economy over the past year negatively and
both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations were individually
significant, national identity had the larger substantive effect on voter choice according to
the predicted probability.23 Similar to the previous presidential elections, national identity
was the dominant determinant of voter choice (Ibid.). Those who were pro-independence
were more likely to vote for Hsieh, and those who were pro-unification or who favored
the status quo tended to vote for Ma.
Media consumption (pan-blue = 0, pan-green = 1) affected both national
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations (table 5.6 and 5.7). Those
who watched pan-green television channels were more likely to evaluate both
retrospective and prospective national economic conditions positively. In contrast, panblue TV station viewers tended to evaluate negatively. In addition, the media influenced
voter choice as well (see table 5.8). Those who watched pan-blue TV stations were more
likely to vote for Ma; the pan-green TV station viewers tended to cast votes for Hsieh.
5.3.6 The 2012 Presidential Election
There were three presidential candidates in 2012 presidential election. The
incumbent Ying-jeou Ma ran for reelection. The DPP candidate was the chairman, Miss
There is a problem of endogeneity between retrospective national economic evaluation and voter choice.
The survey was conducted after President Ying-jeou Ma assumed the presidency and the respondents had
known who the new president was. Voters might think national economic condition was better in the last
year if their ideal candidate was elected; they might evaluated national economic condition in the last year
negatively if their favorite candidate was defeated. Therefore, the statistical result seemed to contradict the
theory: those who thought national economic condition was better in the last year were more likely to vote
for Ying-jeou Ma (Wu and Lin, 2012).
23
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Ing-wen Tsai, and James Soong led the PFP ticket. Although the global credit crunch had
affected national economic conditions in Ying-jeou Ma’s first term and people were not
satisfied with his overall performance, he won reelection with 51.6% of the vote while
Ing-wen Tsai received 45.63% and James Soong only 2.77% (Cheng, 2014). 24 The
candidate factor, including candidate image and past performance, was the important
factor on voter choice. The empirical data demonstrated that Ma’s candidate image was
more favored by voters than Tsai’s, and his cross-strait policies were evaluated positively.
In contrast, voters thought Tsai did not have many political experience and she was
heavily influenced by the DPP’s image of corruption (Ibid.).
A total of 43.82% of respondents evaluated national economic conditions over the
past year negatively (table 5.5). However, table 5.8 shows that retrospective national
economic evaluation was not influential on voter choice; only prospective national
economic evaluation was significant. Neither retrospective nor prospective pocketbook
voting was significant. Again, national identity was the important determinant on voter
choice in addition to party identification. People who preferred the status quo or
unification were more likely to cast votes for Ma.
The media (pan-blue = 1, pan-green = 0) could influence both retrospective and
prospective national economic evaluations (table 5.6 and 5.7). Watching pan-blue
television stations was more likely to the positive evaluation of retrospective and
prospective national economic conditions; in contrast, pan-green channel viewers tended
to evaluate both retrospective and prospective national economic conditions negatively.
Moreover, the media could also influence voter choice (see table 5.8). Voters who

24

James Soong’s votes were few and was dropped in the statistical analysis.
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watched pan-blue television stations were more likely to vote for Ma, and those who
watched pan-green television stations tended to vote for Tsai.
5.3.7 Conclusion of the Taiwan Case
The media effect did not exert significant influence on retrospective national
economic evaluation in 2000 and 2004 presidential election. The effect turned out to be
influential in 1996, 2008, and 2012. While watching the TV stations that were favorable
to the ruling party (the DPP in 2008 and the KMT in 2012), respondents were more likely
to think national economic conditions were better over the past year. The downward
sloping line in 2008 and upward sloping line in 2012 in figure 5.4 can indicate this. In
prospective economic evaluation, the media effect exerted influence in 2008 and 2012.
While viewing the TV stations favorable to the ruling party, voters were more likely to
think national economic condition would be better one year from the present. The same
as retrospective national economic evaluation, the downward sloping line in 2008 and
upward sloping line in 2012 in figure 5.5 can demonstrate the effects. For voter choice,
the media effect exerted influence in 2000, 2008, and 2012. While watching pro-ruling
party TV stations (the KMT in 2000 and 2012, and the DPP in 2008), respondents tended
to vote for the ruling party’s candidate and vice versa. The downward sloping line in
2000 and the upward sloping line in 2008 and 2012 in figure 5.6 substantiate that those
who viewed pro-ruling party TV channels were more likely to cast their votes for the
ruling party. The results confirm that the choice of media (especially TV news channels)
is highly associated with voter choice (Lo, 2013). Although the media system and
political system were nearly competitive in 1996 and 2000 and the media effect might
matter occasionally, the media effect on economic voting was most significant in 2008
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and 2012, in which Taiwan had experienced two changes of party in government and in
opposition. The media effect on economic voting in Taiwan substantiates that the
attribute agenda-setting effect and its consequence could have substantial effect in
entirely open and free political and media systems.
In addition to the media effect, both the retrospective and prospective pocketbook
evaluations can strongly affect both retrospective and prospective national economic
evaluations and it has produced the strongest influence while holding other variables
constant. However, none of presidential elections showed that pocketbook voting was
significant. Moreover, retrospective national economic evaluation was not significant in
presidential elections in 2004 and 2012. Prospective national economic evaluation was
significant from 1996 to 2012. Party identification is the second influential determinant
on both economic evaluations. Voters were more likely to evaluate national economic
evaluation positively if the party they felt closet to was the ruling party; they tended to
evaluate national economy negatively if they were supporters of the opposition party.
Party identification is the most significant factor on voter choice. In particular, national
identity is the second significant determinant on voter choice. Except in 2004, the
predicted probability showed that national identity was more influential than either
retrospective or prospective national economic evaluation. This conforms to the study of
economic voting in Taiwan that national identity has been the most important
determinant on voter choice.
For all other variables, education is not always significant in both national
economic evaluations and voter choice. Political sophistication did not influence either
economic evaluations or voter choice. One of the reasons may be that the items of
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political sophistication in Taiwan were very easy for respondents to answer correctly and
it is difficult to explore the importance of it (Gomez and Wilson, 2006). Talk about
politics only showed influences on retrospective national economic evaluation in 2000
and 2004 elections. It was not influential either on prospective national economic
evaluation or voter choice. It implies that discussion about politics with others may
sometimes impact retrospective national economic evaluation.
In conclusion, the media effect on economic voting was most influential in 2008
and 2012, when the political and media systems were well established. What one needs to
pay attention to is that the question of the media in 1996 and 2004 were newspapers and
the others were TV stations. Wang (2013) examined Taiwan Social Change Survey
(TSCS) data from 1993 to 2003 and found that people’s patterns of media use were
changing. The use of traditional media (newspapers, radio, and magazines) was declining
and the use of TV and internet were increasing. As there were fewer and fewer people
reading hard copies of newspapers and more people reading online newspapers and
watching TV, does this trend really have impact on economic voting? Or do different
types of media have different influence on economic voting? This question deserves
further exploration in the future.
5.4 CONCLUSION OF COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
Both Mexico and Taiwan have had similar trajectories of democratization: the
dominant ruling party in power for decades and experiencing at least two changes of
party in government and in opposition. Nevertheless, the media effects on economic
voting are different. In Mexico, the media affected voter choice in 2000 and 2012, but it
influenced neither retrospective nor prospective national economic evaluations even
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during the time when the media and political systems were open and free. Therefore, the
media effect on economic voting is not that significant in Mexico. In Taiwan, the media
influenced voter choice in 2000, 2008, and 2012. The media also affected both
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations in 2008 and 2012. In this
sense, the media activated economic voting especially in 2008 and 2012 when the media
and the political systems were well-established. The media effect on national economic
evaluation is more influential in Taiwan than in Mexico, given that Taiwan has a higher
level of democracy (the polity score of Mexico and Taiwan are 8 and 10 in 2012
respectively). The comparative case study of Mexico and Taiwan substantiates that
consolidated democracies can have stronger effect on national economic evaluation than
those with lower level of democracy. However, the comparative case study does not
conform to the finding that countries with middle income have the strongest effect on
national economic evaluation given that Mexico belongs to the middle income group.
Although level of democracy and level of economic development do not have effect on
voter choice, the 2012 presidential elections in both countries show that media can affect
voter choice, especially in the situation when the political system and media system had
become more open and free.
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Table 5.1. The Breakdown of the Retrospective and Prospective National Economic Evaluation in Mexico (1997-2012)
Year

1997

2000

2006

2012

Retrospective

Prospective

Retrospective

Prospective

Retrospective

Prospective

Retrospective

Prospective

144(39.56%)

-

128(11.08%)

-

103(5.34%)

74(4.15%)

16(1.49%)

56(5.62%)

99(27.2%)

157(45.51%)

230(19.91%)

-

120(6.22%)

135(7.57%)

233(21.76%)

407(40.82%)

The same

64(17.58%)

126(36.52%)

522(45.19%)

-

911(47.2%)

916(51.37%)

431(40.24%)

309(30.99%)

Somewhat

42(11.54%)

62(17.97%)

259(22.42%)

-

640(33.16%)

535(30.01%)

223(20.82%)

170(17.05%)

better
Much

15(4.12%)

-

16(1.39%)

-

156(8.08%)

123(6.90%)

168(15.69%)

55(5.52%)

364(100%)

345(100%)

1,155(100%)

-

1930(100%)

1,783(100%)

1,071(100%)

997(100%)

Much
worse
Somewhat
worse
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better
Total

Table 5.2. The Ordered Logit Models of Retrospective Economic Evaluation in Mexico Elections (1997-2012)
Year

1997

2000

2006

2012

Coef.(SE)

△

Coef. (SE)

△

Coef. (SE)

△

Coef. (SE)

△

Retro Pocketbook

.57(.14)***

.11(.05)

1.04(.09)***

.08(.02)

1.87(.12)***

.36(.05)

1.45(.09)***

.56(.04)

Pros Pocketbook

.08(.20)

-

.19(.10)*

.01(.01)

-.03(.08)

Talk

.02(.13)

.05(.06)

.0001(.07)

-.09(.06)

Media

.21(.32)

.03(.14)

-.17(.15)

.03(.08)

Ideology

.18(.08)*

.002(.02)

.13(.04)**

Education

.03(.15)

.06(.07)

-.10(.08)

Variable

-.05(.05)
.05(.06)
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.01(.01)

-.42(.23)#

-.01(.003)

.02(.19)

-.35(.51)

.47(.23)*

.01(.003)

.77(.21)***

.02(.01)

-.73(.21)**

-.49(.40)

.14(.29)

-.91(.21)***

-.01(.004)

.09(.21)

-

-.07(.08)

.06(.10)

-

-

-1.10(.57)#

PAN
PRD

-.02(.01)

-.05(.01)

170

768

806

831

-226.79

-919.01

-734.65

-964.50

LR chi2

30.90

188.29

558.65

367.5

Prob

.0003

.000

.000

.000

Pseudo R2

.064

.093

.2755

.16

N of Obs
Log Likelihood

1.
2.
3.
4.

.02(.01)

.84(.25)**

PRI

Sophistication

.04(.02)

#p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001; Predicted probability and standard error (SE)
The choice of the congressional candidate of the party was used for party identification in 1997.
Questions of prospective personal economic evaluation was not asked in 2000 election.
Questions of political sophistication were not asked in the 1997 and 2012 elections.
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Figure 5.1. The Effect of the Media on Retrospective National Economic Evaluation in Mexico’s Elections (1997-2012)

Table 5.3 The Ordered Logit Models of Prospective Economic Evaluation in Mexico Elections (1997-2012)
Year
Variable

1997

2006

Coef.(SE)

Retro Pocketbook

.14(.14)

Pros Pocketbook

1.52(.25)***

△
.32(.05)

2012

Coef. (SE)

△

Coef. (SE)

.37(.10)***

.03(.01)

-.06(.08)

1.86(.11)***

.33(.04)

-2.79(.13)***

△
-.70(.05)

135

Talk

-.03(.14)

-.10(.07)

-.04(.07)

Media

-.45(.35)

-.18(.16)

-.005(.09)

Ideology

-.03(.09)

.11(.05)*

.01(.01)

-.07(.05)

Education

-.31(.16)#

-.16(.08)#

-.01(.01)

.13(.07)#

.002(.001)

PRI

-.19(.63)

.003(.23)

-.73(.22)**

-.003(.001)

PAN

-.25(.58)

.30(.21)

.06(.23)

PRD

-.20(.45)

-.20(.21)

.10(.23)

-

.10(.10)

-

Sophistication

-.18(.10)

166

783

805

-148.40

-747.51

-681.56

LR chi2

49.83

465.73

841.42

Prob

.000

.000

.000

Pseudo R2

.1437

.238

.38

N of Obs
Log Likelihood

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001
2. △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE)
3. Questions of political sophistication were not asked in the 1997 and 2012 elections.
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Figure 5.2. The Effect of the Media on Prospective National Economic Evaluation in Mexico’s Elections (1997-2012)

Table 5.4 The Voter Choice of Mexico Elections (1997-2012)
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Year
1997(Baseline: Peraza of PAN)
2000 (Baseline: Labstida of PRI)
Cardenas (PRD)
Gonzalez (PRI)
Fox (PAN)
Cardenas (PRD) & others
Candidates
Coef. (SE) △
Coef. (SE)
Coef. (SE)
Variables Coef. (SE)
△
△
△
-.32(.32)
.07(.53)
.17(.17)
.18(.24)
Sociotropic
.27(.51)
-.002(.67)
Prospective
.39(.33)
.10(.51)
-.17(.12)
-.29(.17)# -.04(.05)
Talk
-.74(.78)
-.04(1.21)
.48(.32)
.75(.43)# .02(.03)
Media
-.27(.22)
.60(.39)
.01(.05)
-.06(.06)
Ideology
.53(.37)
.88(.68)
-.21(.17)
-.18(.24)
Retro Pocketbook
-.15(.55)
-.96(.79)
Pros Pocketbook
-.14(.37)
-.27(.61)
.24(.14)# .13(.10)
.11(.20)
Education
-.13(.17)
-.06(.24)
Sophistication
23.91(20148)
-3.56(.53)*** -.06(.09) -3.94(.69)*** -.03(.04)
PRI 20.69(20148)
-1.73(1.12)
-.99(1.57)
1.71(.51)** .48(.05)
-.87(.66)
PAN
2.59(1.12)* .27(.16) -15.56(1261)
14.08(585.39)
16.69(585.39)
PRD
1.58(1.83)
-1.45(2.91)
.80(.63)
.68(.79)
Constant
163
747
N of obs
-67.97
-542.95
Log Likelihood
226.00
776.76
LR chi2
.000
.000
Prob
.6244
.42
Pseudo R2
1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001
2. △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE)

Table 5.4. (continued) The Voter Choice of Mexico Elections (1997-2012)
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Year
2006 (Baseline: Calderon of PAN)
2012 (Baseline: Mota of PAN)
Madrazo (PRI)
Obrador (PRD)
Nieto (PRI)
Obrador (PRD)
Candidates
Coef. (SE)
Coef. (SE)
Coef. (SE)
Variables Coef. (SE)
△
△
△
△
-.28(.31)
-.15(.26)
.04(.23)
.58(.23)* .42(.13)
Sociotropic
-.54(.30)#
-.08(.11)
-.48(.27)# -.30(.21)
-.27(.32)
.83(.33)* .74(.12)
Prospective
-.19(.19)
.21(.16)
.14(.17)
.14(.18)
Talk
-.07(.40)
.001(.35)
-.53(.23)* -.001(.09)
-.73(.24)** -.14(.08)
Media
-.26(.12)* -.0004(.05) -.43(.11)*** -.48(.12)
.11(.13)
-.16(.13)
Ideology
-.71(.33)*
-.05(.10)
-.90(.28)** -.58(.17)
.44(.24)#
.45(.15)
-.09(.25)
Retro Pocketbook
.17(.28)
.30(.27)
.10(.35)
.59(.35)# .40(.18)
Pros Pocketbook
.13(.22)
-.39(.19)* -.36(.15)
.39(.16)*
.09(.14)
.42(.17)* .09(.13)
Education
-.41(.26)
.23(.23)
Sophistication
.62(.10)
-1.08(.53)* -.49(.08) 3.71(.55)***
.58(.05)
1.17(.63)# -.34(.07)
PRI 3.24(.49)***
-.04(.04) -2.65(.40)*** -.50(.07) -3.28(.49)*** -.39(.08) -2.66(.46)*** -.12(.08)
PAN -2.02(.64)**
.63(1.31)
4.3(.80)*** -.11(.04)
2.10(1.10)# -.46(.07) 5.15(1.06)*** .67(.06)
PRD
-.24(.72)
2.13(.63)** .68(.05)
-1.43(.65)*
-.98(.65)
Constant
624
679
N of obs
-235.13
-268.03
Log Likelihood
807.15
914.19
LR chi2
.000
.000
Prob
.63
.63
Pseudo R2
1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001
2. △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE)
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Table 5.5. The Breakdown of the Retrospective and Prospective National Economic Evaluation in Taiwan (1996-2012)
Year

1996
Retrospective

Much

2000

Prospective

Retrospective

2004

Prospective

Retrospective

2008

Prospective

Retrospective

2012

Prospective

Retrospective

Prospective

401(30.97%)

34(3.95%)

180(13.3%)

50(4.49%)

-

-

-

-

-

-

465(35.91%)

122(14.19%)

668(48.72%)

338(30.37%)

607(34.89%)

362(25.07%)

1,218(66.67%)

585(38.29%)

777(43.82%)

459(30%)

The Same

294(22.7%)

289(33.6%)

327(23.85%)

411(36.93%)

670(38.51%)

687(47.58%)

553(30.27%)

563(36.85%)

684(38.58%)

738(48.24%)

Somewhat

114(8.8%)

385(44.77%)

168(12.25%)

301(27.04%)

463(26.61%)

395(27.35%)

56(3.07%)

380(24.87%)

312(17.6%)

333(21.76%)

21(1.62%)

30(3.49%)

28(2.04%)

13(1.17%)

-

-

-

-

-

-

1,295(100%)

860(100%)

1,371(100%)

1,113(100%)

1,740(100%)

1,444(100%)

1,827(100%)

1,528(100%)

1,773(100%)

1,530(100%)

Worse
Somewhat
Worse
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better
Much
Better

Total

Note: In 2004 and 2008 survey data, there are only three choices in the economic evaluation: worse, the same, and better.

Table 5.6. The Ordered Logit Models of Retrospective Economic Evaluation in Taiwan Presidential Elections (1996-2012)
Year
Variables

1996
Coef.(SE)

2000
△

2004

Coef.(SE)

△

Coef.(SE)

2008
△

Coef.(SE)

2012
△

Coef.(SE)
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Education

-.12(.12)

.22(.06)***

.013(.004)

.21(.102)*

.104(.047)

.08(.09)

Retro
Pocketbook
Pros Pocketbook

.17(.12)

-

-

1.46(.134)***

.552(.044)

1.11(.13)***

.08(.02)

1.21(.11)***

1.42(.14)***

.20(.05)

-

-

-

.25(.08)**

.01(.003)

-.13(.08)

Media

-.42(.19)*

-.01(.01)

-.02(.06)

.166(.147)

-.36(.16)*

-.01(.003)

.65(.15)***

Sophistication

-.10(.14)

-

-

.044(.066)

.12(.07)#

.01(.004)

.01(.07)

Talk

.08(.10)

-.23(.11)*

-.01(.003)

.169(.076)*

.095(.043)

-.14(.08)#

-.01(.005)

-.01(.07)

Party ID

.05(.09)

-.10(.05)#

-.01(.003)

.520(.087)***

.195(.033)

-.48(.09)***

-.02(.005)

.64(.08)***

N of obs

545

1,319

895

1,327

1,300

Log likelihood

-607.45

-1706.31

-856.78

-873.59

-1168.612

LR chi2

132.27

17.02

245.13

253.88

388.20

Prob

.000

.0019

.000

.000

.000

Pseudo R2

.0982

.005

.1251

.1269

.1424

△

.11(.08)

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001
2. △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE)
3. Questions about the retrospective/prospective pocketbook evaluations and political sophistication in 2000 were not asked.
4. Newspapers are used in lieu of TV station in 1996 and 2004.
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2004 Taiwan Presidential Election

0

0 Pan-Blue; 1 Pan-Green

1

0
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.25
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0

0 Pan-Green; 1 Pan-Blue
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Figure 5.4. The Effect of the Media on Retrospective National Economic Evaluation in
Taiwan Elections (1996-2012)
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Table 5.7. The Ordered Logit Models of Prospective Economic Evaluation in Taiwan Presidential Elections (1996-2012)
Year
Variables

1996
Coef.(SE)

2000
△

Coef.(SE)

2004
△

△

△

Coef.(SE)
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-.19(.10)#

-.01(.01)

.20(.07)**

Retro
Pocketbook
Pros
Pocketbook
Media

.90(.12)***

.08(.03)

-

1.126(.134)***

.17(.12)

-

-.16(.17)

Sophistication

-.11(.12)

Talk

-.17(.09)#

Party ID

.07(.08)

-.33(.06)***

N of obs

643

1,069

782

1,215

1,197

Log
likelihood
LR chi2

-797.58

-1339.13

-712.33

-1052.63

-1124.94

86.88

43.88

245.89

524.68

265.06

Prob

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

Pseudo R2

.0517

.016

.1472

.1995

.1054

△

.28(.09)**

.10(.03)

.05(.08)

.60(.11)***

.20(.04)

.88(.11)***

.29(.04)

-

.57(.07)***

.15(.02)

-.26(.08)**

-.08(.02)

-.02(.07)

.225(.158)

-.36(.15)*

-.05(.02)

.33(.15)*

.05(.02)

-

-.069(.071)

.06(.07)

-.09(.07)

-.08(.12)

.0413(.082)

-.001(.07)

-.10(.07)

-.01(.003)

.123(.112)

Coef.(SE)

2012

Education

-.01(.005)

.01(.003)

Coef.(SE)

2008

.927(.097)***

.419(.048)

.332(.033)

-1.06(.08)***

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001
2. △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE)
3. Questions about the pocketbook evaluation and political sophistication in 2000 were not asked

-.29(.02)

.63(.08)***

.18(.02)

.01

.015

.02

Change in Probability of Much Better

.07
.06
.05
.04

.005

.02

.03

2000 Taiwan Presidential Election

.025

1996 Taiwan Presidential Election

0

0 Pan-Green; 1 Pan-Blue

0

1

0 Pan-Green; 1 Pan-Blue

1

2008 Taiwan Presidential Election

.25
.2
.15

.24

.26

.28

.3

.32

Change in Probability of Better

.34

.3

2004 Taiwan Presidential Election

0

0 Pan-Blue; 1 Pan-Green

0

1

0 Pan-Blue; 1 Pan-Green

.16

.18

.2

.22

.24

.26

2012 Taiwan Presidential Election

0

0 Pan-Green; 1 Pan-Blue

1

Figure 5.5. The Effect of the Media on Prospective National Economic Evaluation in
Taiwan Elections (1996-2012)
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Table 5.8. The Voter Choice in Taiwan Elections (1996-2012)
Year
Variables

1996 (Baseline: Lee)
Lee/Peng

▲

Lee/Lin

2000 (Baseline: Lien)
▲

Lien/Soong

▲

Lien/Chen

▲
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Retro Pocketbook

-.28(.29)

-.14(.28)

-

-

Pros Pocketbook

.08(.30)

.37(.31)

-

-

Retrospective

-.13(.26)

-.53(.22)*

-.08(.04)

-.24(.12)*

-.23(.10)

.03(.15)

Prospective

-.31(.26)

-.45(.21)*

-.11(.07)

.22(.13)#

.01(.11)

.42(.15)**

.23(.10)

Education

.70(.29)*

.76(.29)**

.07(.04)

.11(.14)

-.33(.16)*

-.25(.10)

Sophistication

.16(.36)

-

-

Media

-.70(.42)#

Talk

.05(.26)

Party ID

-2.07(.33)***

-.49(.08)

1.65(.31)***

National Identity

-.20(.10)*

-.07(.05)

Constant

-2.31(.91)*

N of obs

395

788

Log Likelihood

-288.71

-521.58

LR chi2

284.83

615.11

Prob

.000

.000

Pseudo R2

.3303

.3709

.04(.02)

.14(.35)
-.03(.02)

.25(.51)

-.87(.34)*

-.04(.23)

-.22(.22)
.36(.07)

-.06(.06)

-1.09(.35)**

-.11(.06)

.18(.27)

.55(.12)***

.74(.04)

-2.33(.22)***

.14(.09)

.33(.13)**

.34(.10)

-.08(.15)

-6.68(1.15)***

.02(.51)

2.12(.54)***

-90(.02)

Table 5.8. (continued) The Voter Choice in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 Presidential Election

Year
Variables

2004 (Baseline: Lien)
Coef.(SE)

2008 (Baseline: Ma)

△

Coef.(SE)

△

2012 (Baseline: Tsai)
Coef.(SE)

△
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Retro Pocketbook

-.16(.35)

-.38(.34)

.28(.33)

Pros Pocketbook

-

.29(.19)

-.09(.21)

Retrospective

.15(.27)

-.72(.34)*

-.16(.07)

.09(.26)

Prospective

1.01(.31)**

.45(.12)

-.56(.25)*

-.17(.07)

.71(.26)**

Education

-.56(.26)*

-.37(.15)

.25(.22)

-.09(.24)

Sophistication

-.26(.18)

.007(.16)

-.27(.18)

Media

.45(.36)

1.58(.31)***

Talk

.04(.21)

.16(.20)

Party ID

3.36(.31)***

.93(.02)

2.9(.23)***

.84(.03)

3.26(.24)***

.92(.02)

National Identity

-.19(.08)*

-.41(.17)

-.37(.07)***

-.52(.09)

.17(.08)*

.34(.14)

Constant

.83(.79)

-.10(.64)

-1.74(.73)*

N of obs

609

944

932

Log Likelihood

-113.79

-162.13

-155.92

LR chi2

616.63

934.53

943.61

Prob

.000

.000

.000

1. #p≦.10 *≦.05 **≦.01 ***≦.001
2. △ Predicted probability and standard error (SE)

.28(.06)

1.22(.34)***

.28(.10)

.27(.08)

-.24(.20)

2000 Taiwan Presidential Election

.5
.45
.4

.5

.35

.55

.6

.65

Change in Probability of Vote for Chen

.7

.55

1996 Taiwan Presidential Election

0

0

1

0 Pan-Green; 1 Pan Blue

.5
.3

.35

.4

.45

Change in Probability of Vote for Frank Hsieh

.54
.52
.5
.48
.46

1

2008 Taiwan Presidential Election

2004 Taiwan Presidential Election

0

0 Pan-Green; 1 Pan Blue

0 Pan-Blue; 1 Pan-Green

0

1

0 Pan-Blue; 1 Pan-Green

1

.5

.55

.6

.65

2012 Taiwan Presidential Election

0

0 Pan-Green; 1 Pan-Blue

1

Figure 5.6. The Effect of the Media on Voter Choice in Taiwan Elections (1996-2012)
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This research explores the effect of information sources (media consumption and
talking about politics with others) on people’s retrospective and prospective national
economic evaluations and their subsequent voter choice in comparative perspective by
using multilevel models. It substantiates whether level of democracy and level of
economic development can influence economic voting. The purpose of this research is to
establish a general rule on economic voting in comparative perspective. In this chapter I
summarize the findings of the previous chapters and offers a substantive interpretation of
the major contribution of this research. The chapter also analyzes the limitations of the
research and provides suggestions for further work. First, I outline the major findings of
the research from both cross-national analyses using multilevel models and the
comparative case study of Mexico and Taiwan. Second, I analyze the limitations of the
research, such as the measurement of media consumption in both cross-national analysis
and comparative case study, the problem of endogeneity, missing data, and survey data of
state level. Finally, I present a research plan future work in this area, including
suggestions for improving models.
6.1 MAJOR FINDINGS OF THIS RESEARCH
Fundamentally, this research explores whether there is a nomothetic explanation
on economic voting. The effect of information
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sources (especially the media) and the significance of economic voting is controversial
and varied across countries. By using multilevel modeling, a general explanation of
economic voting in comparative perspective can be established. The multilevel modeling
accounts for the differences across countries. The goal is to verify whether level of
democracy and level of economic development can explain the variation across countries.
In other words, I wonder whether level of democracy and level of economic development
can account for economic voting in comparative perspective. The comparative case study
of Mexico and Taiwan substantiates the findings in cross-national analyses. The major
findings are as follows.
6.1.1 Effect of Information Sources on Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective
Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of information sources on retrospective national
economic evaluation by using multilevel ordered logit models. The single-level ordered
logit models for each country show that media effect and talking about politics do not
necessarily affect retrospective national economic evaluation. It is difficult to derive a
general explanation of the effect of information sources on retrospective national
economic evaluation if only ordered logit model are estimated. Although the multilevel
models indicate that level of democracy and level of economic development do not
explain much between-country variance on retrospective national economic evaluation,
the subset of polity score and GDP per capita dummies show that consolidated
democracies (polity score: 10) and countries with middle income (GDP per capita:
$1,000~9,999 USD) have the strongest impact on retrospective national economic
evaluation.
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Chapter 3 explores the effect of information sources on prospective national
economic evaluation. The findings are basically the same as those for the retrospective
national economic evaluation: the single-level ordered logit models for each country
show that media effect and talking about politics with others do not necessarily influence
prospective national economic evaluation. Level of democracy and level of economic
development do not explain much between-country variance on prospective national
economic evaluation. The subset of polity score and GDP per capita dummies indicates
that consolidated democracies and countries with middle income have the strongest
impact on prospective national economic evaluation.
Chapter 4 analyzes the effect of information sources on voter choice. The logit
models for each country indicate that media effect and talking about politics with others
do not affect voter choice in most Latin American countries. In contrast to the findings on
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations, level of democracy and
level of economic development do not influence voter choice. The subset of polity score
and GDP per capita dummies shows the same results. Therefore, level of the democracy
and level of economic development do not exert influence on voter choice.
6.1.2 Findings in the Comparative Case Study
Chapter 5 presents a comparative case study of Mexico and Taiwan, which is used
to substantiate the findings in the cross-national analyses. Both countries experienced one
dominant party system before 2000 and at least two changes of party in government and
in opposition. In Taiwan, the media influenced both retrospective and prospective
national economic evaluations in 2008 and 2012, when the media and political systems
were much more open and free than before; however, the media affected neither
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retrospective nor prospective national economic evaluation in Mexico. For voter choice,
the media influenced voter choice in 2000, 2008, and 2012 in Taiwan; in Mexico, the
media affected voter choice in 2000 and 2012. Compared with Mexico, whose polity
score since 2000 is 8, Taiwan has a higher level of democracy (with a polity score of 10
after 2005), and the media has a stronger effect on national economic evaluations. The
Taiwan case substantiates the idea that countries with full democracy (or consolidated
democracy) have a stronger effect on national economic evaluations than those with
lower levels of democracy; however, the case of Mexico does not conform to the finding
in cross-national analysis that countries with middle income have the strongest effect on
national economic evaluation.
6.1.3 Major Contributions to the information sources on Economic Voting
From the cross-national analysis, it is evident that more media consumption can
lead people to negatively evaluate national economic condition in the past and in the
future. Also, pocketbook evaluation is highly correlated with sociotropic evaluation.
Talking about politics with others leads to positive national economic evaluations. For
voter choice, sociotropic evaluation is highly associated with voter choice. However,
neither does media consumption nor talking about politics with others affect voter choice.
In other words, the media consumption can influence national economic evaluations but
not voter choice in comparative perspective. In my in-depth interviews in Taiwan in 2015,
I interviewed a scholar whose expertise is political communication. The scholar
mentioned that the media can affect people’s national economic evaluation, but it does
not necessarily affect voter choice (Interviewee A in Appendix L). My finding
corroborates to what the scholar alleges in my in-depth interview.
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The multilevel models help to derive that level of democracy and level of
economic development can account for the variation on both retrospective and
prospective national economic evaluations. Consolidated democracies (polity score: 10)
and countries with middle level income (GDP per capita: $1,000~$9,999) have the
strongest impact on both retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations. In
contrast, level of democracy and level of economic development do not affect on voter
choice. The Taiwan case substantiates that media consumption has a stronger influence
on national economic evaluations in countries with consolidated democracy. Given that a
general explanation about the effect of information sources on national economic
evaluations does not exist, this research offers a nomothetic rule of the effect of
information sources on national economic evaluations in comparative perspective.
6.2 LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH
There are limitations in this research, including the measurement of media
consumption in both cross-national analyses and comparative case study, the problem of
endogeneity in the models, missing values, and survey data of state level. They are
delineated as follows, and suggestions for solutions are provided.
6.2.1 Measurement of Media Consumption
The measurement of media consumption in cross-national analyses uses the
frequency of respondents’ television consumption. Although Hetherington (1996) claims
that more television consumption can lead to a more negative national economic
evaluation, his assumption was based on negative coverage of economic news in George
H. W. Bush’s U.S. presidential administration. Because more media consumption is more
likely to result in negative national economic evaluation in most countries according to
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cross-national analyses, it is not appropriate to directly claim that there is more negative
coverage of economic news unless the content analysis can be done to confirm it. In
addition, in two or three countries, more media consumption leads to positive national
economic evaluation. Therefore, it is somewhat difficult to explain why more media
consumption can contribute to either positive or negative national economic evaluation
since the amount of positive or negative of economic news coverage is unknown in each
country.
In order to overcome this problem, I use a different measurement in the
comparative case study. The variable asked respondents which television news channels
or programs they usually watched, and the television news channels are categorized into
two categories: pro-ruling-party channels and pro-opposition-party channels. The result
shows that the choice of TV news channels is highly associated with voter choice (Lo,
2013). However, Lawson et al. (2000), in the 2000 Panel Study project, mentioned that
this kind of media measurement in the cross-sectional data is suspicious because viewers
may self-select according to their preexisting partisan bias. For example, people who feel
close to the KMT may choose to watch pro-blue camp channels in Taiwan. The panel
data measures not only people’s choice of media and their vote choice when they have
preexisting partisan bias but also people’s change of voter choice throughout the
campaign depending on choice of media. Although panel data is available in the Mexico
case, panel data that interviews the same respondents before and immediately after a
particular election is not available in the Taiwan case. I hope this kind of panel data will
be available in Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS), at which time the
media effect can be more appropriately measured.
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6.2.2 Problem of Endogeneity
As mentioned in the comparative case study of Taiwan case, there is a problem of
endogeneity between retrospective national economic evaluation and voter choice.
Except 1996 and 2012, in which the surveys were conducted before the new president
assumed the presidency on May 20, all other surveys were executed after the new
president’s inauguration. There is more of an endogeneity problem if the survey is not
conducted immediately after the election, especially after the newly elected president
assumes the presidency, because voters have different answers depending on whether
their favorite candidate was elected (Wu and Lin, 2012). Fortunately, the presidential
election survey in TEDS have been conducted right after the election since 2012.
6.2.3 Missing Data
There are lots of missing values in Global Barometer and Latino Barometro.
Missing values not only exist in national surveys in developing countries but also in
developed countries. That is the main reason why some East Asian countries are dropped
automatically in multilevel models. To handle the missing data in the future, multiple
imputation can be done to result in a valid statistical inference and heighten statistical
significance (Rubin, 1987, 1996; Lawson and MacCann, 2000).
6.2.4 Survey Data of State Level
Given that the survey data of 1997 Congressional election in Mexico is difficult to
obtain, this research uses 1997 Mexico City Panel data in lieu of national election.
Although the result shows that the information sources do not affect economic voting in
1997, the election may not be comparable with national elections in 2000, 2006, and 2012
for two reasons. First, the party strength in Mexico City is different from those in other
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areas. The strongest parties in Mexico City were PRD and PRI, and the PRD-PRI
competition was significant in 1997 (Klesner, 2004). Also, Cardenas won the mayoral
election and it was the first time that the mayor was not from the ruling PRI. Given that
PAN-PRI competition centers on the north and the center-west, and the PRD-PRI
competition focuses on the south, using the state level analysis to derive the general
explanation of economic in Mexico may not be appropriate. Second, national economic
evaluation may not be associated with voter choice in Mexico City election. Voters may
not attribute the national economic condition to incumbent PRI in state level elections
such as Mexico City mayoral election since they are more likely to attribute national
economic condition to the incumbent in national elections. In other words, they may still
vote for the PRI candidate in mayor election even though they think national economy is
in bad shape. In order to produce a more convincing result, the national election survey
data is preferred if it is available.
6.3 RESEARCH PLAN FOR THE EXTENSION OF THIS RESEARCH
Suggestions for the extension of this research include measurement of the national
level variables, in-depth interviews, and measurement of the media.
In cross-national analyses, most random coefficient models only allow one
variable to vary across nations. Although there are random coefficient models that allow
both polity score and GDP per capita vary, random coefficient models with correlated
variance should be done in the future to determine which model is more appropriate. In
addition, this research contends that consolidated democracies and countries with middle
income can impact national economic evaluations. Is this effect still significant in
countries with both full democracy and middle income (e.g., Mongolia, Costa Rica,
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Uruguay, and Cape Verde)? What is the effect in countries with high economic
development but low democracy (e.g., Singapore, Kuwait) or countries with high
democracy but low level of economic development, such as India? According to the
random intercept models in Chapter 2, 3, and 4, there is between-country variance in the
national economic evaluations and voter choice. However, polity score and GDP per
capita cannot account for much between-country variance. Probably there are some other
national variables which can better explain between-country variance on national
economic evaluation and voter choice. How about the effect of other national level
variables on economic voting such as political contexts and unemployment rate which
can impact economic voting (Chang and Chang, 2006)? Although this research discovers
that consolidated democracy can impose stronger influence on national economic
evaluations, this research does not examine further whether the effect is the same in new
democracies and old democracies. Are there any differences of the effect in new
democracies and in old democracies? These questions deserve further exploration.
Second, the comparative case study is important for exploring the casual
relationship between the effects of information sources on economic voting. Although
this research discovers that consolidated democracies and countries with middle income
have the strongest effect on the effect of information sources on economic voting, the
casual mechanism between information sources and economic voting is still vague. Indepth interviews can help explore the reasons why this is so. In-depth interviews in
Taiwan have been done, and in the future in-depth interviews in Mexico should also be
done in order to obtain a more significant comparative case study (Please refer to
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Appendix L and M for designation of interviewees in Taiwan and questions for in-depth
interviews).
In terms of the measurement of media consumption, content analysis should be
done to explore the media effect in width and in depth. In addition to traditional media,
social media now plays an important role in modern campaigns. How does social media
influence economic voting? Which kind of media (traditional or social) is more important?
It is essential to take both traditional media and social media into consideration in an
extension of this project.
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APPENDIX A: QUESETIONS OF GLOBAL BAROMETER
1. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
(1) Latino Barometro (LB): Do you consider the current economic situation of the
country to be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or
much worse than 12 months ago?
(2) Afro Barometer (AFRO): How do economic conditions in (country) now
compare to one year ago? Are they much worse, worse, about the same, better,
much better?
(3) Asian Barometer (Asia): How would you describe the change in the economic
condition of our country over the past five years? Much better, a little better,
about the same, a little worse, much worse?
(4) Arab Barometer (Arab): As compared to a few years ago, would you say the
economic condition of [county name] has become much better, better, stayed
the same, become worse, or much worse?
Answer: 1 Very bad; 2 Bad; 3 So so (not good nor bad); 4 Good; 5 Very good
2. Prospective National Economic Evaluation
(1) LB: And in the next 12 months do you think that, in general, the economic
situation of your country will be much better, a little better, about the same, a
little worse or much worse compared to the way it is now?
(2) AFRO: What about in twelve month time? Do you expect economic
conditions in (country) to be worse, the same, or better than they are now?
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(3) Asia: What do you think will be the state of our country’s economic condition
five years from now? Much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse,
much worse.
(4) Arab: Thinking about the next few years, do you think the economic condition
of the country will become much better, better, remain the same, become
worse, or much worse?
Answer: 1 Much worse; 2 A little worse; 3 About the same; 4 A little better; 5
Much better
3. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation
(1) LB: Do you consider your economic situation and that of your family to be
much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than
12 months ago?
(2) AFRO: When you look at your life today, how satisfied do you feel compared
with five years ago? Much less satisfied, slightly less satisfied, about the same,
slightly more satisfied, much more satisfied?
(3) Asia: How would you compare the current economic condition of your family
with what it was five years ago? Much better, a little better, about the same, a
little worse, much worse?
(4) Arab: As compared to a few years ago, how is the economic condition of your
household today? Would you say it has become much better, better, remained
the same, become worse, or much worse?
Answer: 1 Much worse now; 2 A little worse now; 3 About the same; 4 A little
better now; 5 Much better now
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4. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation
(1) LB: And in the next 12 months, do you think that your economic situation and
that of your family will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little
worse or much worse compared to the way it is now?
(2) AFRO: When you look forward at your life’s prospects, how satisfied do you
expect to be in one year’s time? Much less satisfied, slightly less satisfied,
about the same, slightly more satisfied, much more satisfied?
(3) Asia: What do you think the economic situation of your family will be five
years from now? Much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse,
much worse?
(4) Arab: What do you think will be the economic condition of your household in
the coming few years? Would you say it will become much better, better,
remain the same, become worse, or much worse?
Answer: 1 Much worse now; 2 A little worse now; 3 About the same; 4 A little
better now; 5 Much better now
5. Media Consumption
(1) LB: How many days during the last week did you watch the news on
television?
(2) AFRO: How often do you get news from television? Every day, a few times a
week, a few times a month, less than once a month, never.
(3) Asia: How often do you watch news about politics on television? Many times
a day, once a day, several times a week, once or twice a week, not even once a
week, practically never.
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(4) Arab: How often do you watch news on TV? More than once a day, once a
day, on most days, once in a while, never.
Answer: 1 Daily; 2 Frequently; 3 Occasionally; 4 Rarely/Never
6. Talk about Politics
(1) LB: How frequently do you talk politics with friends? Very frequently, fairly
frequently, occasionally or never.
(2) AFRO: When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss
political matters? Frequently, occasionally, never.
(3) Asia: How often do you discuss politics in [organization or group]? Is it very
often, often, sometimes, rarely, never?
(4) Arab: How often do you discuss politics with your friends and colleagues?
Very often, often, not so often, never.
Answer: 1 Frequently; 2 Occasionally; 3 Never
7. Political Interests
(1) LB: How interested are you in politics? Very interested, fairly interested, a
little interested, not at all interested.
(2) AFRO: How interested are you in politics and government? Not interested,
somewhat interested, very interested.
(3) Asia: How interested would you say are in politics? Very interested,
somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interested.
Answer: 1 Not at all interested; 2 Not very interested; 3 Somewhat interested; 4
Very interested
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8. Level of Education
What is your highest level of education?
Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2 Incomplete primary; 3 Complete primary; 4 Incomplete
secondary; 5 Complete secondary; 6 Incomplete high school; 7 Complete high school;
8 Other
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APPENDIX B: QUESETIONS OF LATINO BAROMETRO
1. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
Do you consider the country’s present economic condition to be better, a little
better, the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much
worse
2. Prospective National Economic Evaluation
And in the next 12 months do you think that, in general, the economic situation of
your country will be much better, a little better, the same, a little worse or much worse
than now?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much
worse
3. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation
Do you consider your economic situation and that of your family to be much
better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much
worse
4. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation
In the next 12 months, do you think your economic situation and that of your
family will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse
than now?
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Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much
worse
5. Political Interests
How interested are you in politics?
Answer: 1 Very interested; 2 Some interested; 3 Few interested; 4 Not at all
interested
6. Level of Education
What is your highest level of education?
Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2 Incomplete primary; 3 Complete primary; 4 Incomplete
secondary; 5 Complete secondary; 6 Incomplete high school; 7 Complete high school
7. Voter Choice
If elections were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for?
Answer: 1 the incumbent party; 2 the opposition party
8. Party Identification
Which political party do you feel closet to?
Answer: 1 the incumbent party; 2 the opposition party
(Note: This question was asked only if the answer of the preceding question is yes.
The preceding question is “Is there any political party to which you feel closer to than the
rest of the parties? Answer: 1 Yes; 2 No”)
9. How do you inform yourself about politics?
A With the family 1 Mention; 2 Not mention
B Friends 1 Mention 2 Not mention
C People I work with 1 Mention 2 Not mention
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D People I study with 1 Mention 2 Not mention
(Note: The four alternatives are recoded as dummy variables and then added
together to produce an ordinal variable of talking about politics. 0 = never;
1=occasionally; 2=fairly frequently; 3 Very frequently)
10. Media Consumption
How many days in the last week you look political news on TV?
Answer: ＿＿＿ (number of days)
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONS OF 1997 MEXICO PANEL STUDY
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation
In the last two years, would you say that your personal financial situation has
gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 Somewhat worse; 4 Much worse; 5
The same
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation
Thinking about the next 12 months, do you think your personal economic
situation will get better, get worse, or stay the same?
Answer: 1 Better; 2 Worse; 3 The same
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
In the last two years, would you say that the economic situation in the country has
improved, worsened, or remained the same?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 Somewhat worse; 4 Much worse; 5
The same
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation
Thinking about the next 12 months, do you think the country’s economy will get
better, get worse, or stay the same?
Answer: 1 Better; 2 Worse; 3 The same
5. Media Consumption
Which TV program do you usually watch on television?
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Answer: 1 Televisa (Noticiario, Guillermo Ortega, Primero Noticias, L. Doriga,
Abraham Zabludovsky, Hoy, Lolita Ayala, and Notivisa); 2 Azteca (HechosAM,
HechoTarde, HechosNoche, Javier Alatorre, Las siete del 7)
(Note: I categorized the variable into two categories only)
6. Talk about Politics
A. How often do you talk about politics with family?
B. How often do you talk about politics with friends?
Answer: 1 Daily; 2 A few times a week; 3 Once a week; 4 Once a month; 5 Less
than once a month
(Note: I added the two variables – talking with family and talking with friends
together to produce a new variable of talking about politics)
7. Ideology
In politics, people talk about “Left” and “Right. On a scale of 0 to 6, where 0 is
“left” and 6 is “right”, where would you place yourself?
Answer: ＿＿＿ (0:the leftest~6: the rightest)
8. Level of Education
Until what grade in school did you study?
Answer: 1 None; 2 Primary; 3 Secondary/Terciary; 4 High school; 5 University or
more
9. Party Identification
A. Did you vote for PRI for Congress?
B. Did you vote for PAN for Congress?
C. Did you vote for PRD for Congress?
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Answer: 1 Yes; 2 No
(Note: There is no question of party identification in the study therefore I choose
vote choice for Congress in lieu of party identification.)
10. Voter Choice
Who did you for the mayor of Mexico City in July?
Answer: 1 Carlos Castillo Peraza (PAN); 2 Cuauhtemoc Cardenas (PRD); 3
Alfredo del Mazo Gonzalez (PRI); 4 Other/non-voter
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APPENDIX D: QUESTIONS OF 2000 MEXICO PANEL STUDY
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation
In the last 12 months, would you say that your personal financial situation has
gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 The same; 4 Somewhat worse; 5
Much worse
2. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
In the last 12 years, would you say that the national economy has gotten better,
gotten worse, or stayed the same?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 Somewhat worse; 4 Much worse; 5
The same
3. Media Consumption
Do you watch any news program on television?
Answer: 1 Televisa (Noticiario, Guillermo Ortega, Primero Noticias, L. Doriga,
Abraham Zabludovsky, Hoy, Lolita Ayala, and Notivisa); 2 Azteca (HechosAM,
HechoTarde, HechosNoche, Javier Alatorre, Las siete del 7)
(Note: I categorized the variable into two categories only)
4. Talk about Politics
How often do you talk about politics with other people: every day, a few times a
week, a few times a month, rarely, or never?
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Answer: 1 Every day; 2 A few times per week; 3 A few times per month; 4 Rarely;
5 Never
5. Ideology
In politics, people talk about “Left” and “Right. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is
“left” and 10 is “right”, where would you place yourself?
Answer: ＿＿＿ (0:the leftest~10: the rightest)
6. Level of Education
Until what grade in school did you study?
Answer: 1 No formal education; 2 Primary; 3 Secondary/vocation/equivalent; 4
High school/equivalent; 5 College or more
7. Political Sophistication
A. Could you tell me the names of the three branches of government, or do you
not recall right now? (Do not read)
a. Executive

Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned

b. Legislative Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned
c. Judicial

Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned

B. Could you tell me how many members there are in the Chamber of Deputies,
or do you not recall right now?
Answer: ＿＿＿ (500 is the correct answer and all other answers are wrong; 1
correct 0 wrong)
(Note: Factor analysis of the four questions were done and the first factor score
was taken for analysis)
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8. Party Identification
With which party do you most identify? (Do not read)
Answer: 1 PRI; 2 PAN; 3 PRD; 4 Other; 5 None; 9 DK/DA
(Note: I generate three dummy variables for each party accordingly)
9. Voter Choice
Did you vote in the elections on the 2nd of July? (If “No”, go to question 17.) If
yes, could you mark on this piece of paper who you voted for in the elections for
President? (Hand Ballot and Box)
Answer: 1 Fanscisco Labastida; 2 Vicente Fox; 3 Cuauhtemoc Cardenas; 4
Manuel Camacho; 5 Porfirio Munoz Ledo; 6 Gilberto Rincon Gallardo; 7 Annulled; 8
Did not vote; 9 DK/DA
(Note: Choices of 4 to 6 are included together with Cardenas)
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APPENDIX E: QUESTIONS OF 2006 MEXICO PANEL STUDY
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation
Since Fox became president, would you say your personal economic situation has
gotten better, has gotten worse, or stayed the same?
Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 A little better; 3 Stayed the same; 4 A little worse; 5 A
lot worse
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation
Thinking of the next 12 months, do you think your personal economic situation
will get better, get worse, or stay the same?
Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 A little better; 3 Stayed the same; 4 A little worse; 5 A
lot worse
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
Since Fox became president, would you say the national economy has gotten
better, has gotten worse, or stayed the same?
Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 A little better; 3 Stayed the same; 4 A little worse; 5 A
lot worse
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation
Thinking of the next 12 months, do you think the national economy will get better,
get worse, or stay the same?
Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 A little better; 3 Stayed the same; 4 A little worse; 5 A
lot worse
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5. Media Consumption
Do you normally watch any news program on TV? (Yes) Which one?
Answer: 1 Televisa (Noticiario, Guillermo Ortega, Primero Noticias, L. Doriga,
Abraham Zabludovsky, Hoy, Lolita Ayala, and Notivisa); 2 Azteca (HechosAM,
HechoTarde, HechosNoche, Javier Alatorre, Las siete del 7)
(Note: This is an open-ended question. I categorized all answers into two
categories only)
6. Talk about Politics
How often do you talk about politics with other people?
Answer: 1 Daily; 2 A few days a week; 3 A few days a month; 4 Rarely; 5 Never
7. Ideology
In politics, would you consider yourself on the left, on the right, or in the center?
Answer: 1 Very on the left; 2 Somewhat on the left; 3 Center-left; 4 Center-center;
5 Center-right; 6 Somewhat on the right; 7 Very on the right; 8 None; 9 DK/NA
8. Level of Education
Level of education achieved.
Answer: 1 Has no schooling; 2 Incomplete elementary; 3 Complete elementary; 4
Incomplete middle/technical; 5 Complete middle/technical; 6 Incomplete high; 7
Complete high; 8 Incomplete college; 9 Complete college or more
9. Political Sophistication
Could you tell me the names of the three branches of government, or you do not
remember right now?
A. Executive Branch/president Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned
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B. Legislative Branch/ Congress Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned
C. Judicial Branch/Courts

Answer: 1 Mentioned; 2 Not mentioned

(Note: Factor analysis of the four questions were done and the first factor score
was taken for analysis)
10. Party Identification
In general, would you say you identify with the PAN, the PRI or the PRD? Would
you say you identity strongly with the (…) or only somewhat with the (…)?
Answer: 1 Strong PAN; 2 Weak PAN; 3 Strong PRI; 4 Weak PRI; 5 Strong PRD;
6 Weak PRD; 7 Other; 8 None; 9 DK/NA
(Note: Strong and weak partisan for each party are recoded as the same category
to produce three dummy variables for each party accordingly)
11. Voter Choice
There were presidential elections this past July 2nd. As you know, some people do
not have time to vote, or are not interested. Did you or did you not vote in the elections
this past July 2nd?
Answer: 1 Did vote; 2 Did not vote; 3 DK/NA/Does not remember (If 1 is chosen,
continue to ask voter choice; skip to other questions if 2 and 3 are chosen)
11a. For the purposes of this survey, I will give you a sheet where you can mark how you
voted on the last presidential elections, without my seeing you, and then deposit in in this
bag. For whom did you vote for president?
Answer: 1 Felipe Calderon/PAN; 2 Roberto Madrazo/PRI; 3 Andres Manuel
Lopez Obrador/PRD; 4 Roberto Campa/NA; 5 Patricia Mercado/ASDC; 6 Other; 7
DK/NA
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APPENDIX F: QUESTIONS OF 2012 MEXICO PANEL STUDY
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation
In the last year, would you say that your personal economic situation has
improved, worsened, or remained the same?
Answer: 1 Improved a lot; 2 Improved somewhat; 3 Same; 4 Worsened somewhat;
5 Worsened a lot
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation
Thinking about the next 12 months, do you think your personal economic
situation will get better, get worse, or stay the same?
Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 Stay the same; 4 Somewhat worse; 5
A lot worse
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
In the last year, would you say that the economic situation in the country has
improved, worsened, or remained the same?
Answer: 1 Improved a lot; 2 Improved somewhat; 3 Same; 4 Worsened somewhat;
5 Worsened a lot
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation
Thinking about the next 12 months, do you think the country’s economy will get
better, get worse, or stay the same?
Answer: 1 A lot better; 2 Somewhat better; 3 Stay the same; 4 Somewhat worse; 5
A lot worse
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5. Media Consumption
Do you typically watch a television news program? (YES) Which ones?
Answer: Answer: 1 Televisa (Noticiario, Guillermo Ortega, Primero Noticias, L.
Doriga, Abraham Zabludovsky, Hoy, Lolita Ayala, and Notivisa); 2 Azteca (HechosAM,
HechoTarde, HechosNoche, Javier Alatorre, Las siete del 7)
(Note: This is an open-ended question. I categorized all answers into two categories only)
6. Talk about Politics
How often do you talk about politics with other people?
Answer: 1 Daily; 2 Several times a week; 3 Several times a month; 4 Rarely; 5
Never
7. Ideology
In politics, do you consider yourself to be on the left, the right, or in the center?
Answer: 1 Very left; 2 Somewhat left; 3 Center-left; 4 Center-center; 5 Centerright; 6 Somewhat right; 7 Very right; 8 None; 9 DK/NA
8. Level of Education
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Answer: 1 No formal education; 2 Incomplete primary school; 3 Complete
primary school; 4 Incomplete secondary/technical school; 5 Complete
secondary/technical school; 6 Incomplete preparatory equivalent; 7 Complete preparatory
equivalent; 8 Incomplete university; 9 Complete university or more; 10 DK/NA
9. Party Identification
Generally, do you identify with the PAN, PRI or PRD? Do you identify strongly
or weakly?
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Answer: 1 Strong PAN; 2 Weak PAN; 3 Strong PRI; 4 Weak PRI; 5 Strong PRD;
6 Weak PRD; 7 Other; 8 None; 9 DK/NA
(Note: Strong and weak partisan for each party are recoded as the same category
to produce three dummy variables for each party accordingly)
10. Voter Choice
Who [did you vote for/would you have voted for] as President of the country? Use
this ballot to mark your response and then deposit here without showing me your
selection.
Answer: 1 Josefina Vazquez Mota/PAN; 2 Enrique Pena Nieto/PRI option; 3
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador/PRD option; 4 Enrique Pena Nieto/PVEM option; 5
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador/PT option; 6 Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador/Mov.
Ciudadano option; 7 Gabriel Quadri/Nueva Alianza; 8 Marked more than one option for
different parties; 9 Marked more than one option for Pena Nieto; 10 Marked more than
one option for AMLO; 11 Marked or crossed out entire ballot; 12 Left ballot blank; 13
Said don’t plan to vote and left ballot blank; 99 Said don’t know and left ballot blank
(Note: Only Mota, Nieto, and AMLO are included in the analysis.)
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APPENDIX G: 1996 ELECTION SURVEY IN TAIWAN
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation
Do you consider your family economic situation to be much better, a little better,
about the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much
worse
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation
In the next 12 months, do you think that your family economic situation will be
much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse compared to the
way it is now?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much
worse
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
Do you consider the current economic situation of our country to be much better,
a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much
worse
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation
In the next 12 months, do you think that, in general, the economic situation of our
country will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse
compared to the way it is now?
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Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much
worse
5. Media Consumption
Do you typically read newspapers? (YES) Which one?
Answer: 1 Pro-blue newspapers (China Times, China Times Express, United
Daily News, United Evening News, Central Daily News, Commercial Times, The
People’s Livelihood Newspaper, Economic Daily News, Youth Daily News, Great News,
and China Daily News); 2 Pro-green newspapers (Independent Daily News, Independent
Evening News, The Commons Daily, Taiwan Times, and Liberty Times)
(Note: There were not many pro-green TV stations before 2000 so I use the
choice of newspaper for analysis. I categorize newspapers into two categories according
to their partisan bias.)
6. Talk about politics
How often do you talk about 1996 presidential election with family or friends?
Very frequently, fairly frequently, occasionally or never?
Answer: 1 Very frequently; 2 Fairly frequently; 3 Occasionally; 4 Never
7. Level of Education
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Answer: 1 No formal education; 2 Primary school; 3 Secondary/technical school;
4 High/technical school; 5 College; 6 University; 7 Graduate School; 8 Other.
8. Political Sophistication
Could you answer the following question?
a. Who is the governor of Taiwan Province?
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b. Who is the president of the United States?
c. Who is the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party?
d. How many years of a legislative term?
e. Which branch of government can interpret the Constitution?
(Note: These four items are open-ended questions. If answers are correct, it is
coded as 1. If they are wrong, it is coded as 0. The factor analysis for the four items is
done to take the first factor score.)
9. Party Identification
a. Which party do you feel closet to? (If 4, 5, 98, and 95 are selected, go to b.)
Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 NP; 4 All of them; 5 None of them; 98 Do Not Know;
95 Decline to answer
b. Do you feel yourself closer to KMT, DPP, NP, or none of them?
Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 NP; 4 None of them
(Note: The answer of item b. is combined with item a. and the party identification
is recoded as an ordinal variable according to their position of national identity. E.g.
DPP=0, KMT=1, NP=2)
10. National Identity
About the cross-strait relationship, which one do you personally prefer?
Answer: 1 Unification ASAP; 2 Independence ASAP; 3 Status quo now and
unification later; 4 Status quo now and independence later; 5 Status quo now and
unification or independence later; 6 Status forever; 7 Other.
(Note: National identity is recoded as an ordinal variable from 0 independence
ASAP to 5 Unification ASAP.)
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11. Voter Choice
Did you vote in the presidential election on Mar. this year? (If Yes) Which
candidate did you vote for?
Answer: 1 Li-an Chen (independent); 2 Teng-hui Lee (KMT); 3 Ming-min Peng
(DPP); 4 Yang-kang Lin (independent).
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APPENDIX H: 2000 ELECTION SURVEY IN TAIWAN
1. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
Do you consider the current economic situation of our country to be much better,
a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much
worse
2. Prospective National Economic Evaluation
In the next 12 months, do you think that, in general, the economic situation of our
country will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse
compared to the way it is now?
Answer: 1 Much better; 2 A little better; 3 The same; 4 A little worse; 5 Much
worse
3. Media Consumption
Which TV news station did you usually watch during presidential campaign?
Answer: 1 Taiwan Television; 2 China Television; 3 Chinese Television System;
4 Formosa Television; 5 TVBS; 6 San-lih E-Television; 7 ETTV; 8 Chung-tien
Television; 9 STV news; 10 Global TV; 11 Public Television Service; 12 Truth News
Network (TNN); 13 Other; 14 Did not watch TV
4. Talk about Politics
Did you talk about election with others during presidential campaign?
Answer: 1 Yes; 2 No
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5. Level of Education
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2. Literate without formal education; 3 Primary school; 4
Secondary/technical school; 5 Army/police secondary school; 6 High/technical school; 7
Normal College; 8 College; 9 Army/police college; 10 Army/police University; 11
University 12 Graduate School; 13 Other.
6. Party Identification
Which party do you identify with?
Answer: 1 Strong KMT; 2 Strong DPP; 3 Strong NP; 4 Strong PFP; 5 strong
(other party); 6 Weak KMT; 7 Weak DPP; 8 Weak NP; 9 Weak PFP; 10 Weak (other
party); 11 None; 12 Do not know; 13 Decline to answer
(Note: Strong partisan and weak partisan of a certain party are combined together
and is then recoded to produce a new ordinal variable. e.g. DPP=0, KMT=1, NP/PFP=2)
7. National Identity
About the cross-strait relationship, some people prefer Taiwan independence and
some people favor unification. Which one do you personally prefer?
Answer: 1 Strongly favor independence; 2 Fairly favor independence; 3 Favor
independence; 4 Strongly favor unification; 5 Fairly favor unification; 6 Favor unification;
7 Independence once status quo fails; 8 Unification once status quo fails; 9 Status quo; 10
Neutral; 11 Do not know
(Note: National identity is recoded as an ordinal variable from 0 strongly favor
independence to 8 strongly favor unification.)
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8. Voter Choice
Did you vote in the presidential election on Mar. this year? (If Yes) Which
candidate did you vote for?
Answer: 1 James Soong; 2 Chan Lien; 3 Ao Li; 4 Hsin-liang Hsu; 5 Shui-bian
Chen
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APPENDIX I: 2004 ELECTION SURVEY IN TAIWAN
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation
Do you consider your family economic situation to be better, about the same, or
worse than 12 months ago?
Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse
2. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
Do you consider the current economic situation of our country to be better, about
the same, or worse than 12 months ago?
Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse
3. Prospective National Economic Evaluation
In the next 12 months, do you think that, in general, the economic situation of our
country will be better, about the same, or worse compared to the way it is now?
Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse
4. Media Consumption
Which newspaper did you usually read during presidential election?
Answer: 1 Pro-blue newspapers (China Times, China Times Express, United
Daily News, United Evening News, Central Daily News, Commercial Times, The
People’s Livelihood Newspaper, Economic Daily News, Youth Daily News, Great News,
and China Daily News); 2 Pro-green newspapers (Independent Daily News, Independent
Evening News, The Commons Daily, Taiwan Times, Taiwan Daily, and Liberty Times)
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(Note: There was no question asking respondents which TV news station they
usually watch during campaign. I use newspaper in lieu of TV station. I categorize
newspapers into two categories according to their partisan bias.)
5. Talk about Politics
How often do you talk about politics with other people?
Answer: 1 Very frequently; 2 Fairly frequently; 3 Seldom; 4 Never
6. Level of Education
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2. Literate without formal education; 3 Incomplete primary
school; 4 Primary school; 5 Incomplete secondary/technical school; 6
Secondary/technical school; 7 Incomplete High/technical school; 8 High school; 9
Incomplete College; 10 College; 11 Incomplete University 12 University; 13 Graduate
school; 14 Japanese high school.
7. Political Sophistication
Could you answer the following question?
a. Who is the President of the People’s Republic of China?
b. Who is the president of the United States?
c. How many years of a legislative term?
d. Which branch of government can interpret the Constitution?
e. Who is the vice President of our country?
(Note: These five items are open-ended questions. If answers are correct, it is
coded as 1. If they are wrong, it is coded as 0. The factor analysis for the five items is
done to take the first factor score.)
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8. Party Identification
There are several political parties in the political arena. Do you feel yourself
closer to one party than the others? (YES, answer the following) Which one? (NO) Since
you do not feel closer to any party, do you still feel a little bit closer to any party than
else?(YES, answer the following)
Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 NP; 4 PFP; 5 Taiwan Independence Party; 6 TSU; 7
Pan-blue; 8 Pan-green
(Note: The party identification is recoded as pan-blue-1, independent 0, pangreen 1)
9. National Identity
About the cross-strait relationship, some people prefer Taiwan independence and
some people favor unification. Which one do you personally prefer (from 0 independence
ASAP to 10 unification ASAP)?
Answer: ＿＿＿ (possible answer from 0 to 10)
10. Did you vote in the presidential election on Mar. this year? (If Yes) Which candidate
did you vote for?
Answer: 1 Shui-bian Chen; 2 Chan Lien; 3 Annulled; 91 Forgot; 95 Decline to
answer; 98 Do not know
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APPENDIX J: 2008 ELECTION SURVEY IN TAIWAN
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation
Do you consider your family economic situation to be better, about the same, or
worse than 12 months ago?
Answer: 1 Better; 2 The same; 3 Worse
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation
In the next 12 months, do you think that your family economic situation will be
better, about the same, or worse compared to the way it is now?
Answer: 1 Better; 2 The same; 3 Worse
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
Do you consider the current economic situation of our country to be better, about
the same, or worse than 12 months ago?
Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation
In the next 12 months, do you think that, in general, the economic situation of our
country will be better, about the same, or worse compared to the way it is now?
Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse
5. Media Consumption
Which TV news station did you usually watch during presidential campaign?
Answer: 1 Taiwan Television; 2 China Television; 3 Chinese Television System;
4 Formosa Television; 5 TVBS; 6 San-lih E-Television; 7 ETTV;
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8 Chung-tien Television; 9 Era news; 10 Gala Television; 11 USTV; 12 DaAi TV; 13
Public Television Service; 14 Hakka TV; 15 Taiwan Indigenous Television (TITV); 16
No Television; 17 Local TV channels; 18 NHK
6. Talk about Politics
How often do you talk about politics with other people?
Answer: 1 Very frequently; 2 Fairly frequently; 3 Seldom; 4 Never
7. Level of Education
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2. Literate without formal education; 3 Incomplete primary
school; 4 Primary school; 5 Incomplete secondary/technical school; 6
Secondary/technical school; 7 Incomplete High/technical school; 8 High school; 9
Incomplete College; 10 College; 11 Incomplete University 12 University; 13 Graduate
school.
8. Political Sophistication
Could you answer the following question?
a. Who is the president of the United States?
b. Who is the prime minister of our country?
c. Which branch of government can interpret the Constitution?
(Note: These three items are open-ended questions. If answers are correct, it is
coded as 1. If they are wrong, it is coded as 0. The factor analysis for the three items is
done to take the first factor score.)
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9. Party Identification
There are several political parties in the political arena. Do you feel yourself
closer to one party than the others? (YES, answer the following) Which one? (NO) Since
you do not feel closer to any party, do you still feel a little bit closer to any party than
else?(YES, answer the following)
Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 NP; 4 PFP; 5 TSU; 6 Green Party; 7 Red Party
(Note: The party identification is recoded as pan-blue-1, independent 0, pangreen 1)
10. National Identity
About the cross-strait relationship, some people prefer Taiwan independence and
some people favor unification. Which one do you personally prefer (from 0 independence
ASAP to 10 unification ASAP)?
Answer: ＿＿＿ (possible answer from 0 to 10)
11. Did you vote in the presidential election on Mar. this year? (If Yes) Which candidate
did you vote for?
Answer: 1 Frank Hsieh; 2 Ying-jeou Ma; 91 Forgot; 94 Annulled 95 Decline to
answer; 98 Do not know
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APPENDIX K: 2012 ELECTION SURVEY IN TAIWAN
1. Retrospective Pocketbook Evaluation
Do you consider your family economic situation to be better, about the same, or
worse than 12 months ago?
Answer: 1 Better; 2 The same; 3 Worse
2. Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation
In the next 12 months, do you think that your family economic situation will be
better, about the same, or worse compared to the way it is now?
Answer: 1 Better; 2 The same; 3 Worse
3. Retrospective National Economic Evaluation
Do you consider the current economic situation of our country to be better, about
the same, or worse than 12 months ago?
Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse
4. Prospective National Economic Evaluation
In the next 12 months, do you think that, in general, the economic situation of our
country will be better, about the same, or worse compared to the way it is now?
Answer: 1 better; 2 The same; 3 Worse
5. Media Consumption
Which TV news station did you usually watch during presidential campaign?
Answer: 1 Taiwan Television; 2 China Television; 3 Chinese Television System;
4 Formosa Television; 5 TVBS; 6 San-lih E-Television; 7 ETTV;

206

8 Chung-tien Television; 9 Era news; 10 Gala Television; 11 USTV; 12 DaAi TV; 13
Public Television Service; 15 Hakka TV; 17 Local TV channels; 18 Next TV; 19 NHK;
22 EBC Financial News Channel; 23 VL Sports; 24 CSTV; 25 All of them except
Formosa Television and San-lih E-Television.
6. Talk about Politics
How often do you talk about politics with other people?
Answer: 1 Very frequently; 2 Fairly frequently; 3 Seldom; 4 Never
7. Level of Education
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Answer: 1 Illiterate; 2. Literate without formal education; 3 Incomplete primary
school; 4 Primary school; 5 Incomplete secondary/technical school; 6
Secondary/technical school; 7 Incomplete High/technical school; 8 High school; 9
Incomplete College; 10 College; 11 Incomplete University 12 University; 13 Graduate
school.
8. Political Sophistication
Could you answer the following question?
a. Who is the president of the United States?
b. Who is the prime minister of our country?
c. Which branch of government can interpret the Constitution?
d. Who is the minister of Ministry of Finance in our country?
Answer: 1 Yi-huah Jiang; 2 Sean Chen; 3 Chi-kuo Mao; 4 Sush-der Lee
e. What is the unemployment rate of Taiwan by the end of 2011?
Answer: 1 2.3%; 2 4.3%; 3 6.3%; 4 8.3%
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f. Which party is the second largest party in the Legislature after the legislative
election?
Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 PFP; 4 Non-Partisan Solidarity Union
g. Who is the Secretary-General of the United Nations?
Answer: 1 Kofi Annan; 2 Kurt Waldheim; 3 Ban Ki-moon; 4 Boutros BoutrousGhali
(Note: The first three items are open-ended questions and the remaining items are
multiple choice questions. If answers are correct, it is coded as 1. If they are wrong, it is
coded as 0. The factor analysis for the seven items is done to take the first factor score.)
9. Party Identification
There are several political parties in the political arena. Do you feel yourself
closer to one party than the others? (YES, answer the following) Which one? (NO) Since
you do not feel closer to any party, do you still feel a little bit closer to any party than
else?(YES, answer the following)
Answer: 1 KMT; 2 DPP; 3 NP; 4 PFP; 5 TSU; 6 Green Party; 8 Communist Party
(Note: The party identification is recoded as pan-blue-1, independent 0, pangreen 1)
10. National Identity
About the cross-strait relationship, some people prefer Taiwan independence and
some people favor unification. Which one do you personally prefer (from 0 independence
ASAP to 10 unification ASAP)?
Answer: ＿＿＿ (possible answer from 0 to 10)
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11. Did you vote in the presidential election on Jan. this year? (If Yes) Which candidate
did you vote for?
Answer: 1 Ing-wen Tsai; 2 Ying-jeou Ma; 3 James Soong; 91 Forgot; 94
Annulled; 95 Decline to answer; 98 Do not know
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APPENDIX L: DESIGNATION OF INTERVIEWEES IN TAIWAN
Interviewee

Position

A

Scholar in political communication

B

Former deputy minister in charge of
mainland China affairs in Shui-bian
Chen’s administration

C

Former Prime Minister in Ying-jeou Ma’s
administration

D

Senior minister in Presidential office in
Ying-jeou Ma’s administration

E

Scholar in political communication

F

Scholar in cross-strait relationship,
economic voting, and national identity

G

Former deputy minister in charge of
economic affairs in Ying-jeou Ma’s
administration

H

Former research fellow in National
Security Council in Shui-bian Chen’s
administration

I

Former deputy minister in charge of
mainland China affairs in Shui-bian
Chen’s administration
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APPENDIX M: QUESTIONS OF IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS
1. According to the median voter theorem, the issue position of a party is close to the
center in which most voters are located. Take cross-strait relationship for example,
President Ying-jeou Ma’s asserted status quo and Ing-wen Tsai also claim the same
position in 2015. However, President Shui-bian Chen (2000-2008) alleged Taiwan
independence instead of the status quo in which the majority of voters favor. What is the
incentives for him to allege this? How to explain the paradox?
2. President Ying-jeou Ma centers on economic issues during the campaign in 2008
presidential elections. Can the emphasis of economic issues be attributed to the economic
recession? Or is it just an incentive to pacify the identity problem? How does the
emphasis of the economy influence the presidential election?
3. National identity has been usually the most important determinant on voter choice in
Taiwan. It seems that economic evaluation is getting more and more important. Do you
think economic voting will turn out to be significant eventually? Moreover, will its
significance surpass national identity in the future?
4. How do you think about the media effect on economic voting? Are there any
differences before and after regime transition in 2000? Does the legacy of one party
dominance influence economic voting?
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